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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error when 
it found the defendant competent to stand trial? 
II. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error when, 
after the trial court appointed counsel, it allowed defendant to 
act as his own counsel in certain respects, and when it allowed 
defendant to withdraw the insanity and/or diminished capacity 
defenses? 
III. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error when 
it interpreted Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-4(2) strictly, thereby 
allowing a mentally ill (and statutorily insane) defendant to 
discard the defense of not guilty by reason of insanity or 
diminished capacity? 
IV. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error when 
it failed to allow the defendant to represent himself? 
V. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error when 
it denied the defendant's motion for change of venue? 
VI. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error when 
it excluded jurors who expressed a reluctance to impose the death 
penalty or it failed to exclude those who expressed an eye for an 
eye, tooth for a tooth attitude concerning imposition of the 
death penalty, thus violating defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights? 
VII. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error when 
it allowed individuals who indicated that they had formed an 
opinion that the defendant was guilty to remain as prospective 
1 
jurors, thus requiring defendant use peremptory challenges to 
exclude those who should have been excused for cause? 
VIII. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error 
when it failed to give requested voir dire questions concerning 
knowledge of Dan Lafferty's conviction and its effect on 
prospective jurors? 
IX. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error when 
it followed the procedure of death-qualifying and, thus, allowed 
a jury to be impanelled which was predisposed to conviction? 
X. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error when 
it allowed the prosecution, during both the trial and the penalty 
phase, to make statements that called attention to matters which 
the jury would not have been justified in considering and which 
were unfairly prejudicial to the defendant? 
XI. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error when 
it admitted photographs of the homicide victims which were unduly 
prejudicial and not probative of essential facts? 
XII. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error when 
it admitted a color video recording of the homicide scene which 
was unduly prejudicial, cumulative and calculated to inflame the 
passions of the jurors? 
XIII. Do Utah's sentencing proceedings for capital 
felony cases violate due process when the statutory aggravating 
factors, which are necessary elements of the capital crime, are 
also the aggravating factors considered by the jury in 
determining whether to impose the death sentence? 
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XIV. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error when 
it excluded evidence proferred by defense counsel designed to 
establish mitigating factors? 
XV. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error when 
it allowed evidence regarding factors in aggravation/ in addition 
to the statutory factors set forth in the jury instructions? 
XVI. Based upon the evidence introduced at the penalty 
hearing, could reasonable minds have found beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the totality of the aggravating factors totally 
outweighed the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
that the imposition of the death penalty is justified and 
appropriate in these circumstances? 
XVII. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error 
when it allowed hearsay and liearsay upon hearsay evidence at the 
penalty hearing? 
XVIII. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error 
when it instructed the jury that they could consider any evidence 
which had been admitted in the guilt portion of the trial, in 
addition to those admitted in the penalty portion? 
XIX. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error when 
it denied the defendant's motion to arrest judgment? 
XX. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error when 
it allowed the jury to find the defendant guilty of both 
capital homicide and the inchoate crime of conspiracy? 
3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant Ronald Watson Lafferty was charged with the 
commission of two capital felonies involving the death of Brenda 
Lafferty, a sister-in-law, and a niece, Erica Lafferty. The 
homicides were alleged to have occurred on the 24th of July, 
1984. The defendant was also charged with committing two 
aggravated burglaries and two counts of conspiracy to commit 
capital homicide, all of which are first-degree felonies alleged 
to have been committed the same day. (See Addendum, Exhibit 1.) 
The preliminary hearing was held on the 10th and 11th 
of September, 1984 at which the defendant represented himself. 
(P..3) Defendant was bound over, with all charges, to the Fourth 
Judicial District Court for arraignment. 
On September 21, 1984, defendant was arraigned before 
Judge George E. Ballif, at which time the defendant declined to 
enter a plea upon the grounds that the court had no jurisdiction. 
Judge Ballif entered a plea of not guilty to all counts on behalf 
of defendant. (P..63) The case was assigned to Judge J. Robert 
Bullock for trial to begin on October 29, 1984. 
On the 27th of September, 1984, the prosecuting 
attorney, Wayne B. Watson, on behalf of the State filed a 
petition to determine competency of the defendant. (R.64-68) 
Hearing on the petition was held on September ?&, 1984, at which 
time the defendant represented himself. The court issued 
an order appointing two alienists to examine the defendant and 
submit written reports to the court. 
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On October 23, 1984 the trial court held a hearing to 
determine the competency of the defendant to proceed. At the 
hearing, the defendant and his co-defendant, Dan Charles 
Lafferty, represented themselves (as they had at the preliminary 
hearing and the arraignment) by calling their own witnesses, 
cross-examining the expert witnesses and responding to the 
questions of the court. (See Addendum, Exhibit 2, pp. 52-60,) 
The evidence introduced consisted of written reports 
from expert witnesses Dr. Jess Groesbeck and Dr. Phillip 
Washburn, as well as Dr. Washburn's oral testimony, and the 
testimony of serveral lay witnesses called by the defendants, 
including Noall T. Wootton, the county attorney, Wayne Watson, 
deputy county attorney, two circuit court judges, one district 
court judge, and several of the defendants1 acquaintances. Based 
upon the evidence set forth in this hearing, the trial court 
concluded that the defendants were not incompetent to proceed. 
(See Addendum, Exhibit 2, p. 147.) 
Shortly after the October 23, 1984 hearing, a second 
petition for inquiry as to the competency of the defendant was 
filed by Lt. Jerry Scott of the Utah County Sheriff's Department, 
in charge of the Utah County Jail, wherein the defendant had been 
held. This petition alleged that the defendant had been observed 
by Lt. Scott to act in such a fashion that he did not appear to 
be in control of his faculties. (See Addendum, Exhibit 3.) 
Defendant was ordered to the Utah State Hospital for an 
evaluation. 
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Four doctors completed the ordered evaluation and 
submitted a letter report to the court. The report, signed by 
Dr. Van Austin, forensic psychiatrist. Dr. Robert J. Howell, 
clinical and forensic psychologist, Dr. Peter Heinbecher, 
Clinical Director of Forensic Psychiatry and Dr. Jess Groesbeck, 
Medical Director of the Utah State Hospital, concluded that the 
defendant was competent to stand trial. They found that he did 
not suffer from a mental disease or defect, that he had the 
ability to comprehend the nature of the proceedings agair^t bin, 
and that he had the ability to assist counsel in his deferse. 
(See Addendum, Exhibit 4.) A subsequent competency hearirg 
was then held, at the conclusion of which the court found the 
defendant competent to proceed. The trial date was set for the 
first week of January, 1985. 
On October 27, 1984 the trial court, on its ovvn 
initiative, appointed the law firm of Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & 
Esplin as counsel for the defendant, Ronald Watson Lafferty 
(R.135). Michael D. Esp]in and Gary E. Weight, at the request of 
both the defendant and his co-defendant, filed their motion to 
withdraw (R.140) on October 30, 1984 and filed their memorandum 
in support thereof (R.154-167) one day later. 
On December 4, 1984 Richard E. Johnson (hereinafter 
referred to as defense counsel) entered his appearance as 
attorney of record for the defendant (R.196) and replaced Michael 
D. Esplin and Gary H. Weight. Defense counsel filed a notice of 
insanity and/or diminished capacity on behalf of the defendant on 
6 
that same day (P..194) . 
On December 29, 1984 the defendant attempted to hang 
himself in his cell at the Utah County ceil. He was found 
unconscious with no heart beat; he had also stopped breathing. 
On December 31, 1984, a motion to sever the trials of 
Dan Charles Lafferty and the defendant, based upon the 
defendant's January 29, 1984 attempted suicide, was granted 
(P.263). By order of the court, dated that sane day, tie 
defendant's brother, Dan ci'-a/T^ s Lafferty, vas allowed to 
represent himself in his trial, which was set for January 3, 
1985, so long as he followed court procedure and protocol. 
However, the appointment of Richard E. Johnson as counsel for the 
defendant was confirmed and continued until further order of the 
court (P.256-58). 
On Jcruajy 2, 1985 a petition to determine the 
competency of the defendant was filed by the State of Utah 
(R.266). Due to the suicide attempt, the possibility of brair 
damage, the results of the EEC, an apparent memory loss and 
difficulties in motor control, it was determined by the court 
that another competency evaluation should be done. Accordingly, 
the defendant was admitted to the Utah State Hospital for a 
second evaluation on January 2, 1985. This evaluation was 
completed by the same team of court-appointed specialists who had 
evaluated the defendant in November. 
The reports submitted by this panel of experts found 
the defendant (1) lacking the ability to comprehend the nature of 
7 
the charges against him and the punishment specified for the 
offense charged and (2) lacking the ability to either 
meaningfully assist his counsel in his defense or to 
realistically conduct his own defense. (See Addendum, Exhibit 
5.) The trial court found the defendant incompetent to 
proceed and ordered him hospitalized at the Utah State Hospital. 
On March IP, 1985 an additional report was submitted to 
the court by the same panel of experts. The ooctois found that 
the defendant suffered from a mental illness which involved a 
paranoid delusional system which had generalized to the entire 
judicial system and severely impaired his ability to understand 
and interpret reality. The alienists also found the defendant 
suffering from amnestic syndrome, secondary tc encephalopathy 
caused by the hanging attempt, in addition to the paranoia. 
The doctors found that, although) the defendant had a 
factual understanding of the proceedings, he did not have a 
rational understanding or ability to assist counsel or aid in his 
defense, nor could he conduct his own defense. (See Addendum, 
Exhibit 6.) 
Following the receipt of the doctors1 report, a 
hearing was held on April 2, 1985. At that hearing Dr. Howell, 
Dr. Austin and Dr. Groesbeck testified as per their written 
report. The only other witness to testify was Dr. Eugene Thcrne, 
who had not examined the defendant. Dr. Thorne had been retained 
by the State. 
On £pril 8, 1985 the -trial court issued its memorandum 
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decision, finding that the defendant was rot mentally J]l, as 
defined in Utah Code Ann. £ £4-7-28(1), 'as amended, (See 
Addendum, Exhibit 7.) As far as present counsel can 
determine, the court never made any ruling subsequent to this 
memorandum regarding the defendant's sanity. 
On the next day, April 9, 1985, the court, vie a 
telephone hearing, determined that the defendant did not intend 
to further cooperaie v-itb the doctors regarding evaluations of 
his sanity (R.898-904). On that same day defense counsel filed 
an affidavit stating that the defendant wished to introduce 
testimony from doctors who had previously tested the defendant 
(R.519-520). At that time defense counsel also renewed his motion 
to reassert the insanity or diminished capacity defense. 
Defense counsel, at the request of the defendant, 
renewed his motion to withdraw as appointed counsel (R.507) and 
filed a memorandum in support of his renewed motion to withdraw 
(R.496-506) on April 23, 1985. Defendant had been advised of the 
ramifications of self-representation at every stage of the 
proceedings, including the preliminary hearing, the arraignment 
(R.912-917), at the close of the first competency hearing on 
October 24, 1984, and at several other junctures. The position 
of the defendant remained consistent, in that he continually 
asserted his desire to represent himself. (See Addendum, Exhibit 
2, p. 4.) 
Defense counsel's motion to withdraw as attorney of 
record and his motion to reassert the insanity or diminished 
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capacity defense were denied on ApriJ ?4, 1985 (F.570). 
The trial began on April 25, 1985 with voir dire 
examination of the jurors and ended on Kay 7, 1985 with the 
jury's decision that the defendant should receive the death 
penalty. 
Jury qualification began the morning of April 75, 3 985 
and continued until ApriJ 27, ]985 at 12:30 p«r.t r«i n'ro tlis two-
and-a-half day process, sixty-nine jurors were questioned 
relative to their knowledge regarding the case, their 
backgrounds, whether they had formed an opinion regarding the 
case, and their feelings about the death penalty. (P..992-164C) 
Additionally, sorre jurors were questioned about their knowledge 
of the trial of Dan Charles Laffer\.\ , ticther and alleged 
co-conspirator of the defendant. At the end of this procedure, 
forty jurors were qualified, fror< which a jury of twelve was 
selected. 
During the trial proceedings, defense counsel 
participated fully before the jury, clearly representing the 
defendant individually and not as co-counsel, advisory counsel or 
standby counsel. At the beginning of the trial the court stated, 
"The defendant is present with his counsel, Mr. Richard Johnson." 
(R.992-993, 1692) 
Although the court had indicated that the defendant 
could participate as much as he desired, defense counsel found it 
necessary to object to the court's exclusion of the defendant 
during arguments in chambers on motions (R.1657). The court, as 
10 
c rule, treated defense counsel, Richard F. Johnson, as the 
person determining the course of the defense in his remarks 
before the jury throughout the trial and related proceedings. 
During the trial defense counsel indicated to the court 
that the defendant did not agree with the wa^ counsel was 
presenting the defense (R.2466). In fact, 1 he defendant 
prevented defense counsel, in the midst of one witness1 
testimony, from questioning that witness further. (R.2456) The 
trial court had advised defense counsel that he could argue 
whatever he wanted to argue to the jury (R.2457); however, when 
counsel argued a particular defense to the jury during his 
closing statement, the defendant disagreed with his Jine of 
argument and told him to "wind it up." (R.2507-252C) 
An in camera hearing prior to the sentencing phase of 
the trial was held on May 6, 19C5 in the cleared courtroom 
(R.2527-2536). A video tape of the crime scene was shown after 
the prosecution indicated its intent to show the tape to the 
jury. After viewing the tape, defense counsel objected to the 
prejudicial nature of the tape, because its contents were already 
in evidence, and it was, therefore, cumulative. The court ruled 
that the video tape was probative and admissible (R.2526-2531). 
Also during this in camera hearing the prosecution 
objected to defense counsel's attempt to elicit testimony from 
the psychiatrists and psychologists regarding the defendant's 
state of mind on July 24, 1984. The prosecution argued that, 
because the defendant was not a, willing patient, the affirmative 
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defense of insanity at the time of the crime had been waived. 
(R.2531-2535). The court ruled in the prosecution's favor. 
During the sentencing phase of the trial, the video 
tape of the crime scene was shown to the jury, and Dr. Groesbeck, 
Dr. Howell, and Dr. Heinbecker all testified regerding their 
observations of the defendant during his residency at the Utah 
State Eospital. Dr. Thorne, who had. never personally interviewed 
or observed the defendant, lei>iifiec regarding the mental state 
of the defendant and regarding the reports on the defendant's 
competency to stand trial submitted by the other doctors 
(R.2796-2845). 
During the in camera discussion of the jury 
instructions, defense counsel proffered testimony fron WilliCP 
Euish, the Fourt Judicial District Court Clerk, regarding the 
life sentence received by Dan Lafferty, as evidence of a 
r.iit icating factor in the defendant's favor. The court denied the 
introduction into evidence of Mr. Kuisl's testimony 
(R.2869-2877). 
On May 27, 1985 the jury returned from its 
deliberations and sentenced the defendant, Ronald Watson 
Lafferty, to die (R.2938-2942). 
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SUMMARY OF APGUttENT 
The trial court committed prejudicial error in finding 
defendant competent to stand trial. The court's findings and 
determination of the defendant's ability to understand the nature 
of the proceedings and the penalty to be imposed and to 
rationally assist counsel in his defense were* not supported by 
the evidence. 
The ecu it further erred prejudicially when, after the 
trial court appointed counsel, the court allowed defendant to act 
as his own counsel in certain respects and when it allowed 
defendant to withdraw the insanity and/or diminished capacity 
defense. This cction of the court was an abuse of discretion 
where the court had received evidence of the mental illness 
of the defendant and then allowed the mentally ill defendant 
to waive substantial defenses against the advice of counsel. 
The provisions of Utah Code Ann. 5 77-i£-*(?) c^ 
c^plied in this instance are unconstitutional. This statute 
precludes defendants who refuse to cooperate with examiners 
from presenting the defense of insanity even though, as in the 
present case, the nature of the mental illness would prevent 
defendant from cooperating. 
The court committed prejudicial error in failing to 
allow defendant to represent himself after having found him 
competent to stand trial. The court allowed defendant to waive 
substantial rights against the advice of counsel. If the court 
was convinced that the defendant was capable of understanding 
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the nature of the case sufficient to waive defenses, the cent 
should have allowed him to represent himself in compliance witt 
the Sixtl Amendment guarantees. 
The court committed prejudicial error by failing to 
grant a change of venue. In view of the unusually concentrated 
and regionally publicized nature of this case and esj.eejelly in 
view of the fact that defendant's brother had been tried and 
convicted in Utah County, the court should have granted the 
change of venue. This fct'jire resulted in a panel of jurors who 
were mere than casually informed of the case. 
The couit committed prejudicial error whe-r it excluded 
jurors who expressed a reluctence to inpese the death penalty or 
it failed to exclude those who expressed an eye for an eye, toctl-
for a tooth attitude concerning imposition of the death penalty, 
thus violating defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendr ent n'cjlts. 
The action of the court precluded persons who expressed some 
concern, not amounting to a refusal to apply the death penalty, 
from sitting, thereby weighing the panel with those who favored 
the death penalty. 
The trial court committed prejudicial error when it 
allowed persons \vho indicated they had previously formed an 
opinion that the defendant was guilty to remain as prospective 
jurors, thus requiring defendant to use peremptory challenges to 
exclude those who should have been excused for cause. There was 
not a single prospective juror who had not heard of the case. 
A substantial number had gone so far as to form an opinion as to 
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the guilt of the defendant. The court did not sufficently 
determine that those individual! had the ability to set a£-ide 
their previously fornied opinions. Defendant's right to a fair 
and impartial jury was violated. 
The couit committed prejudicial error by not giving 
requested voir dire questions concerning knowledge of Dan 
Lafferty's trial and conviction a few months before the defendant 
went to trial/ his brother had been tried and convicted in a 
highly publicized trial. The court asked some of the prospective 
jurors concerning their knowledge of the previous trial and 
conviction, but not all; failure to do so was prejudicial to 
defendants. 
The court committed prejudicial error by death-
qualifying the jury by impanelling a jury that was predisposed to 
conviction. Those who are inclined to impose the death penalty 
are also more inclined to convict. The jury was not a cioss 
section of individuals, but a group weighted toward conviction. 
The court erred in failing to grant a mistrial based 
upon the prosecutor's improper comments during his rer«arks to the 
jury. The comments of the prosecutor involved statements of 
evidence which was never produced, inflammatory remarks designed 
to arouse the passions of the jury and statements of personal 
belief, all of which exceeded the bounds of fair comment and 
resulted in prejudice to the defendant. 
The trial court committed error in allowing admission 
of photographs of the victims which were unduly prejudicial, 
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inf]armatoiy ar d net probative of essential facts. The il.fnce 
that the jury would base their decision out of passion was 
enhanced by such evidence. The photos were not necessary to 
establish any facts and were cumlative of the other competent 
evidence introduced. 
The court connitted prejudicial error in admitting a 
color video recording of the honicide scene (including the bodies 
of the victims) which was unduly prejudicial, cur'ulatjve arc 
calculated to inflane the passions of the jtry. The court, 'n 
adnittinc the color video after already having received £ 1 _' Z Z 
pl-ctcs of the same subject matter , amoved the £tc^< <c ccccrplish 
the announced intention of the prosecutor to "bring the sreJ] of 
death into the courtroom." Said evidence created an atmosplere 
in which the consideration of the jury as to the appropriateness 
of the death penalty was likely based upon passior and prejudice. 
Utah's statutory scheme, in vhich the statutory 
aggravating factors, also eier-ents of tie capital crime, ere 
also the aggravating factors considered by the jury in 
determining whether to impose the death penalty, violates due 
process. The jurors who have convicted the defendant have 
already found beyond a reasonable doubt the aggravating factors 
during the guilt phase. They are then instructed that they must 
find aggravating factors in the penalty phase and apply the same 
reasonable doubt standard. The jurors are already predisposed 
toward death because finding that the mitigating factors 
outweigh the aggravating beyond a reasonable doubt requires scne 
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mental g^nnastics that are extrenely difficult if not Jia>oh«- *\ "J 6 
for a lay person to do. 
The t.jfO ccurt connitted prejudicial error in 
excluding evidence profferred by defense counsel designed to 
establish mitigating factors. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-2C7C2) 
allows any factors in mitigation to be admitted. The court 
should have allowed evidence as to the sentence of Dan Ldrfijji\< 
Tie trial court committed prejudicial error by admittjrg 
evidence regarding aggravating factors cutsice those wticl tire court 
had indicated end instructed would be considered. The court 
allowed additional evidence of aggravation other than two statutory 
factors whicl the court had indicated the State vcild be limited 
to introduce. The additional evidence did not go to either of 
the statutory factors, and defendant was not aware the cot it 
would allow anything other than tie two factors the court had 
set forth. 
Feasonable minds could not have found beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the totality of the aggravating factors 
completely outweighed the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and that the imposition of the death penalty was ]ustified 
and appropriate under the circumstances. There was substantial 
evidence of mitigation and little evidence of aggravation, other 
than the actual commission of the crime. 
The trial court committed prejudicial error in allowing 
the admission of evidence during the penalty hearing, which was 
hearsay and hearsay upon hearsay. The court allowed hearsay evidence 
to be presented by the State which denied the defendant the 
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opportunity to confront the declarant and which violated his di e 
procedural rights to a fair hearing. The court also allowed the 
introduction of hearsay upon hearsay evidence which even further 
prejudiced the jury. 
The court erred in allowing the jury to consider any 
evidence which had been admitted during the guilt phase of the 
trial in considering the penalty to be imposed. Such procedure 
is rot susceptible to meaningful review/ in that the reviewing 
court cannot determine the validity of the factors which were 
considered by the jury in arriving at their determination to 
impose the death sentence. It is, therefore, constitutionali\ 
infirm in that the death penalty may be imposed in an cibitiery 
and discriminatory irannei. Sicl" procedure is further prejudicial 
in that there may be evidence introduced during the guilt phase 
which is competent for a limited purpose, but which is net 
competent evidence should it be offered in the penalty phase. 
The court committed prejudicial error in dentine, 
defendant's motion to arrest judgnent. The court had found, and 
the weight of all of the experts was, that the defendant was 
mentally ill. The court had, in fact, committed him to the Utah 
State Hospital, but there had never been any finding or 
determination by the court that the defendant was net mentally 
ill. Under the statutes of this state, judgment should have been 
arrested. 
The court erred in allowing conviction of the defendant 
on the principal charge of capital homicide and the inchoate 
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offense of conspiracy to commit capital honicide. Und^i the laws 
of this state, the defendant cannot be convicted cf the piincipal 
crime and the inchoate offense of conspiracy to commit the same. 
APGUFFKT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED I^  FINDING DEFENDANT 
COMPETENT TO SI AND TRIAL. 
Utah Codf- An:>„f- G " ~ r f - ] , <s trended, 
provides/ "No person who is incompetent to proceed shall be tried 
or punished for a public offense." Section 77-15-2 defines 
incompetency as follows: 
For the purposes of this chapter, a person is 
incompetent to proceed if he is suffering fron a 
mental disease or defect resulting either: 
(1) In his inability to comprehend the nature of the 
proceedings against him or the punishment 
specified for the offense charged; or 
(2) In his inability to assist counsel in his 
defense. 
This statutory definition must be read in light of the 
decision of the Un i 1 ed States Supreme Cou'i ir risky v. Urited 
States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960). Although the Dusky opinion is a 
very brief per curiam decision, it has been cited in numerous 
subsequent decisions on the point of competency to stand trial. 
The standard set forth in Dusky is as follows: 
We also agree with the suggestion cf the 
Solicitor Genera] that it js not enough for the 
District Judge to find that "the defendant [is] 
oriented to time and place and [has] some 
recollection of events," but that the "test must 
be whether he has sufficient present ability to 
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree 
of rational understanding — and whether he has a 
rational as well as factual understanding of the 
proceedings against him." 
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The Utah standard appears to be compatible with the Dusky 
standard by use of the term "comprehend." Rationality would seem 
to require comprehension/ as would comprehension encompass 
rational understanding. 
Applying the Dusky and Utah statutory standards to the 
evidence of record in the present case, it is apparent the trial 
court erred in finding the defendant "not incompetent" to proceed. 
The initial evaluation of the defendant by Dr. 
Washburn and Dr. Groesbeck had previously indicated a mental 
disease as set forth in their respective reports to the court 
in October/ 1984. At that time, both court-appointed alienists 
found the defendant to have a significant mental illness which 
had been present for a number of years. They also found that 
as a result of the mental illnessf the defendant was also unable 
to assist counsel in his defense or to defend himself. (See 
Addendum/ Exhibit 4.) 
Notwithstanding this clear and unequivocable findings 
of the court-appointed alienists/ the trial court found that 
there was insufficient evidence to establish that the defendant 
was incompetent to stand trial (R.145). The court made the 
foregoing decision on October 24f 1984. 
On October 25f 1984/ the defendant's behavior at the 
Utah County Jail became so irrational that the Utah County Deputy 
Sheriff felt it necessary to file a second petition requesting a 
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determination of the competency of the defendant (R.168-169) 
alleging the defendant to "appear to become irrational" and that 
he "was physically out of control and did not appear to be 
mentally in control of his faculties." 
On November 30, 1984, the court held a hearing wherein 
the defendant was allowed to waive his right to a competency 
hearing. Consequently no hearing was held. (Reports of the 
alienists indicated the defendant was, in their opinion, 
competent.) (See Addendum, Exhibit 8.) 
On December 29, 1984, the defendant attempted to hang 
himself in the Utah County Jail, resulting in the third Petition 
to Determine Competency being filed by the State, this time Mr. 
Watson again as the affiant. (See Addendum, Exhibit 9.) The 
same alienists who had previously evaluated the defendant in 
November were involved in the third evaluation. 
On January 28, 1985, the court held a competency 
hearing following which the court found the defendant to be 
incompetent to stand trial. 
During the hearing, the defendant was examined and 
exhibited difficulty in remembering conversations with counsel 
and facts about the case. (R.880-882,889). The examiners 
unaminously concluded that the defendant was suffering from 
a mental disease or defect which prevented him from comprehending 
the nature of the charges against him and the punishment 
specified for the offenses charged, and that he lacked the ability 
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to meaningfully assist counsel in his defense or to realistically 
conduct his own defense. (See Addendum, Exhibit 5,) 
The court found that he was incompetent and ordered 
defendant to be treated at the Utah State Hospital. The court 
also, sua sponte, set a rehearing on April 4, 1985. (R.429) 
On April 2, 1985 (the court changed the date of hearing 
from April 4 to April 2), the court held the third hearing to 
determine the competency of the defendant. At that hearing, the 
reports of the alienists appointed by the court were received. 
The court-appointed alienists all concurred in the opinion that 
the defendant's competency had not improved, but had deteriorated 
in that the defendant had developed a form of mental illness 
described as paranoia and amnestic syndrome. Their reports 
further indicated the shared opinion that he could not rationally 
comprehend the nature of the charges against him or the 
punishment specified. The examiners also stated the defendant 
could not assist counsel as a result of the mental illness. (See 
Addendum, Exhibits 6.) 
Dr. Robert J. Howell, Dr. Van 0. Austin, and Dr. C. 
Jess Groesbeck testified as witnesses. Dr. Howell testified that 
in his opinion the defendant could not rationally understand the 
trial proceedings (R.803), that he had suffered memory loss which 
impaired his ability to assist counsel (R.795), that he suffered 
from two mental illnesses which substantially impaired his 
functioning (R.800), and that, if there was "any faking going on," 
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in his opinion it would be the defendant faking normality rather 
than abnormality. (R.815) 
Dr. Van 0. Austin testified that the loss of memory was 
such a substantial impairment that the defendant's attorney would 
have trouble reconstructing the facts from the defendant's 
memory. Also, the defendant's memory was so impaired that he 
did not remember things he had recently been told. (R.820) Dr. 
Austin further testified that, although the defendant physically 
knew where he was# he did not have a rational understanding of 
the significance of that. (R.824) He testified concerning the 
significance of an I.Q. drop of 22 points, the amnesia, and 
paranoid delusional systems as being a combination of factors 
which resulted in the defendant's incompetence. (R.824-825) 
Dr. Austin also stated that the paranoid delusional system would 
interfer with the defendant's ability to meaningfully function 
either independently in a courtroom or with the aid of counsel. 
(R.826) 
Dr. Jess Groesbeck testified that the defendant 
suffered from mental illness specifically, organic amnestic 
syndrome and atypical paranoid reaction, (R.839) that the 
defendant did not have a rational understanding of the 
proceedings, and that the paranoid delusional system of the 
defendant would have to be eliminated before the defendant 
would be able to cooperate with counsel or rationally 
understand the proceedings. (R.841) 
The only additional testimony at the hearing was that 
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of a psychologist hired by the State, Dr. Eugene Thorne. Dr. 
Thorne testified that he had been contacted on March 29, 1985, 
four days prior to the hearing (R.845), that he had spent a total 
of four hours reviewing hospital reports (R.853) that he had never 
interviewed the defendant (R.851), and that he would like to know 
more about the facts upon which the other experts based their 
opinion (R.857-858). In Dr. Thome's opinion, a defendant who 
viewed the trial and offenses in a totally unrealistic sense would 
have an insanity defense, but would still be competent. (R.865) 
Faced with the foregoing evidence, only a portion of 
which has been recited herein, the court found the defendant not 
to be incompetent after taking the matter under advisement 
(R.472). The court further allowed the defendant to waive his 
right to the defense of insanity. (R.898-903) 
During the course of the trial, defense counsel was 
compelled to make a record concerning the lack of cooperation on 
the defendant's part, for example, the defendant's unwillingness 
to make a decision, after which he would object to the direction 
counsel pursued. (R.2057-2067) 
After defense counsel called a witness to provide 
evidence upon which the jury could find a lesser charge of 
manslaughter, the defendant objected and forbade his attorney to 
pursue the manslaughter defense, which had been suggested by the 
attorney. The defendant understood the strategy to be plea 
bargaining (R.2459) and an admission of guilt. Defendant elected 
to go against advice of counsel, interrupted defense counsel in 
24 
the middle of his summation to the jury, and told him to wind up 
his argument, (R.2520-2521) 
In light of the great weight of the evidence from 
those who had an opportunity to observe and evaluate the 
defendant for several months, and who possessed the expertise 
to, the trial court erred in finding the defendant "not 
incompetent." He did not cooperate with counsel. In fact, 
he demonstrated the result of his paranoia by accusing counsel 
of trying to plea bargain, ordering counsel to cease calling 
witnesses and to cease summation. He waived the sanity defense 
against advice of counsel and simply did not cooperate with 
counselfs efforts to defend him. Applying the Utah standard and 
the Dusky standard of competence to the facts of this case, the 
defendant was simply not competent to stand trial in a case where 
the information charged two capital crimes, in addition to several 
first degree felonies. 
POINT II 
AFTER THE TRIAL COURT APPOINTED COUNSEL, IT ERRED 
IN ALLOWING THE DEFENDANT TO ACT AS HIS OWN COUNSEL 
IN CERTAIN RESPECTS AND PARTICULARLY IN ALLOWING 
DEFENDANT TO WITHDRAW THE INSANITY AND/OR DIMINISHED 
CAPACITY DEFENSES. 
Since the trial court appointed counsel to represent the 
defendant, it was improper for the court to allow the defendant 
control over the substantive aspects of the proceedings. 
It is clear that it appeared to the jury that counsel 
was conducting the trial on behalf of the defendant. Therefore, 
it was improper for the court to allow the defendant to interfere 
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with the proceedings and the trial* 
According to 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 71 (1981), 
"lilt has been held that where defense counsel offers to prove the 
defendant was insane at the time of the act and was insane at the 
time of the trial, such evidence must be received even against 
the defendant's will." See also People v. Merkouris, 297 P.2d 
999 (Cal. 1956) where the appellate court found the trial 
court's use of discretion abusive where it permitted the 
defendant/ over the objection of counsel, to withdraw the 
insanity plea* 
Also according to 21A Am. Jur* 2d Criminal Law §767 
(1981): 
A defendant in a criminal proceeding is not 
entitled as a matter of right to be heard by 
himself and also by counsel and an application or 
request by an accused to act as co-counsel may be 
denied in the discretion of the trial court, at 
least in the absence of showing or indication of 
special need therefore. Nor is an accused 
entitled to have the services of an attorney for 
purely advisory purposes. 
Under the general rule a defendant who is 
represented by counsel has no constitutional 
right to act as co-counsel and make his own 
summation. 
And according to 21A Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 996: 
The defendant in criminal proceedings is not 
entitled as a matter of right to be heard by 
himself and also by counsel, in what amounts 
to a form of hybrid representation, or have the 
services of an attorney for purely advisory 
purposes. And the right of the accused to have 
the assistance of counsel is not infringed by 
requiring him to elect between taking charge of 
his own defense and having it conducted by 
counsel. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held that, even in 
the absence of an objection and where it is clear that the 
interests of justice so require, the court should instruct on 
appropriate defenses notwithstanding the lack of a requested jury 
instruction or an objection to the introduction of evidence. 
State v. Close, Utah, 499 P.2d 287 (1972); State v. Cobo 60 P.2d 
952 (1936); State v. Poe, Utah/ 441 P.2d 512 (1968). 
At the very least, since the court had previously found 
the defendant to be mentally ill, the trial court should have 
instructed the jury on the insanity defense and the diminished 
capacity defense. After the jury found the defendant guilty, the 
court should have also found that, as a matter of law, the 
defendant was quilty and mentally ill, pursuant to Utah Code Ann., 
§ 77-35-21.5, as amended. 
Since the defendant had previously made himself 
available for evaluations on numerous occasions, and since 
numerous evaluations of the defendant were made by the court 
appointed doctors, Utah Code Ann., § 77-14-4, as amended, was 
substantially complied with, and the court committed reversible 
error in not allowing counsel to present evidence on the defenses 
of diminished capacity, insanity, and mental illness. 
POINT III 
UTAH CODE ANN., § 77-14-4(2), AS AMENDED, IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
In light of the nature of the defendant's well-
established mental illness (R.479), a strict interpretation of 
§ 77-14-4(2) would allow a mentally ill (and statutorily insane) 
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defendant to discard the defense of not guilty by reason of 
insanity or diminished capacity. Such an interpretation of this 
section denies the defendant due process of law in violation of 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution and Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution. 
Further^ this section violates the defendant's constitutional 
privilege of equal protection of the laws in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 
Article 1, Section 24 of the Utah State Constitution. 
It appears that a strict reading of this statute allows 
a trial court to find a mentally ill defendant guilty of a crime, 
simply because the defendant suffers from paranoia and refuses to 
cooperate with the alienists who have been appointed to examine 
him, all the while claiming that he is sane. By reading this 
statute so strictly, the trial court abused its discretion 
and failed to protect the rights of the defendant. 
It is clear that the only possible situation in which 
this statute would be constitutionally valid is a situation 
where the defendant refuses to cooperate with court-
appointed examiners, but, wishes to have his own independent 
examiners testify at trial. See United States v. Campbell, 
675 F.2d 815 (6th Cir. 1982). However, such is not the case with 
the present defendant. The defendant, through counsel, did not 
seek to have independent examiners testify, while excluding the 
testimony of court-appointed doctors. In fact, the reverse 
appears to be true; that is, the prosecution called a doctor who 
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had not examined the defendant* 
By denying the defendant the same due process of law 
and equal protection that a more cooperative mentally ill 
defendant would have received, the trial court in the instant 
case refused the defendant his best defense and thereby committed 
reversible error. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING DEFENDANT TO 
REPRESENT HIMSELF. 
The right sought to be exercised by the defendant/ 
to-wit: the right to represent himself, is set forth in the 
Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States; Article 
12, Section 1 of the Constitution of the State of Utah; and the 
Utah State Code Ann., §77-32-2. Each of these provisions have 
been interpreted by the various courts which have considered the 
question to recognize the right of the defendant in a criminal 
case to represent himself and his ability to reject counsel and 
to not have counsel forced upon him. 
The defendant who is indigent is not in the position as 
result of his indigency, where he must accept appointed counsel 
any more that the court could force a defendant who is not 
indigent to employ counsel. The defendant has a right to 
proceed to trial in a criminal case without counsel to assist him 
or to represent him and has a right not to have the counsel 
forced upon him. The provision of Utah Code Ann., § 77-32-2 
provides two situations in which a court may appoint counsel: 
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First, where the defendant requests it; and second, "the court on 
its own motion or otherwise so orders and the defendant does not 
affirmatively waive or reject of record the opportunity to be 
represented." (Emphasis added.) In the instant case, the 
defendant did not request the court appoint counsel but 
specifically, on the record, waived his right to counsel and 
rejected the opportunity to be represented and did so at every 
stage of the proceedings at which he was questioned concerning 
his intentions and wishes regarding counsel. At every stage 
of the proceedings, Defendant had been thoroughly and 
competently advised of his right to counsel and the willingness 
of the court to appoint counsel, at the request of the defendant, 
should Defendant change his mind at any point and desire to be 
represented by counsel. He had, moreover, been urged by each of 
the respective judges, who had so advised him, that, in the 
opinion of the court, he should accept counsel and proceed with 
counsel, rather than proceeding as his own counsel. Again, after 
receipt of such advice, the defendant recognized the concern of 
the court, indicated to the court that he had considered his 
decision to act as his own counsel, and made knowing and 
intelligent waiver as to counsel either orally upon the record, 
or through written motions, based upon an understanding of the 
consequences which could occur as a result of his self-
representation. It is apparent from the record that the trial 
court had no more authority under Utah Code Ann., § 77-32-2, to 
appoint counsel in this case than the court would have had to 
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force someone who is not indigent to hire counsel rather than 
defend himself. 
The Utah Supreme Court has considered a situation 
somewhat similar to the present case in the matter of gtate v. 
Penderville, Utah, 272 P.2d 195 (1954). In Penderville 
the defendant was charged with second-degree homicide. The 
defendant in Penderville originally had counsel which he had 
employed and then later attempted to discharge. The day before 
trial the defendant appeared before the court and requested a 
continuance in order to procure new counsel to represent 
him at trial. The court declined to allow a continuance to the 
defendant for the purpose of obtaining additional counsel, where-
upon the defendant elected to defend in person rather than proceed 
with counsel he had discharged or was about to discharge. The 
defendant apparently made this choice notwithstanding a warning 
from the court that his defense should probably be made by 
counsel. The court, notwithstanding such election by the 
defendant to represent himself, appointed the same attorney who 
had been discharged or was about to be discharged to conduct 
defendant's defense at the trial. The question of whether or not 
the court committed error in refusing to permit defendant to 
conduct his own defense was considered by the appellate court. 
At 272 P.2d 199 the court stated: 
This question cannot be answered by reaching a 
conclusion that the appellant was better defended 
by counsel than he would have been without the 
aid of counsel. The Constitution of this State 
provides: "In criminal prosecutions the accused 
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shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel." Const. Art. I, § 12. 
Courts of last resort in several states have 
similar constitutional provisions in their 
application to facts quite similar to those in the 
present case. 17 A.L.R. 266 and cases there cited. 
It is generallyr if not universally held that the 
accused in a criminal proceeding who is sui juris 
and not mentally incompetent has the right to 
conduct his own defense without the aid of 
counsel. 
On that same page the court further stated: 
Can it be said that the appellant lost his right 
to defend in person by his unsuccessful effort to 
have his trial postponed to get other counsel? 
We think not. The right to defend in person 
certainly should not be denied an accused in a 
situation where he must either choose to use 
it or proceed with counsel in whom he has lost 
confidence. We hold that the court erred in 
denying the appellant the right to try his case 
without the aid of counsel and that because of this 
error he is entitled to a new trial. 
The trial court reversed the judgment of conviction and 
defendant was granted a new trial. The principle enunciated by 
the Utah State Supreme Court in interpreting Article I Section 12 
was that the Constitution of the State of Utah recognized the 
right of the defendant upon his election to proceed without 
counsel/ and that counsel cannot be forced upon him as long as he 
is competent to stand trial and represent his interests. In the 
instant casef the trial court held a competency proceeding in 
which the court found the defendant/ Ron Laffertyf competent to 
understand the nature of the proceedings against himr to 
understand the possible punishment against him, and to assist 
counsel in his defense. The defendant, under the Penderville 
case, should have been allowed to proceed without counsel. 
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The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States has also been interpreted as providing the criminal 
defendant with the right to represent himself in a criminal 
proceeding. In Faretta vs. California/ 422 U. S. 806 
(1975) the defendant was charged with grand theft in an 
information filed in the Superior Court of Los Angeles Countyf 
California. At the arraignment stage the judge assigned to 
preside at the trial appointed the public defender to represent 
Faretta. Well before the date of trial/ however/ Faretta 
requested that he be premitted to represent himself. Questions 
by the judge revealed that Faretta had once represented himself 
in a criminal prosecution/ that he had a high school education/ 
and that he did not want to be represented by the public defender 
because he believed that the office was very loaded down with a 
heavy case load. The judge responded that he believed Faretta 
was making a mistake and emphasized in further proceedings that 
Faretta would receive no special favors. Nevertheless, after 
establishing that Faretta wanted to represent himself and did not 
want a lawyer/ the judge in a preliminary ruling accepted 
Faretta1s waiver of the acceptance of counsel but indicated/ 
however/ that he might reverse this ruling if Faretta was unable 
to adequately represent himself. Some time later, the judge/ on 
his own motion/ held a hearing to inquire into Faretta1s ability 
to conduct his own defense and questioned him specifically about 
the hearsay rule and state law governing challenge to potential 
jurors. The judge, upon receiving the answers from Faretta, 
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reversed his earlier ruling permitting self-representation and 
appointed the public defender to represent Faretta. Faretta's 
subsequent request for leave to act as co-counsel was rejected/ 
as were his efforts to make motions on his own behalf. The United 
States Supreme Court, in interpreting the Sixth Amendment in the 
context of the Faretta facts at 422 U. S. 819-20 stated: 
The Sixth Amendment does not provide merely that 
a defense shall be made for the accused; it 
grants to the accused personally the right to 
make his defense. It is the accused, not counsel, 
who must be "informed of the nature and cause 
of accusation," who must be "confronted with the 
witnesses against him," and who must be accorded 
"compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in 
his favor." Although not stated in the Amendment 
in so many words, the right to self-
representation — to make one's own defense 
personally — is thus necessarily implied by the 
structure of the Amendment. The right to defend 
is given directly to the accused; for it is he 
who suffers the consequences if the defense 
fails. 
Further, the court stated at 422 U. S. 833-34: 
But it is one thing to hold that every defendant, 
rich or poor, has the right to the assistance of 
counsel, and quite another to say that a State 
may compel a defendant to accept a lawyer he does 
not want. The value of state-appointed counsel 
was not unappreciated by the Founders, yet the 
notion of compulsory counsel was utterly foreign to 
them. And whatever else may be said of those who 
wrote the Bill of Rights, surely there can be no 
doubt that they understood the inestimable worth 
of free choice. 
In the present case, as has been previously stated, the 
defendant had been advised regarding his right to appointed 
counsel at several stages of the proceedings and had elected to 
proceed without counsel. He had been advised that, in the court's 
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opinion it would be more advantageous to his defense to present 
his case through the use of competent counsel. Nonetheless, after 
being fully advised of the possible peril and dangers of repre-
senting himself, the defendant still elected to proceed as his own 
counsel; However, the trial court refused to afford him that 
opportunity. The court ultimately held that "tiln forcing Faretta, 
under these circumstances, to accept against his will a state-
appointed public defender, the California courts deprived him 
of his constitutional right to conduct his own defense." Id. at 
836. 
As is held in Faretta, and the other cases on this 
point, the defendant need not demonstrate to the court any 
particular degree of legal skill or sophistication, other than a 
basic understanding of the right to counsel, a willingness to 
voluntarily waive that right and the advantages of counsel, and 
to, therefore, reject counsel. There is no requirement that the 
defendant understand the Pules of Evidence, the Rules of Civil 
Procedure, or be familiar with the other procedures involved in 
a court trial. The record must simply show that "he knows what 
he is doing and his choice is made with his eyes open." Id. at 
835, quoting Adams v. United States ex rel McCann, 317 U.S. at 
279. 
The record is clear in the instant case that the trial 
court had adequately and frequently advised the defendant that 
the defendant would probably be better off presenting his case 
through the use of counsel. However, the defendant continued to 
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assert his right of self-representation, and the judge did 
appoint counsel against the defendant's clearly expressed wishes. 
The Court in Faretta hypothesized one final reason for allowing a 
defendant the right of self-representation, "Moreover, it is not 
inconceivable that in some rare instances, the defendant might in 
fact present his case more effectively by conducting his own 
defense.11 422 U.S. at 834. Perhaps, the defendant in the 
instant case, might have done better for himself than his 
appointed counsel did. 
Even had the defendant's right to self-representation 
been preserved through the appointment of standby counsel, his 
counsel acted far beyond the limits of Faretta. In McKaskle v. 
Wiggins, 104 S. Ct. 944 (1984), the trial court allowed 
the defendant to act as his own counsel with the assistance of 
standby counsel. The Supreme Court held that the defendant's 
right to representation of his own case was not violated by the 
use of standby counsel, even in the situation where standby 
counsel took an active part in some phases of the trial proceed-
ings phases of the trial proceedings. The Court held that the 
defendant's right to defend himself had not been violated by the 
participation of standby counsel, where the participation was 
either outside the presence of the jury or, when in the presence 
of the jury, was at the request of the defendant. However, while 
arriving at that holding, the court did state as a general rule 
at 104 S.Ct. 946 the following: 
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It is when standby counsel participate in the 
jury's presence that a defendant may legitimately 
claim that excessive involvement by counsel will 
destroy the appearance that the defendant is 
acting pro se. 
The court at page 949 concluded that: 
The pro se defendant must be allowed to control 
the organization and content of his own defense/ 
to make motions/ to argue points of law/ to 
participate voir diref to question witnesses/ 
and to address the court and jury at appropriate 
points in the trial. 
Further the court at page 950 stated: 
We recognize/ nonetheless/ that the right to 
speak for oneself entails more than the 
opportunity to add onefs voice to the cacophony 
of others* As Wiggins contends/ the objectives 
underlying the right to proceed pro se may be 
undermined by unsolicited and excessively 
intrusive participation by standby counsel. In 
proceedings before a jury the defendant may 
legitimately be concerned that multiple voices 
"for the defense" will confuse the message the 
defendant wishes to convey/ thus defeating 
Faretta's objectives. Accordingly/ the Faretta 
right must impose some limits on the extent of 
standby counsel's unsolicited participation. 
First/ the pro se defendant is entitled to 
preserve actual control over the case he chooses 
to present to the jury. This is the core of the 
Faretta right. If standby counsel's 
participation over the defendant's objection 
effectively allows counsel to make or 
substantially interfere with any significant 
tactical decisions/ or to control the questioning 
of witnesses/ or to speak instead of the 
defendant on any matter of importance/ the 
Faretta right is eroded. 
Second/ participation by standby counsel without 
the defendant's consent should not be allowed to 
destroy the jury's perception that the defendant 
is representing himself. 
Wiggins recognizes the right of the court to 
appoint standby counsel/ even over the defendant's objection/ to 
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relieve the court of the need to explain and enforce the basic 
rules of courtroom protocol or to assist the defendant in 
overcoming routine obstacles standing in the way of the 
defendant's acheivement of his own clearly indicated goals. 
The position of counsel in Wiggins is substantially 
different than was position of appointed counsel in the present 
case. In view of the trial court's rulings as to the compentency 
of the defendant/ and especially in light of the obvious 
disagreements between defense counsel and the defendant as 
to how the representation should have proceeded/ the court 
erred in not allowing the defendant to represent himself/ a right 
recognized by this Court in the Penderville case, supra as well 
as in subsequent cases. See State v. Domingues/ Utah/ 
564 P.2d 768 (1977). As set forth in Faretta and Penderville/ 
supra/ denial of this substantial right requires reversal. 
POINT V 
THE COURT'S DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
CHANGE OF VENUE WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
The Utah Constitution provides that in criminal 
prosecutions/ the accused shall have the right to a trial "by an 
impartial jury ..." Constitution of Utah/ Article If Section 12. 
Utah Code Ann./ § 77-35-29(e) (1980 as amended) deals 
with the bases that may be employed by a defendant to request the 
court for a change of venue. That subsection, also known as Rule 
29 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides as follows: 
If the prosecution or a defendant in a 
criminal action believes that a fair and 
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impartial trial cannot be had in the juris-
diction where the action is pending, either 
may, by motion, supported by an affidavit 
setting forth facts, ask to have the trial 
of the case transferred to another jurisdiction. 
If the court is satisfied that the 
representations made in the affidavit are true 
and justify transfer of the case, the court 
shall enter an order for the removal of the 
case to the court of another jurisdiction 
free from such objection and all records 
pertaining to the case shall be transferred 
forthwith in such another county. 
In addressing the issue of pretrial publicity, the Court 
i n
 State v. Wood, Utah, 648 P.2d 71, 88 (1982), established that the 
defendant has the burden of proving that a "fair and impartial 
trial cannot be held in the county where the action is pending*" 
It is generally accepted that the defendant must show a 
reasonable likelihood that, in the absence of relief such as a 
change of venue, a fair trial cannot be had. It is also 
generally understood that a reasonable likelihood of prejudice does 
not mean that prejudice must be more probable than not. Fraizer 
y. Superior Court of Santa Cruz County, 95 Cal. Rptr. 798, 486 
P.2d 694 (1971); People v. Welch, 104 Cal. Rptr. 217, 501 P.2d 
225 (1972); Brown v. State, 601 P.2d 221 (Ak. 1979). 
The most recent Utah case addressing the pretrial 
publicity issue is Codjanna v. Morris, Utah, 660 P.2d 1101 (1983). 
In Codianna the Court recognized that: 
An accused can be denied a fair trial where 
the process of news gathering has allowed such 
a free reign that it intrudes into every aspect 
of a trial and creates a "carnival atmosphere" 
and where the publicity is so weighted against 
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the defendant and so extreme in its impact that 
members of the jury are encouraged to form strong 
preconceived views of his guilt. Id. at 1111; 
Shepherd v. Maxwell/ 384 U.S. 333, 358, 86 S. C. 
1507, 1519% 16 L.Ed 2d 600 (1966). 
Mo case in recent Utah history has received as much 
publicity as the instant case. The nature of the alleged crime 
has been detailed explicitly in numerous accounts, as well as the 
Lafferty connection to the alleged crime. The trial of Dan 
Lafferty, the defendant's brother, was reported in daily 
accounts on television and in the media. The testimony of 
specific witnesses was recounted in those articles. The fact 
that Dan Lafferty was convicted was widely broadcast in all of 
the media available to the major population in Utah County. 
There had been articles in the newspaper quoting jurors, who sat 
in the Dan Lafferty case, as to their view of the evidence and 
the fact that they would have given the death penalty except for 
some "strange" views of two jurors. No articles discussed any 
other suspects, the fact that Dan Laffertyfs conviction was 
against the weight of the evidence, or stating any other facts as 
to doubts of the two brother's guilt. 
During the voir dire process, all eighty-seven of the 
prospective jurors indicated that they had knowledge of the 
events of July 24, 1984 and of the ongoing proceedings against 
Ron and Dan Lafferty. Indeed, the publicity was so weighted 
against the defendant, that sixty percent of the prospective 
jurors indicated during individual voir dire that they believed 
Ronald Lafferty was guilty of tfre murders of Brenda and Erica 
Lafferty. 
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In determining whether a massive, pervasive and 
prejudicial pretrial publicity can so bias a community as to 
require change of venue, the trial court should consider: 
The inflammatory nature of the publicity; 
the degree to which the publicity was circulated 
throughout the community; the length of time 
elapsed from the dissemination of the publicity 
to the date of trial; care exercised and the 
difficulty encountered in the selection of a 
jury; familiarity of prospective trial jurors 
with publicity and the result and effect upon 
them; the challenges exercised by the defendant 
in selecting the jury, preemptory challenges/ 
and for cause; the connection of government 
officials with the release of publicity; the 
severity of the charge; and the size and type 
of area from which the venire is drawn. 
State v. Crudup/ 11 Wash. App. 583/ (1974); People v. McCran , 
549 P.2d 1320 (Colo. 1976). 
All of the above factors/ taken together and applied to 
the instant case/ clearly establish a situation in which the trial 
court should have granted a change of venue to a county in which 
the pretrial publicity was less concentrated. While none of the 
prospective jurors indicated they were unaware of the casef more 
importantly/ sixty percent indicated that they had not only heard 
or read about the case, but that their knowledge, attained 
through media or word of mouth/ had brought them to the point of 
forming an opinion of the guilt of the defendant. With only 
twelve peremptory challenges/ the defendant was not in a position 
to remove all of those individuals who had indicated a prior 
opinion of the guilt of the defendant. In fact/ five persons who 
were ultimately selected as jurors as well as both alternate 
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jurors had formed an opinion as to the guilt of the defendant. 
(Susan G. Heath R.1225-1226; Heidi Nielson Strong R.1378; Ila C. 
Lundberg R.1417-1424; Richard Roy Eubank R.1340-1342; Richard 
Barry Westwood R.1576-1576; Arietta G. Wilkey R.1612-1615; Patrick 
W. Shumway R.1631-1634.) 
It is difficult to conceive a situation where a change 
of venue would be more appropriate than in the present case. 
Defendant respectfully submits the trial court erred in refusing 
to grant Defendants motion to change the venue. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY EXCLUDING JURORS WHO 
EXPRESSED A RELUCTANCE TO IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY 
OR BY FAILING TO EXCLUDE THOSE WHO EXPRESSED AN 
EYE FOR AN EYE, TOOTH FOR A TOOTH ATTITUDE 
CONCERNING IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY, THUS 
VIOLATING DEFENDANT'S SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT RIGHTS. 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the defendant the right 
to a jury trial while the Fourteenth Amendment's rights of due 
process guarantee the right to a fair and impartial jury. 
Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226, 228 (8th Cir. 1985). 
In Witherspoon v. Illinois/ 391 U.S. 510, (1968) the 
court outlined the standards which must be applied in determining 
whether a jury is properly impanelled with regard to the 
possibility of the imposition of a sentence of death. The 
Witherspoon case held "that a sentence of death cannot be 
carried out if the jury that imposed or recommended it was 
chosen by excluding veniremen for cause simply because they 
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voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed 
conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction. 
No defendant can constitutionally be put to death at the hands 
of a tribunal so selected." Id. at 521-23. 
In the Illinois trial, it appeared to the court 
that the prosecution had eliminated almost half of the potential 
jurors by challenging them under an Illinois statute allowing for 
challenge if potential jurors expressed any qualms about imposing 
the death penalty. The court held that such exclusion of persons 
expressing conscientious objections allowed for a jury that was 
uncommonly willing to condemn a man to death. 
The Witherspoon court also established the standards to 
follow in choosing which persons could be excluded for cause: a 
juror must indicate in unambigious and unmistakable language that 
he would automatically vote against the imposition of the death 
sentence in any circumstance without regard to the facts presented. 
Also, such a juror must state that his beliefs regarding the death 
penalty would prevent him from reaching an impartial decision 
regarding the defendant's guilt because of his awareness that a 
defendant found guilty might receive a death sentence. Therefore, 
according to Witherspoon/ a mere belief in the invalidity of 
capital punishment or feelings against capital punishment are not 
adequate to exclude a juror for cause, but such belief or feelings 
must rise to the level of an incapacity to impose the death penalty 
under any circumstances. Mr. Justice Stewart stated: "The most 
that can be demanded of a venireman in this regard is that he be 
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willing to consider all of the penalties provided by state law, and 
that he not be irrevocablly committed before the trial has begun to 
vote against the penalty of death regardless of the facts and 
circumstances that might emerge in the course of the proceedings." 
Id. at 521-22, n.21. 
Since the Witherspoon case the Supreme Court, as well as 
the state courts, has attempted to conform the procedure for the 
selection of juries to the Witherspoon standard. One of the more 
recent cases decided by the Supreme Court is the case of Adams v. 
Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980). The Adams case stated with regard to 
a Texas statute: 
As employed here, the touchstone of the inquiry 
under Section 12.31(b) was not whether putative 
jurors could and would follow their instructions 
and answer the posited questions in the affirma-
tive if they honestly believed the evidence warranted 
it beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, the touchstone 
was whether the fact that the imposition of the death 
penalty would follow automatically from affirmative 
answers to the questions would have any effect at all 
on the jurors1 performance of their duties. Such a 
test could, and did, exclude jurors that stated that 
they would be affected by the possibility of the 
death penalty, but who apparently meant only that 
the potentially lethal consequences of their decisions 
would invest their deliberations with greater 
seriousness and gravity and would involve them 
emotionally. Others were excluded only because they 
were unable to positively state whether or not their 
deliberations would in any way be affected. But 
neither nervousness, emotional involvement, nor 
inability to deny or confirm any effect whatsoever 
is equivalent to an unwillingness or an inability 
on the part of the jurors to follow the courtfs 
instructions and obey their oaths, regardless of 
their feelings of the death penalty. The grounds 
for excluding these jurors were consequently 
insufficient under the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendment. Nor in our view would the Constitution 
permit the exclusion
 tof a juror from the penalty 
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phase of a Texas murder trial if they aver that 
they will honestly find the facts and answer the 
questions in the affirmative if they are convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt, but not otherwise/ yet 
who frankly concede that the prospects of the death 
penalty may effect what their honest judgment of the 
facts will be or what may deem to be a reasonable 
doubt, Id. at 49. (Emphasis added.) 
The Oklahoma case of Parks v. State, 651 P.2d 686, 
(Okla. Crim. Ct. 1982) stated that a sentence of death can not be 
carried out if the jury which recommends it was chosen by 
excluding veniremen for cause simply because they voiced general 
objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or 
religious scruples against its infliction. 
Another case heard by the U. S. Supreme Court is 
the case of Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 (1978). In the 
Lockett case, the defendant had been convicted of aggravated 
murder and sentenced to death. On appeal the defendant 
contended that four prospective jurors had been excluded in 
violation of her Sixth and Fourteeth Amendment rights under 
Witherspoon* The Supreme Court rejected that argument because 
each of the four jurors was questioned regarding the death 
penalty and unequivocably stated that he or she would not take 
an oath "to try this case and follow the law." The jurors had 
been asked if they were so opposed to the idea of capital 
punishment that they would not be able to sit and listen to the 
evidence and the law and then determine, based on the evidence 
and the law, that capital punishment should be imposed. 
The court held that exclusion for cause was proper because the 
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four jurors had each said he would not take an oath* See also 
Maxwell v. Bishop/ 398 U.S. 262/ (1970); Woodards v. Maxwell/ 
303 F. Supp. 690 (D. Ohio 1969); Woodards v. Cardwell/ 430 F.2d 
978/ (6th Cir.); People v, Goodrich/ 70 Cal. 2d 824/ 452 P.2d 
637/ 76 Cal. P.ptr. 421 (1969); People v. Washington/ 71 Cal. 2d 
1061/ 458 P.2d 479/ 80 Cal. Rptr. 567 (1969); People v, Vauqhny 
71 Cal. 2d 406/ 455 P.2d. 122, 78 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1969); 
People v. Chacon/ 69 Cal. 2d 765f 447 P.2d 106, 73 Cal. P.ptr. 10/ 
34 ALR 3d. 454 (1968); State v. Watson/ 20 Ohio App. 2d 3 if»r 252 
N.E. 2d 305 (1969). 
One of the most recent Utah cases regarding this issue 
is the case of State v. Norton/ Utah/ 675 P.2d 577 (1983). 
The Norton case stated the general principal to be followed in 
voir dire in a capital punishment case: "On the issue of capital 
punishment, the object of voir dire is to obtain a jury that can 
hear the evidence and apply the law without legal partiality for 
or against capital punishment. Approval of or opposition to 
capital punishment in general is not legal partiality for this 
purpose." JId. at 589. In Morton the court vacated the death 
sentence and remanded to the trial court for resentencing. This 
was because of the court's failure to comply with defendant's 
request that potential jurors be asked "Is there any member of 
the panel who feels that/ if an individual is convicted of first 
degree murder/ then the penalty must be death?" The Norton court 
held that the refusal of the court to ask the question was errorf 
even though the court had asked.the jurors questions regarding 
their willingness to follow the instructions of the court and 
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even though the court appeared to feel satisfied that the jurors 
would follow the instructions. 
The Norton case also dealt with the issue of 
exclusion of a juror who "indicated that she could not vote 
to impose the death penalty under any circumstances." Id._ at 
588. The Court held that that exclusion was proper. 
The trial of Ron Lafferty received a great deal of 
publicity because of the nature of the crime and also because 
this defendant had to be tried following the trial of his brother 
Dan Lafferty. As a resultf during the questioning may of the 
jurors were familiar with the case. Many jurors were also 
familiar with the fact that Dan Lafferty had received a life 
sentence. During the two-and-one-half day jury qualification 
session/ the defendant objected and moved to have dismissed for 
cause several jurors who exhibited the attitude of "an eye for an 
eye, tooth for a tooth," or a belief that they felt it necessary 
to impose the death penalty where a death had occurred. H a 
Lundberg (eventually chosen as a juror) stated that she would 
probably not impose the death penalty if the mitigating factors 
outweighed the aggravating factors. (See R.192-194, 1423; Judith Ann 
Johnson, R.1523-1524; and Patrick Shumway, R.1633-1634.) 
Some jurors were not given an adequate explanation of 
the standard to be applied in the penalty phase. (See Judith Ann 
Johnson, R.1423-1424; Richard Barry Westwood (eventually chosen 
as a juror), R.1580-1581; Vivian Best, R.1607-1610; Terry 
Melendez, R.1123-1124.) 
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Two jurors were excluded for having expressed some 
concern over the imposition of the death penalty, (See Jean E. 
Paulitz, R.1148-1150.) Ms. Paulitz, when asked if she would 
follow the law as it related to the death penalty being imposed, 
said that she was not sure about that. The Court did not 
question her further regarding this issue. The court did not ask 
her if she would take the oath and endeavor to follow the law. 
Also expressing some concerns over the death penalty 
was Max Baldwin (R.1560-1567). Mr. Baldwin expressed the belief 
that he had formed no opinion and that he felt he would be an open-
minded juror. And when asked if there was any reason that he could 
not sit as a juror and render a fair and impartial verdict he 
responded, "No" (R.1565). When asked about the imposition of 
the death penalty, Mr. Baldwin responded "It's a hard question to 
answer. I would have to say that right now I don't know whether 
I can or not." (R.1566) The court then questioned Mr. Baldwin as 
to his feelings about what he would do but failed to ask 
him whether he would impose the death penalty if he was 
instructed that that was the law and that the mitigating 
circumstances were outweighed by the aggravating circumstances so 
that the death penalty was proper. The court did not ask Mr. 
Baldwin if he would follow the law and take the oath. 
The court failed in questioning jurors clearly and 
explaining clearly the standards to be imposed in determining 
the issue of the death penalty. Further the court allowed the 
exclusion of two jurors who did not respond unequivocably that 
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they would not impose the death penalty if the law dictated it 
should be imposed. The court also refused to excuse for cause 
those jurors who exhibited an "eye for an eye, tooth for a 
tooth" attitude regarding the death penalty. Such error on 
the part of the court requires that the matter be set for 
retrial consistent with Pitts v. Sockhart, 753 F.2d 689 (8th 
Cir. 1985) or at the least remanded for resentencing. This is 
consistent with the most recent Supreme Court cases and also the 
Utah cases cited, State v. Norton, Utah, 675 P.2d 577 (1983). 
POINT VII 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING INDIVIDUALS 
WHO INDICATED THAT THEY HAD FORMED AN OPINION 
THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS GUILTY TO REMAIN AS 
PROSPECTIVE JURORS THUS REQUIRING DEFENDANT USE 
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES TO EXCLUDE THOSE WHO SHOULD 
HAVE BEEN EXCUSED FOR CAUSE. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-18(e) (13) requires that jurors 
be excused for cause 
"[if they have] formed or expressed an unqualified 
opinion or belief as to whether the defendant was 
guilty or not guilty of the offense charged; or 
"the state of mind exists on the part of the juror 
with reference to the cause, or to either party, 
which will prevent him from acting impartially 
without prejudice to the substantial rights of the 
party challenging; but no person shall be dis-
qualified as a juror by reason as having formed or 
expressed an opinion upon a matter and caused to be 
submitted to such jury, founded upon public rumor, 
statements in public journals or common notarity, 
if it satisfactorly appears to the court that the 
juror can and will, notwithstanding such opinion, 
act impartially and fairly upon the matter to be 
submitted to him." 
The case of People v. Moorer, 429 N.Y.S. 2d 913, (NY 
App. Div. 1980) well states the general principle of law that 
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should be applied in a case of this nature. The trial court 
in that case held that anyone who expressed questionable 
impartiality in the interest of fairness should be disqualified. 
Further the case of People v. Gurule, 628 P.2d 99 (Colo. 1981) 
held that it was error not to excuse someone with a set opinion 
and an unwillingness to set aside that opinion. Defendant in the 
present case was required to use all of his peremptory challenges 
in excluding members of the jury, several of whom he had moved to 
excuse for cause. The trial court, however, denied his motions 
for removal for cause and thus required that the defendant 
exercise his peremptory challenges for those persons. Although 
many persons were aware of the proceedings and almost all jurors 
questioned had heard something about the case, there were several 
who said they hadn't formed an opinion. The court erred in 
failing to exclude those persons who stated that they had formed 
an opinion as to the defendant's guilt and/or they were aware of 
and knew of Dan Lafferty's trial. There were sufficient persons 
who could have been found, who, although they had heard the 
publicity of the trial, said they had formed no opinion, or that, 
if they had formed an opinion, it wasn't that the defendant was 
necessarily guilty. 
Defendant moved to exclude the fourteen jurors for 
cause because they stated that they had formed an opinion and/or 
that they had formed an opinion and were aware of the proceedings 
in the Dan Lafferty trial. Richard Barry Westwood (R.1575-1581) 
eventually served on the jury. Anetta G. Wilkie (R.1610-1618) 
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eventually served on the jury, but expressed throughout her 
questioning by the court that, although she felt she had not 
formed an opinion/ she wondered whether she could provide the 
defendant with the presumption of innocence, or whether she 
thought she would like a juror of her own frame of mind to judge 
her. She expressed considerable doubt concerning her ability to 
set aside her opinion of the defendants guilt, because of the 
trial of Dan Lafferty. Defendants motion to excuse for cause 
was denied* 
Patrick Shumway, who eventually served as a juror 
(R.1629-1634), said that it was a hard question for him to answer 
as to whether he had an expressed opinion. Cecile Gallertine 
said that she had formed an opinion and had followed the 
trial of Dan Lafferty. She said that the opinion she had formed 
was that the defendant was guilty and that she had talked about 
it with people from work. (R.1110-1117) Bernadine Marie Packer 
(R.1067-1076) said that her husband had formed an opinion that 
the defendant was guilty, and that she had watched television 
newscasts and felt that her opinion would be a concern to her if 
she were the defendant* She stated that, if she were the 
defendant, she would prefer someone who had not heard what she 
had and that her opinion regarding his guilt was a strong 
opinion. Defendants motion to strike for cause was denied. 
Defendant then used one of his peremptory challenges to excuse 
this juror. 
Brian C. Groo (R.1266-1278) said that he had heard 
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about the trial through the television and newspaper/ had 
discussed it with people and had an opinion that the defendant 
was involved. He stated that it was a hard question for him to 
determine whether he would be comfortable having a person with 
his frame of mind on the jury. He stated that he had the opinion 
that the defendant was guiltyf and that he was confident of his 
opinion. Defendant's motion to dismiss for cause was denied. 
Defendant then used a peremptory challenge to excuse this juror. 
Also expressing similar opinions were Bruce Tuckett/ R.1325; 
Susan Heath, who was selected as a juror/ R.1225-1232; Jack 
Donaldson/ R.1172-1173; Richard Roy Eubcrk, vho was eventually 
chosen as a juror, R.1340-1342; Heidi Nelson Strong/ R.1378; Janet 
Taylor/ R.1396-1400; Ila C. Lundberg/ who was eventually chosen as 
a juror, R.1417-1424; and Craig Ray Watkinsf R.1493-1494. 
POINT VIII 
THE COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO GIVE REQUESTED VOIR 
DIRE QUESTIONS CONCERNING KNOWLEDGE OF DAN LAFFERTY'S 
CONVICTION AND ITS EFFECT ON PROSPECTIVE JURORS. 
In the Utah case of State v. Norton/ Utah/ 675 P.2d 
577 (1983) the Court reversed the sentence of death based on the 
trial court1s failure to ask the requested question/ "Is there any 
member of the panel who feels that if an individual is convicted 
of first degree murder/ then the penalty must be death?" The 
defendant in Norton argued that he was denied the right to an 
impartial jury (Id, at 589). The court reasoned that/ not only 
should questions be asked to determine whether a juror should be 
excused for cause/ but also to allow the defendant nan 
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intelligent exercise of a peremptory challenge," Id. at 589. 
This same principle applies in the Ron Lafferty case in that the 
defendant is allowed to ask those questions which would either 
have a bearing on whether a juror should be excused for cause or 
would lead to information that would allow them to intelligently 
use the peremptory challenge. The court erred in not allowing 
the defendant in the instant case to exercise his rights by 
asking the requested questions concerning Dan Laffertyfs 
convictions. Id. at 587. See also State v. Taylor, 
594 P.2d 211 (Kan. 1979). 
POINT IX 
THE COURT ERRED BY FOLLOWING THE PROCEDURE OF DEATH 
QUALIFYING AND THUS ALLOWING A JURY TO BE IMPANELED 
WHICH IS PREDISPOSED TO CONVICTION. 
This question was addressed most recently in the case 
of State v. Moore, Utah,697 P.2d 233 (1985) and is one that 
continues to be a concern. There are currently cases pending 
before the United States Supreme Court regarding this question. 
Numerous articles and cases have mentioned the issue. In 
addition to the discussion in the Moore case, in the Third 
Judicial District Court of the State of Utah, Judge J. Scott Daniels 
ruled in the Francis Mitchell trial that it is not a violation of 
a defendants Sixth Amendment rights to have one jury for the 
the guilt-innocence phase and a different jury for the 
penalty phase of the trial. This procedure is being followed 
elsewhere and most notably in Arkansas. 
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals case, Grigsby v. 
53 
Mabry, 758 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1985) currently is pending before 
the United States Supreme Court (cert, granted 10-7-85). This is 
a case which Utah, as well as many other states, has joined in 
because of the importance of the issue to be decided. Grigsby. 
involves a capital case out of Arkansas in which the state 
prisoner sought a writ of habeas corpus. The Federal District 
Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas ruled that defendant's 
Sixth Amendment rights had been violated by the Arkansas court 
who excluded jurors who stated that they would, under no circum-
stances, vote for the death penalty. The Court of Appeals affirmed 
the lower court's decision and held: 
We find substantial evidentiary support for the 
district court's findings. We find that substantial 
evidence supports the court's finding that a capital 
jury, with WE's [Witherspoon Excludables] stricken 
for cause, is in fact conviction prone and, therefore, 
does not constitute a cross-sectional representation 
in a given community. In view of our finding on the 
Sixth Amendment violation, it is unnecessary to dis-
cuss the issue whether the jury in petitioners' 
cases was in fact a biased jury. We affirm, with 
modification, the judgment of the district court. We 
vacate that portion of the district court's judgment 
which requires the state to utilize two separate 
juries; one to determine guilt-innocence and another 
for the penalty phase of the trial. We leave the 
actual procedural remedy to the discretion of the 
state. Id. at 229. 
The Eighth Circuit noted in its reasoning that the 
Witherspoon case stood for the principle of the necessity of an 
impartial jury as provided under the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. The Witherspoon case expressly left open the issue 
of whether a death-qualified jury is conviction prone because no 
data was available at the time to support the finding. The court 
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indicated a willingness to rule on the issue upon the necessary 
data. Witherspoon at 520 n.18. Since the Witherspoon decision, 
numerous studies have been done which firmly establish that a 
death-qualified jury is more likely to convict than a jury which 
has not been death qualified. Grigsby at 232-236. The studies 
indicate that in death-qualifying a jury, a systematic exclusion 
of a "distinctive" group occurs in violation of the rule 
established in Durren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357,364 (1979) and 
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U. S. 522, 538 (1975). 
This reasoning, which led the Eighth Circuit to set 
aside the conviction of the defendant, applies equally in the 
State of Utah. In the instant case two jurors were excluded 
by the court for cause because they expressed concern over their 
ability to vote for capital punishment. The jurors who remained 
to be chosen included only those who had not been systematically 
excluded and were, thus, conviction prone as the studies 
indicate. This process clearly violated the defendant's rights 
under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. 
Since the violations involved included Constitutional 
guarantees, any decision which may be following from the United 
States Supreme Court would necessarily be retroactive. Ruiz v. 
Lockhart, 754 F. 2d 254 (8th Cir. 1985). 
POINT X 
THE PROSECUTION1S ARGUMENTS BOTH IN THE TRIAL AND IN 
THE PENALTY PHASE CONTAINED STATEMENTS THAT CALLED 
ATTENTION TO MATTERS WHICH THE JURY WOULD NOT HAVE 
BEEN JUSTIFIED IN CONSIDERING AND WERE UNFAIRLY 
PREJUDICIAL TO THE DEFENDANT. 
Prosecutors have considerable latitude in their 
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arguments to the jury, including the right to discuss the evidence 
from their own standpoint, inferences and deductions arising 
therefrom. See State y. Valdez, Utah, 513 P.2d 422 (1973); 
State v, Kazda, Utah, 540 P.2d 949 (1975). However, this broad 
latitude for arguments made to the jury is more limited in 
capital cases "because of the acknowledged uniqueness of the 
death penalty." State v. Brown, Utah, 607 P.2d 261, 271 (1980). 
In the instant case the prosecution's opening statement and 
closing argument contained prejudicial facts that were never 
presented or received into evidence and could have had no 
effect other than to prejudice the jury. 
This court has established that the standard for 
reviewing the comments of counsel is n(l) the remarks called to 
the jurors1 attention matters which they would not be justified 
in considering in reaching a verdict, and (2) unc'er the 
circumstances, the jurors were probably influenced by the 
remarks." State v. Johnson, Utah, 663 P.2d 48,51 (1983) (citing 
State v. Creviston, Utah, 646 P.2d 750, 754 (1982). 
In the prosecutor's closing argument, he mentioned the 
existence of a "hit-list." (R.2481). Although no evidence to that 
effect had ever been introduced, he attempted to convince the 
jurors that there was indeed, a "hit-list": he, therefore, 
far exceeded his duty to use "scrupulous care" as required 
by Brown, 607 P.2d at 271. The prosecutor also, in effect, 
testified that the defendant "stood over her and he grabbed 
her hair, and he pulled her head back so that the blood from 
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her heart would pump freely to the kitchen floor." (R.1672). 
Such a bold assertion of fact should have been established 
through actual evidence/ yet the horrible picture he painted on 
the minds of the jurors was never substantiated. Indeed these 
were substantial matters that the jury would not be justified in 
considering. 
It is important to recognize that the prosecutor had 
painted a graphic description of what supposedly took place and 
that the defendant was compared to a mobster with a hit-list. 
This, coupled with a higher standard of care required in a 
capital case, is sufficient to establish that the jury could have 
been influenced by the remarks and have made a less than rational 
decision. 
The prosecutor also committed error in his closing 
statement during the penalty phase, which included unfair 
references to his own belief of essential issues and extremely 
prejudicial statements of his knowledge, amounting to a 
prejudicial influence over the jury. 
It is essential to reemphasize the scrupulous care 
required of the prosecution in capital cases such as this one. 
It is in the penalty phase that the jury must choose between the 
two most serious penalties that the law can impose. It is not a 
clear-cut determination that might be found in the 
guilt-innocence phase, but a delicate balancing at only the 
essential facts, a balance in which the smallest error may 
incorrectly tip the sensitive scales. It is because of the 
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extreme importance of a correct decision that error in the 
penalty phase should not be overlooked on the chance that it may 
not have been unduly prejudicial. State v. Poe, Utah, 441 P.2d 512 
(1968); Brown, supra. 
In the prosecution1s final statement to the jury, the 
prosecutor again referred to the [defendant's! hit-list." 
(R.1869) Later, he repeatedly and unfairly commented on his own 
belief and hypothesis of the defendant's state of mind. 
(R.1876-82). It has generally been held that it is error for the 
prosecutor to inject his personal opinion into his jury argument. 
State v. Williams, 621 P.2d 423 (Kan. 1980); State v. Sr.oot, 590 
P.2d 1001 (Idaho 1978); People v. Bickley, 372 P.2d 100 (Cal. 
1962). But perhaps the most critical error of all was when, at 
the close of the prosecutor's entire argument, he stated: 
He will kill again. He will murder. He will take 
another human life. The only thing, Ladies and 
Gentlemen, and believe me, I know exactly what i"m 
saying to you,...the only thing between you and the 
only thing between him and his next victim is you. 
The only thing that's going to save the life of the 
next victim of his is you. (R.1889) 
This statement was far beyond the boundaries of mere 
opinion; it was a statement of the prosecutor's own knowledge, 
knowledge that was nowhere evident in the record nor even 
admissible. In effect the prosecutor was testifying as though he 
had a higher knowledge. He effectively stated that he personally 
knew that the defendant would kill again unless the jury returned 
with the death penalty. 
This declaration was not only completely improper and 
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based on mere speculation/ but it was used solely for the purpose 
of inciting the jurors1 passions and tears. In doing so, the 
prosecutor committed grievous prosecutorial misconduct, unduly 
prejudiced the jury and violated the command of the United States 
Supreme Court when it declared, "tilt is of vital importance to 
the defendant and the community that any decision to impose the 
death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than 
caprice or emotion.11 Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. at 349, 358 
(1976). 
POINT XI 
THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ADMITTING 
PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE HOMICIDE VICTIMS WHICH WERE UNDULY 
PREJUDICIAL AND NOT PROBATIVE OF ESSENTIAL FACTS. 
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence allows for the 
exclusion of relevant evidence when "the probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, misleading the jury or other problems." 
The Utah Supreme Coi rt has stated, in relation to a challenge 
that photographs of the victim were unduly prejudicial, 
"photographs that are gruesome are not inadmissible if they are 
probative of essential facts, even though they may be cumulative 
of other evidence." State v. Garcia, Utah, 663 P.2d 60,63 (1983). 
The "key consideration in the application of this rule," the 
Court held, was "the relevence of the photographs." Id. The 
court has held that slides of a victim's body have "no probative 
value" when "[a]11 the material facts which could conceivably 
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have been adduced from viewing of the slides had been established 
by uncontradicted lay and medical testimony." State v. Poe, Utah, 
441 P.2d 512, 515 (1968). In the instant case, as in the goe 
case, the record clearly establishes that any material fact which 
the photographs might have established had already been 
established by uncontradicted testimony; therefore, the 
photographs should not have been admitted. 
The trial court determined that the photographs were 
not cumulative and admitted the photographs of the victims for 
the reasons stated by the prosecution and because "they may have 
some bearing upon the degree of the crime." (P.1931,32) However, 
as the defense pointed out, this information was to be or had 
already been established and was uncontradicted. (P.1935-38) 
Therefore the photographs were merely repetitious of evidence 
already before the jury. 
Exhibit #20, a photograph of the slain child, was 
offered, according to the prosecution, to show the length of the 
wound, that it was inflicted without a "sawing action" (R.1934), 
and that the wound was consistent with a particular knife. Id, 
However, all of this evidence was sufficiently established by the 
medical examiner's testimony and report. (R.1970-93) It is 
highly unlikely that the purpose stated by the prosecution would 
actually be served. The gruesomeness of the photograph with the 
child's throat gaping open is undeniable, so much so that it is 
extremely unlikely that the jury could focus on the extent of the 
"sawing action." The prosecution could have better funfilled 
60 
its stated purpose by the medical examiner's own testimony and 
demonstration. Therefore, the only purpose the photographs 
served was to incite the jurors to passion, prejudice, or hatred. 
While the Court in fiarcia determined that photographs 
may be admissible even though they are cumulative of other 
evidence, the cumulative effect of gruesome photographs is an 
essential element in determining whether the probative value is 
minimized and outweighed by the prejudicial effect. The Garcia 
court determined that in Eoe, "[slince the only material facts 
that could conceivably be adduced from viewing these gruesome 
photographs were otherwise well established and uncontradicted . 
. . the only purpose they served 'was to inflame and arouse the 
jury.1" 663 P.2d at 63 (citing Poe, 441 P.2d at 515). Similarly 
in State v. Wells, Utah, 603 P.2d 810, 813 (1979), the Court held 
that "because the defendant did not dispute [the] shooting..., 
and because the medical examiner testified that the victim died 
as a result of the gunshot, the admission of the photographs was 
superfluous." Because the photographs were merely repetitious, 
the Court determined that there was "no evidentiary value" for 
the photographs and they were wrongly admitted (although the 
court goes on to determine that it was not prejudicial error). 
Id. In State v. Allies, 606 P.2d 1043, 1054 (Mont. 1980), the 
Montana Supreme Court held that the trial court committed 
reversible error by admitting pictures that were "extremely 
gruesome and quite capable of inflaming the minds of the jury." 
As a basis for this determination the Allies court held that the 
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photograph1s demonstiative purpose (including position of the 
bodies at the scene) "could have been and was established [by the 
medical examiner] without the use of the photographs." 
There is no doubt that the photographs of the victims 
are extremely gruesome and prejudicial, when compared to the 
pictures described in Poe. Due to the fact that any purpose they 
might have served was sufficiently established and 
uncontradicted, their actual purpose was only to incite the 
jurors1 passions, disgust and vengeance. 
The trial court also admitted into evidence a 
picture of the victims in a family photo (Exhibit #34). There is 
nothing in the record to demonstrate the relevancy of this 
photograph to the prosecution's case. In People v. Ramos, 639 
P.2d 908 (Cal. 1982), the California Supreme Court held that the 
trial court erred in admitting photograph of victim while she was 
still alive. Similarly, in Ritchie v. State, 632 P.2d 1244 
(Okla. Crim. App. 1981), the court held that reversible error had 
occured when a photograph of the victim was displayed for the 
jury. The court stated that "the jury should not have been 
concerned with what the [victim] looked like prior to the offense 
committed." Id. at 1246. The court determined that "liln a close 
case, on appeal, such a photograph may well tip the scales in 
appellant1s favor." Id. 
This Court has stated that, in distinguishing between 
harmless and reversible error, the court will look to determine 
whether there is a "reasonable probability or likelihood the 
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result would have been more favorable to the defendant," Wells, 
603 P.2d at 813, see also State v. Fisher, Utah, 680 P.2d 35 
(1984). In determining this probability it must be remembered 
that "Is]crupulous care must be exercised by the State in capital 
cases in both the guilt-determining and penalty phases in 
presentation of evidence and argument because of the acknowledged 
uniqueness of the dealth penalty." State v« Brown, Utah, 607 
P.2d 261, 271 (1980). 
It is especially probable that the above photographs 
"could very well have tipped the scales in favor of the death 
penalty" and "with the defendant's life at stake, this court 
should not hazard a guess." Poe, 441 P.2d at 515. 
POINT XII 
THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY ADMITTED A COLOR VIDEO 
RECORDING OF THE HOMICIDE SCENE WHICH WAS UNDULY 
PREJUDICIAL, CUMULATIVE AND CALCULATED TO INFLAME 
THE PASSIONS OF THE JURORS. 
During the crucial and vital penalty phase where 
scrupulous care is to be taken, the trial court allowed the jury 
to view a color video of the crime scene. The massive amounts of 
blood made the video unquestionably prejudicial and, in effect, 
even more dramatic than had the prosecution introduced hundreds of 
photographs. The obvious prejudicial and cumulative effect could 
only be justified if the video had a substantial probative value. 
The purpose of the video was dramatically etched into the juror's 
minds by the prosecution's closing argument in which he stated, 
"We saw red blood, fresh blood, and the smell of death. And 
that's why, quite frankly, I tried to show that video tape; so 
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that you could get a feeling of what the smell of death is 
actually like." (R.2885) With that on their minds the jury 
retired to deliberate on the life or death of the defendant, a 
vital and delicate decision which the United States Supreme Court 
has determined should "be, and appear to be, based on reason 
rather than caprice or emotion." Gardner v. Florida, 430 U. S. 
349, 358 (1976). 
The purpose of the video was obvious from the 
prosecution1s own declaration and worked to incite the passions 
and vengeance of the jurors. For this reason the court should 
set aside the defendant's sentence of death. 
POINT XIII 
UTAH'S SENTENCING PROCEEDINGS STATUTE FOR CAPITAL 
FELONY CASES VIOLATES DUE PROCESS BECAUSE THE 
STATUTORY AGGRAVATING FACTORS, WHICH ARE NECESSARY 
ELEMENTS OF THE CAPITAL CRIME, ARE ALSO THE 
AGGRAVATING FACTORS CONSIDERED BY THE JURY IN 
DETERMINING WHETHER TO IMPOSE THE DEATH SENTENCE. 
In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, (1972) the Supreme 
Court reversed the death sentence imposed upon the defendant and 
held that the death penalty could not be imposed under sentencing 
procedures that created a substantial risk that the penalty would 
be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. The effect 
of that holding was to deem unconstitutional many of the capital 
punishment statutes throughout the United States. As a result, a 
majority of the states, including Utah, modified or rewrote their 
capital punishment statutes in order to comply with the 
constitutional standards required under gurman. One of the 
developments adopted by several states, including Utah, is a 
64 
bifurcation of the trial into an initial guilt-innocence phase 
and a subsequent the penalty phase. Drafters of the Model Penal 
Code, as quoted in Sregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 191 (1976), 
concluded: 
[If a unitary proceeding is used] the determination of 
the punishment must be based on less than all the 
evidence that has a bearing on that issue, such, for 
example/ as a previous criminal record of the accused, 
or evidence must be admitted on the ground that it is 
relevant to sentence, though it would be excluded as 
irrelevant or prejudicial with respect to guilt or 
innocence alone. Trial lawyers understandably have 
little confidence in a solution that admits evidence 
and trusts to an instruction to the jury that it should 
be considered only in determining the penalty and 
disregarded in assessing guilt. 
The obvious solution ... is to bifurcate the 
proceeding, abiding strictly by the Rules of Evidence 
until and unless there is a conviction, but once guilt 
has been determined opening the record to further 
information that is relevant to sentence. This is the 
analog of the procedure in the ordinary case when 
capital punishment is not an issue; the court conducts 
a separate inquiry before imposing sentence. 
ALI Model Penal Code, Section 201,6, Comment 5, pages 
74-75, (Tent. Draft #9, 1959). 
The purpose, then, of the bifurcated trial is to permit 
a limitation on the evidence admitted to avoid unfair prejudice 
to the defendant during the jury's determination of guilt or 
innocence. After the determination of guilt, the penalty phase 
of the trial begins. In that phase, 
[elvidence may be presented as to any matter the court 
deems relevent to sentence, including but not limited 
to the nature and circumstances of the crime, the 
defendant's character, background, history, mental 
and physical condition, and any other facts in 
aggravation or mitigation of the penalty. Any 
evidence the court deems to have probative force may 
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be received regardless of its admissibility under the 
exclusionary rules of evidence. Utah Code Ann., 
§ 76-3-207(2). 
The purpose of broadening the scope of evidence to be 
considered by the jury is to permit the defendant to present 
evidence of factors which mitigate against imposition of the 
death penalty. Often this evidence would be inadmissible in the 
guilt-innocence phase of the trial because of its irrelevance in 
determining guilt. 
Another reason for bifurcation of the trial as 
indicated by the drafters of the Model Penal Code quoted above is 
that the jury often cannot distinguish between evidence which 
should be considered only in determining the penalty and 
disregard it in assessing guilt. The Supreme Court has 
recognized that there are limitations on a jury's ability to 
disregard incriminating evidence against a defendant despite 
limiting instructions from the court. In Eruton v. United Statesf 
391 U.S. 123 (1967), evidence of a confession by the defendant 
implicating his co-defendant was admitted. The defendant 
invoked his right not to testify and, therefore, the co-defendant 
could not cross-examine the defendant. The trial court instructed 
the jury, an impossible task — to consider the evidence only 
in determining the guilt of the defendant but not the co-
defendant. The Supreme Court said "We hold that, because of the 
substantial risk that the jury, despite instructions to the 
contrary, looked to the incriminating extrajudicial statements in 
determining [co-defendant1si guilt, admission of [defendant's] 
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confession in this joint trial violated co-defendant's right of 
cross-examination secured by the confrontation clause of the 
Sixth Amendment." 
Similarly, in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 (1963), 
the New York practice has been to submit the issue of 
voluntariness of a confession to the jury along with the 
determination of guilt or innocence. The jury was told that, if 
it found the confession involuntary, it was to disregard it 
entirely, and determine guilt or innocence solely from the other 
evidence in the case; alternatively, if it found the confession 
voluntary, it was to determine its truth or reliability and 
afford it weight accordingly. The Supreme Court said that "the 
New York procedure poses substantial threats to a defendant's 
constitutional rights to have an involuntary confession entirely 
disregarded and to have the coercion issue fairly and reliably 
determined. These hazards we cannot ignore." Id. at 389. The 
Supreme Court held that the New York procedure was a violation 
of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and that 
the determination of voluntariness of confession must be determined 
in an independent hearing to avoid unfair prejudice to the 
defendant. 
Under Utah law, the defendant in the instant case was 
charged with first-degree murder. During the trial phase the 
jury was required to determine two issues: First, whether 
criminal homicide had been committed in connection with one 
aggravating factor, thereby enhancing the crime to first-degree 
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murder; and second, whether the defendant was guilty of committing 
the act of first-degree murder. The Utah Code Ann. §7i5-5-202 
states: 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the first 
degree if the actor intentionally or knowingly causes 
the death of another under any of the following circum-
stances. •. 
(b) The homicide was committed incident to one act, 
scheme, course of conduct, or criminal episode during 
which two or more persons are killed... 
(q) The homicide was committed in an especially 
heinous, atrocious, cruel, or exceptionally depraved 
manner, any of which must be demonstrated by physicial 
torture, serious physical abuse, or serious bodily 
injury to the victim before death. 
(2) Murder in the first degree is a capital offense. 
In the instance case, the defendant was found guilty 
in a jury trial of first-degree murder because of the presence 
of the two enhancing or aggravating factors listed in (b) and (g) 
of the statute. 
Dpon conviction of a capital felony § 76-3-2G6 
and § 76-3-2C7 control the penalty phase of the bifurcated 
trial. During the penalty phase, the jury has one issue before 
it — whether the defendant is sufficently culpable for his act 
warranting imposition of the death sentence. During the penalty 
phase the jury must consider the aggravating factors as compared 
to the total mitigating factors. The jury must be persuaded 
beyond a reasonable doubt that total aggravating factors outweigh 
total mitigating factors and they must be further persuaded 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the imposition of the death 
penalty is justified and appropriate under the circumstances. 
State V. Wood, Utah, 648 P.2d 71 (1981). 
Section 76-3-2C7 lists seven statutory mitigating 
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factors which may be considered and refers to § 76-5-202 for the 
list of statutory aggravating factors. These statutory aggravat-
ing factors are the same factors which the jury has already 
considered in finding the defendant guilty of first-degree 
murder in the guilt-innocence phase of the trial. However, 
the purpose of the penalty phase in not to determine guilt, 
but rather culpablility and sentence. Because the only statutory 
aggravating factors to be considered during the penalty phase are 
those for which the defendant has already been found guilty, the 
jury is prejudiced against the defendant regarding those factors. 
The distinction that the jury must make between the 
purpose of the guilt-innocence phase of the trial and the penalty 
phase is too obscure and approaches the same degree of mental 
gymnastics as was required by the trial courts in J_ackson v. 
Denno, gupr_a and Bruton v. United States, supra. The jury enters 
the penalty phase of the trial believing beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the aggravating factors are present. This statutory 
scheme shifts the burden of proof from the state to the 
defendant. The defendant must now prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the total mitigating factors outweigh total aggravating 
factors and therefore the death penalty is inappropriate in his case. 
The capital punishment statutes of Georgia and Florida, 
which were deemed constitutional in Gregg v. Georgia, supra and 
Proffit v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) do not list the elements 
of the capital crime as aggravating factors. In contrast, the 
Utah statute, § 16-3-2C7, incorporates by reference § 76-5-202 as 
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the only statutory aggravating factors. This significant 
difference in the Utah statute shifts the burden of proof to the 
defendant, is highly prejudicial and violates due process under 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The scope of review established for reviewing alleged 
error in the penalty phase of a capital case was stated in State 
V. Wood, Utah, 648 P.2d 71 (1981). The Court said that "in the 
penalty phase it is our duty to determine whether the sentence of 
death resulted from error, prejudice, or aibitrariness, or was 
disproportionate." The shifting of the burden of proof caused by 
the mental gymnastics required of jurors by this statute causes 
great prejudice to the defendants in capital cases and produces 
arbitrary and disproportionate results in the sentencing in 
capital cases. This error is so prejudicial that it violates the 
defendant's due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and 
therefore the death sentence as determined by the jury should be 
reversed in the instant case. 
POINT XIV 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY 
EXCLUDING EVIDENCE PROFFERRED BY DEFENSE COUNSEL 
DESIGNED TO ESTABLISH MITIGATING FACTORS. 
As discussed in the previous section the evidenciary 
standards for admission of evidence of the penalty phase of the 
trial are greatly reduced, thereby permitting introduction of 
evidence which would not otherwise be admissible at trial. 
Section 76-3-207(2) states: "In these sentencing proceedings, 
evidence may be presented as to any matter the court deems 
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relevant to sentence/ including but not limited to the nature 
and circumstances of the crime/ the defendant's character, 
background/ history/ mental and physical condition/ and any other 
facts in aggravation or mitigation of the penalty. Any evidence 
the court deems to have probative force may be received 
regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary rules of 
evidence." (Emphasis added.) 
In the penalty phase of the instant case, the only 
aggravating factors relied on by the state were those statutory 
aggravating factors found in § 76-5-2C2 (1)(b) and (q) 
(multiple deaths and heinous nature of murder). Section 76-3-2C7 
(2) outlines the possible mitigating circumstances: 
(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior 
criminal activities; 
(b) The murder was committed while the defendant was 
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance; 
(c) The defendant acted under extreme duress or under 
the substantial domination of another person; 
(d) At the time of the murder/ the capacity of the 
defendant to appreciate the criminality 
(wrongfulness) of his conduct or to conform his 
conduct to the requirement of law was substantially 
impaired as a result of mental disease, intoxica-
tion/ or influence of drugs; 
(e) The use of the defendant at the time of the crime; 
(f) The defendant was an accomplice in the murder 
committed by another person and his participation 
was relatively mild; 
(g) And any other fact in mitigation of the penalty. 
The trial court committed prejudical error and abused 
its discretion during the penalty phase when it denied admission 
into evidence testimony by the district court clerk regarding the 
two life sentences received by Dan Lafferty. On the morning of 
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the last day of trial, in the judge's chambers prior to calling 
the final witness, defense counsel proferred testimony by 
William Huish, the district court clerk. Defense counsel said, 
"I would think that to allow the jury to gauge the relative 
contributions of the defendant, make some evaluation as to 
control and dominion and yet not have the ultimate fact, that is, 
how the other co-defendants were disposed of in the fact, is 
ridiculous. I just think that you just go halfway and just 
stop." (R.2874-20) 
The court denied the proffer and stated, "I don't think 
it has any bearing at that stage, because I think what happened 
to other defendants similarly situated, including the co-defendants, 
is probably a matter to be taken into consideration on an appeal to 
the Supreme Court or some other place." (P.2875) 
Although the Arizona Supreme Court found that there is 
no requirement that the court impose identical sentences upon two 
co-defendants, State v. Schlarp, 541 P.2d 411, (Ariz. 1975), the 
Idaho Supreme Court later found that it was not error that a 
trial court compared a defendant with his co-defendant, nor that 
the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a greater 
sentence upon the leader of the two. State v, Eovcutt, 620 
P.2d 795 (Idaho 1980). 
In the penalty phase of a defendant's trial, § 76-3-
207(2) permits a broad range of evidence which is admissable 
to establish mitigating and aggravating factors to be considered 
by the jury. Also in that section, one of the statutory 
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mitigating factors is "(g) And any other fact in mitigation of 
the penalty." As the testimony of Dr. Groesbeck, Dr. Howell, and 
Dr. Eeinbecker indicated the defendant suffered a shared 
paranoia with Dan Lafferty Dr. Groesbeck and Dr. Powell testified 
that Dan Lafferty was the dominant person in the shared paranoia. 
(R. 2645-2653, R. 2729-2738, R.2781) The juryfs consideration of 
Dan Laffertyfs sentence as a mitigating factor would have been 
relevant to its decision regarding imposition of the death 
penalty on the defendant. The trial courtfs refusal to admit 
such testimony by Mr. Huish was an abuse of discretion which was 
prejudicial to the defendant. Therefore, the defendant's death 
sentence should be reduced to life imprisonment. 
POINT XV 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN 
ALLOWING FACTORS IN AGGRAVATION IN ADDITION TO 
THE STATUTORY FACTORS SET FORTH IN THE JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS. 
Instruction Number 3 (See Addendum, Exhibit 10) 
instructed the jury as to the factors the jury could consider in 
aggravation or mitigation of the death penalty. Only two 
aggravating factors were set forth for the jury to consider: 
1. The homicide was committed incident to one act, 
scheme, course of conduct, or criminal episode during which two 
or more persons were killed. 
2. The homicide was committed in an especially 
heinous, atrocious, cruel, or exceptionally depraved manner, any 
of which must be demonstrated by physical torture, serious 
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physical abuse, or serious bodily injury of the victim before 
death. 
In addition to giving the foregoing instruction, the 
court also orally advised the jury, prior to the commencement of 
the penalty phase, that there would only be two factors to be 
considered in aggravation, those set forth above. (P.2538) 
Further, the court had previously informed counsel that the only 
aggravating circumstances would be the two set forth above. 
(R.2529) 
The prosecutor was allowed, over objection, to cell Lt. 
Jerry Scott of the Utah County £herifffs Department to testify as 
to alleged assault the defendant had committed while incarcerated 
in the Utah County Jail. There were four such incidents related, 
none of which had any connection or relationship to either of the 
aggravating factors which the court had stated would be 
allowed. The defendant had not been convicted, nor was he even 
charged with any criminal act in regard to any of the four 
incidents. 
The Washington Supreme Court considered a similar 
situation in which the prosecution introduced evidence during the 
penalty phase of crimes alleged to have been committed by the 
defendant but of which he had not been convicted. In State v. 
Bartholomew, 654 P.2d 1170, 1184 (Wash. 1982) the court stated: 
To allow the jury which has convicted defendant of 
aggravated first-degree murder to consider evidence 
of other crimes of which the defendant has not been 
convicted is, in our opinion, unreasonably prejudicial 
to defendant. A jury which has convicted defendant of 
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a capital crime is unlikely to fairly and impartially 
weigh the evidence of prior alleged offenses. In 
effect/ to allow such evidence is to impose upon a 
defendant who stands in peril of his life the burden 
of defending/ before the jury that has already con-
victed him/ new charges of criminal activity. 
Information relating to defendant's criminal past 
should therefore be limited to his record of con-
victions* 
The admission of the testimony of Lt. Scott concerning 
the alleged assualts was additionally prejudicial in that the 
defendant had no prior notice that such evidence would be 
introduced and/ therefore/ no opportunity to rebutt the 
allegations. As was stated in Bartholomew/ the effect upon the 
jury of such evidence places upon the defendant an unreasonable 
burden. 
POINT XVI 
BASED UPON THE EVIDENCE INTRODUCED AT THE PENALTY 
HEARING/ REASONABLE MINDS COULD NOT FIND BEYOND 
A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE TOTALITY OP THE 
AGGRAVATING FACTORS TOTALLY OUTWEIGHED THE 
MITIGATING FACTORS BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT AND 
THAT THE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IS 
JUSTIFIED AND APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES. 
This Court in State v» Wood/ Utah/ 638 P.2d 71 (1981)/ 
established the standard of proof in capital penalty proceedings 
to be that: "falfter considering the totality of the aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances/ you must be persuaded beyond a 
reasonable doubt that total aggravation outweighs total 
mitigation/ and you must further be persuaded/ beyond a 
reasonable doubt/ that the imposition of the death penalty is 
justified and appropriate in the circumstances.11 648 P.2d 83. 
Defendant produced evidence of many factors in 
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mitigation, including, but not limited to, the following: 
1. The defendant had no prior criminal record. 
(R.2849-2850) 
2. The homicides were committed while defendant was 
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, 
(R.2644, 2779, 2790) 
3. The defendant acted under the substantial 
domination of another person, (R.2649-2653, 2730) 
4. At the time of the homicides the capacity of the 
defendant to appreciate the wrongfulness of conduct or to conform 
his conduct to the requirement of the law was substantially 
impaired as a result of mental disease* (R. 2792) 
5. The defendant was presently mentally 
ill. (R. 2629, 2714-15, 2778-79) 
6. Evidence of past community and public service, 
church positions and defendant's qualities as a friend and 
neighbor. (R.2768, 2778-79, 2877-79) 
It is apparent from the record that the totality of the 
mitigating circumstances was sufficient to, at least, rise to the 
point of establishing a reasonable doubt as to whether the death 
penalty should be imposed in the present case. 
POINT XVII 
THE TRIAL CODRT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN 
ALLOWING HEARSAY AND HEARSAY UPON HEARSAY EVIDENCE 
AT THE PENALTY HEARING. 
During the penalty phase, the State introduced, over 
objection of defense counsel, evidence through Lt. Jerry Scott. 
76 
Portions of Scott's testimony involved a recounting of what a 
cellmate of defendant, Joel Montgomery, had related to Scott. 
(R.2568) Montgomery was not called to testify and Scott's 
recounting of* Montgomery1s statements constituted hearsay. 
Additionally, Lt. Scott related information told to him by 
co-defendant Dan Lafferty. This information was as follows: 
". . . And then he proceeded to tell me that Ron had been trying 
to grab him and would kill him if he had the opportunity to, and 
he was really scared of him and he was afraid that Ron would try 
to kill himself.11 (R.2570) 
The foregoing hearsay statements were extremely 
prejudicial to the defendant in that he had no opportunity to 
confront the witnesses against him as required by Bruton v. 
United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1967). Although the language of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(1) provides for the admission of any 
probative evidence regardless of its admissibility under the 
exclusionary rules of evidence, this Court has not viewed that 
statute as a carte blanch authorization to allow such normally 
inadmissible evidence as that described above in the penalty 
hearing. 
In State v. Brown, Utah, 607 P.2d 261, 271 (1980) the 
Court stated: 
And that scrupulous care must particularly extend to 
evidence introduced by the State in the penalty phase 
when the evidence is probative but would not be 
admissible under the exclusionary rules of evidence 
in the guilt-determining phase. When the State offers 
this type of evidence in the penalty phase, it must 
be certain that it is not prejudicial to the defendant 
— prejudicial, of course, in a legal sense. 
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It is worth noting that the hearsay evidence introduced 
as described above was not probative of either of the two 
aggravating factors allowed by the court, in addition to being 
legally prejudicial to the defendant. 
Further, the court allowed hearsay upon hearsay when 
the court allowed Scott to testify to statements of defendant 
made to Montgomery, his cellmate, which were related by 
Montgomery to Scott and by Scott to the jury. (P..2569) The said 
testimony was offered in an attempt to show that the defendant 
had attacked Montgomery over an argument as to which television 
program they should watch. (R.2543) In Brown, supra/ the court 
held the admission of hearsay upon admissible hearsay to be 
prejudicial error. The statement of defendent here introduced 
was not admissible hearsay in that it was not an admission, but 
rather hearsay upon inadmissible hearsay. The court committed 
error in allowing such evidence as set forth above since such 
evidence was both legally prejudicial and non-probative of either 
of the two aggravating factors set forth by the court. The 
nature of the error is of constitutional proportion, in that, as a 
result, the defendant was denied due process of law. See Gardner 
v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1976). 
POINT XVIII 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN 
INSTRUCTING THE JURY THAT THEY COULD CONSIDER 
ANY EVIDENCE WHICH HAD BEEN ADMITTED IN THE 
GUILT PORTION OF THE TRIAL IN ADDITION TO 
THOSE ADMITTED IN THE PENALTY PORTION. 
The trial court instructed the jury in the penalty 
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phase via Instruction Mo. 3, thet the jury could consider 
"•••all of the evidence which has been admitted in the case." 
(See Addendum, Exhibit 10.) Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(2) 
outlines what evidence may be admitted during the penalty phase 
of a capital case. This provision does not provide that the jury 
may consider evidence introduced during the guilt phase. The 
court advised the jurors they could consider: "All evidence 
which has been admitted in the case, as well as evidence which 
may be introduced in this penalty phase, is available for your 
consideration. It does not have to be reintroduced again, but 
may be referred to by counsel on both sides if they so desire." 
(R.2541) 
The prosecutor relied heavily in his closing arguments 
in the penalty phase from evidence not introduced in the penalty 
phase. He referred to medical testimony describing the victims 
heart pumping blood about the floor (R.2891), alleged prior 
criminal activity of defendant, i.e. stealing gas, food, etc. 
(none of which had been the subject of a conviction or charge 
against the defendant) (R.2891), marriages of defendant (R.2902), 
a hit-list (R.2903) and many other matters which were the subject 
of testimony introduced at the guilt phase of the trial. 
This procedure denies the defendant due process in that 
the defendant does not have the opportunity to object to evidence 
which may have been competent during the guilt phase, but would 
be objectionable if offered during the penalty phase. For 
example, the evidence of prior criminal activity of defendant for 
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which he had not been convicted may have had some advisibility in 
the guilt phase, but should have been excluded in the penalty phase* 
In addition to the problem of admissibility, the more 
serious due process violation is the difficulty of determining and 
rationally reviewing the process and evidence upon which the jury 
based its determination that the death penalty was appropriate 
and that the totality of mitigating factors was outweighed by the 
totality of the aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The imposition of any standard of procedure or process of 
determination is constitutionally flawed if there is no effective 
means of review. It is difficult to perceive how this Court can 
make meaning of the evidence and factors upon which the jury 
based their considerations of the death penalty issues. The trial 
court did not require the jury to make any specific findings as 
to the factors or evidence they considered. Even bad the jury's 
consideration been limited to the evidence introduced at the 
penalty phase, this court would have a difficult test. However, 
the overly broad invitation of the court to consider "any and 
allw evidence introduced during the guilt and penalty phase 
imposes an impossible test upon the appellate court. In Gaiflner 
v^ Florida, supra at 361, the United States Supreme Court stated: 
Since the state must administer its capital sentencing 
procedures with an even hand, it is important that the 
record on appeal disclose to the reviewing court the 
considerations which motivated the death sentence in 
every case in which it is imposed. Without full 
disclosure of the basis for the death sentences, the 
Florida capital sentencing procedures would be subject 
to the defects which resulted in the holding of 
unconstitutionality in Fucman v. Georgia. 
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The trial court violated the defendants right to 
procedural due process by allowing the jury to consider matters 
not introduced in the penalty phase, since no meaningful review 
can be had of the factors upon which the jury based their 
decision to impose the death penalty. 
POINT XIX 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO ARREST JUDGMENT. 
According to Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-23, as amended: 
At any time prior to the imposition of sentence, 
the court upon it own initiative may, or upon 
the motion of the defendant shall, arrest 
judgment if the facts proved or admitted do not 
constitute a public offense or the defendant is 
mentally ill, or there is other good cause for 
the arrest of judgment. 
Since the court found as a matter of law that the 
defendant was mentally ill (R.471), the court erred as a matter 
of law in not granting the motion to arrest judgment. 
The term mental illness appears in several sections 
throughout the code. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-21.5, as 
amended. However, mental illness is only defined in Utah Code 
Ann. § 64-7-28(1), as amended. 
Therefore, since the court had already found as a 
matter of law that the defendant was mentally ill, it erred in 
denying the defendants motion to arrest judgment. 
POINT XX 
DEFENDANT CANNOT BE CONVICTED OF BOTH CAPITAL 
HOMICIDE AND THE INCHOATE CRIME OF CONSPIRACY. 
Defendant was convicted of two counts of capital 
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homicide, as well as two counts of conspiracy to commit capital 
homicide. Conspiracy, an inchoate offense, is defined in Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-4-201 as follows: 
For purposes of this part a person is guilty of 
conspiracy when he, intending that conduct 
constituting a crime be performed, agrees with 
one or more persons to engage in or cause the 
performance of such conduct and any one of them 
commits an overt act in pursuance of the 
conspiracy, except where the offense is a 
capital offense, a felony against the person, 
arson, burglary, or robbery, the overt act 
is not required for the commission of conspiracy. 
According to the State1s theory of the case, the 
defendant, with three others, planned to carry out the killing 
of four individuals in rapid succession. (P.1677) Two of these 
four individuals were the victims alleged in the two counts of 
criminal homicide, while the remaining two individuals, Richard 
Stowe and Chloe Low, were the alleged intended victims in each of 
the two conspiracy counts. The record is devoid of any testimony 
or other evidence presented supporting the existence of a 
separate agreement or conspiracy to commit homicide of the two 
conspiracy victims. Although Chip Carnes testified that there 
was a meeting during which the homicides were discussed (P..1282), 
there was no evidence presented regarding any separate meetings 
or any separate agreements to kill Low and Stowe. The evidence 
would, if at all, support only one agreement to kill four 
individuals, rather than separate conspiracies to commit two 
capital homicides. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-302 provides: 
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No person shall be convicted of both an inchoate 
and principal offense or of both an attempt to 
commit an offense and a conspiracy to commit the 
same offense, (Emphasis added,) 
The defendant, having been convicted of the principal 
offense of capital homicide, could not have been convicted of the 
inchoate offense of conspiracy to commit capital homicide with 
regard to the homicide victims. The only possible victims of a 
conspiracy for which the defendant could have been convicted were 
Richard Stowe and Chloe Low. The record simply fails to provide a 
basis for having convicted the defendant of two additional and 
separate conspiracies. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant seeks reversal of his conviction on all six 
counts in the Information and a reversal of his sentence of 
death. In the alternative, he seeks a new trial and a reversal of 
the death penalty, upon the basis that the trial of defendant in 
both the guilt phase and the penalty phase did not meet 
constitutionally mandated procedure, which resulted in substantial 
prejudice to defendant. 
Respectfully submitted this day of January, 1986. 
MICHAEL D/~ES?LIN 
Attorney for Appellant 
Gary JU7 Weight 7 
Attorney for Appellant 
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RONALD WATSCN LAFFERTY, DAN 
ZHARLES LAFFERTY, RICHARD M. 
"RICK" KNAPP, aka RICKY MARTIN 
KNAPP aqd CHARLES ALAN "CHIP" 
CARNES 
Defendants. 
I N F O R M A T I O N 
Criminal No. 84-CR-186 
The undersigned Gary C a i d v e i i
 t under oath states on information 
and belief that the defendant(s) committed the cnme(s) of: 
COUNT I : 
CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, Murder in the First Degree, a Capital Offense, in violation of 
76-5-202(1) (b), Utah Criminal Code, as amended, in that they/ on or about July 
24, 1984, in Utah County, Utah, knowingly and intentionally caused the death of 
Brenda Lafferty incident to one act, scheme, course of conduct, or criminal 
episode in which two or more persons were killed. 
ODUNT II: 
CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, Murder in the First Degree, a Capital Offense, in violation of 
76-5-202(1) (b), Utah Criminal Code, as amended, in that they, on or about July 
24, 1984, in Utah County, Utah, knowingly and intentionally caused the death of 
Erica Lafferty incident to one act, scheme, course of conduct, or criminal 
episode in \ghich two or more persons were killed. 
COCNT III: 
AGGRAVATED BURGLARY, a Felony of the First Degree, in violation of 76-6-203, Utah 
Criminal Code, as amended, in that they, on or about July 24, 1984, in Utah County, 
Utah, unlawfully entered the duelling of Brenda Lafferty, with the intent to corrmit 
felony, and that during the oonmission thereof, the actor or another participant 
in the crime was armed with a deadly weapon. 
COCNT IV: 
CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY, a Felony of the First Degree, in violation of 76-4-201, Utah 
Criminal Code, as amended, in that they, on or about July 24, 1984, in Utah County, 
Utah, did agree with one or more persons to engage in conduct intending that the 
criminal homicide of two or more persons, including Chloe Lew, a Capital Offense, 
be ooiuidtted. 
COUNT V: 
AGGRAVATED BURGLARY, a Felcny of the First Degree, in violation of 76-6-203, Utah 
Criminal Code, as amended, in that they, an or about July 24, 1984, in Utah County, 
Utah, unlawfully entered the duelling of Chloe Lav, with the intent to aoimit a 
felcny, and that during the oonmission thereof, the actor or another participant 
in the crime was armed with a deadly weapon. 
COUNT VI: 
CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY, a Felony of the First Degree, in violation of 76-4-201, Utah 
Criminal Code, as amended, in that they, on or about July 24, 1984, in Utah Cbunty, 
Utah, did agree with one or more persons to engage in conduct intending that the 
criminal homicide of t**o or more persons, including Richard Stowe, a Capital Offense, 
be oomnitted. 
This Information is based on evidence from the following witnesses: 
Gary C a l d w e l l , A .F .P .D . 
Authorized for presentment and filing: 
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY 
COMPLAIN AWT 
. CdUu^ 
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EXHIBIT 2 
C O P Y 
IK THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
RONALD WATSON LAFFERTY 
and DAN CHARLES LAFFERTY, 
Defendants. 
Criminal No. 9309 
TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING 
BE IT REMEMBERED, that the above-
entitled matter came on regularly for hearing before the 
Honorable J. Robert Bullock, Judge of the above-entitled 
court, on the 23rd and 24th days of October, 1984, at Room 
310, County Building, Provo, Utah; 
That there appeared as counsel repre-
senting plaintiff State of Utah, WAYNE B. VJATSON, ESQ., 
Deputy Utah County Attorney, and NOALL T. WOOTTON, ESQ., 
Utah County Attorney; and that both defendants appeared pro 
se, and that court-appointed standby counsel representing the 
defendants, MICHAEL D. ESPLIN, ESQ. and GARY H. WEIGHT, ESQ.J 
were both in attendance. I 
WHEREUPON, the following proceedings 



























CRAIG L. RASVALL: 
BRENT H. HARRISON: 
(Mark Reed - not p 
NOALL WOOTTON: 
TRACY STEVE VALDEZ 
WAYNE WATSON: 
JERRY SCOTT: 
ROBERT J. SUMSION: 
(Dave Olson - not 
(Barry Crowther -
MICHAEL K, JENSEN: 
KAY JENSEN: 
JOSEPH DIMICK: 
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1 THE COURT: As I indicated before the 
2
 recess: This is a hearing under Section 77-15-5 and 64-7-
3 36, Utah Code Annotated, to determine whether or not the 
4
 defendants, or either of them, are incompetent to proceed, 
5 as defined in Section 77-15-2, Utah Code Annoted, 1953 as 
6
 Amended, 
7 The issue in this case has been raised by the 
8
 state, by the filing of a petition, pursuant to Section 
9
 J 77-15-3, alleging that both defendants are incompetent to 
proceed, 
11
 I The record will show that both the defendants are 
12
 I present; that the state is represented by Mr. Wootton, Utah 
13
 ( County Attorney, and by Mr. Watson, Deputy Utah County 
14
 I Attorney. And the record will show, further, that standby 
*
5
 I counsel previously appointed by the Court are present. 
The record will show also that the Court appointed 
two alienists to examine the defendants with regard to their 
competency to proceed under Section 77-15-5, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, on October 1, 1984; and that the reports 
of the examination by the two alienists have been received 
by the Court and are made a part of the record. 
Further, that copies of the reports were furnished 
to the defendants; and that this hearing is being held not 
less than five nor more than 15 days after the report from 












2 The Court will further, or, the record will 
3 further show that the Court has excluded from the courtroom 
4 all persons not necessary to the conduct of the proceedings. 
5 Now, Mr. Ron Lafferty, do you have counsel? 
6 RON LAFFERTY: Do I have counsel? 
7 THE COURT: Yes. Are you represented 
8 by counsel. 
9 RON LAFFERTY: No, I'm certainly not. 
10 THE COURT: And, Mr. Dan Lafferty, are 
11 you represented by counsel? 
12 DAN LAFFERTY: No, I'm not. 
13 THE COURT: Do either or you, or both 
14 of you, want counsel to represent you in this proceeding? 
15 RON LAFFERTY: I don't. 
16 DAN LAFFERTY: No. 
17 THE COURT: Now, I will appoint, for 
18 this proceeding, counsel for you, if that is your desire. 
19 J On the other hand, if you do not accept counsel, I will not 
appoint it. And I tell you that you have a constitutional 
right to counsel in this proceeding, the same as you have a 





 Now, again, do either of you want counsel? 
24 
25 
DAN LAFFERTY: I appreciate acknowledg-


























counsel, I'll represent myself. 
THE COURT: Okay. And, Mr. Ron 
Lafferty? 
RON LAFFERTY: No, I don't. I don't 
care to have counsel, either. 
THE COURT: All right, then, are you 
ready to proceed? 
RON LAFFERTY: Yes. 
DAN LAFFERTY: Urn-hum. (Yes) 
THE COURT: Now, I understand that Dr. 
Groesbeck, who was one of the alienists who conducted the 
examination pursuant to the Court's order and whose report 
has been received and a copy of which report has been furnish-
ed to the defendants, and which report has been read by the 
Court, is not available to testify or for cross examination 
here today. 
If either of you want to postpone this hearing, 
so that Dr. Groesbeck can be here, or for any other purpose 
including being examined by any psychiatrists or psychologists 
or other alienist, the Court would postpone it. The alter-
nature to that is to proceed without Dr. Groesbeck. 
Now, I'm going to ask you, Mr. Ron Lafferty, if 
you want to proceed at this time or do you want additional 
time to have Dr. Groesbeck available and, perhaps, also 


























Jesus Christ has identified as positives. And although he is 
a Mormon, or a Latter-day Saint, I can't acknowledge him to 
be anything but anti-Christ. And all he is trying to do is 
to violate another First Amendment right, which I have, the 
right to religious belief. He wants to put me in a treat-
ment center and force me to believe as he believes , which is 
anti-Christ, which is incidentally as far as his belief as 
an infidel. And I have no desire to change my religious 
beliefs. 
And, I think that pretty well covers it. 
THE COURT: Okay. Since you have been 
talking about the waiver of right to counsel and in response 
to my question, you've indicated that you felt that you could 
and have made a knowing and intelligent decision with regard 
to waiving your counsel. I want to point out to you some of 
the consequences or some of the reasons why you ought to 
have counsel. And then if your answer is still the same, so 
be it. But, I think you should know. I'm not sure that 
these things have been called to your attention prior to 
this time. 
DAN LAFFERTY: Frankly, each judge has 
taken the time to do that. And I might ask if after you do 
that, I may have the right to explain to you the reasons I 
think it would be to my disadvantage. 
ThE COURT: Yes. Yes, I'll let you do 
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it, pamphlet, and if you could erect that wall, you could 
figure out, you could look at one, and you probably could 
put some mortar in and put the bricks on top of each other 
the way that they are supposed to be. But, the chances of 
you getting the kind of a wall that you would get if you had 
a bricklayer build the wall, are pretty slim. And, I think 
that's true when you don't have counsel in a complex and 
complicated trial, such as a capital case. 
Now, there is an old addage, I don't know how old 
it is, but there is an addage which says, that: "A person 
who represents himself has a fool for a client." 
Do you know what that means, Mr. Dan Lafferty? 
DAN LAFFERTY: Yes. I've heard it many 
times. 
THE COURT: What does it mean? 
DAN LAFFERTY: It means that the person 
who's made the statement is judging that the person who is 
representing themselves is a fool. 
THE COURT: Okay. What do you think it 
means? 
RON LAFFERTY: About the same thing. 
THE COURT: About the same thing? All 
right. 
Do you agree with it? 
DAN LAFFERTY: Absolutely, not. 
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RON LAFFERTY: You say that we are going 
to have to within a day or two? 
THE COURT: Make the decision, if you 
want to reconsider. If you want to reconsider and ask for 
counsel, then I'm going to require you to do so within the 
next day or two. 
RON LAFFERTY: Are you indicating that 
you've already made up your mind concerning incompetency? 
THE COURT: No. No. No, I didn't mean 
to imply that. I meant, if the trial goes forward, and I'm 
taking this in context that we'll assume that the trial, 
some day that the trial is going to go forward, and that you 
will want, you should want to be represented by counsel at 
that time. If not, even at this time, even at this time. 
RON LAFFERTY: Well, from the statement ' 
that you made, it was a pretty strong indication that you \ 
had already made a judgment on this, perhaps even --
THE COURT: What was the judgment? | 
RON LAFFERTY: That we would be 
found competent if we were going to go on to trial. 
THE COURT: Well, I have not, at this 
point. I 
All right. Those matters I wanted to put on the 
record so that I would be sure. I know that the other judges 
1 1 a ' e s • a, i d s i i i 11 ] :i i , ! i r , B g i r e i i s i i i i i 1 a ] : i ; 3 ;r i c e B "i 11: 1 "u • 3, i 11 • z :3 
t: o b e s u i e 11 i a t y o i 1 1: i a d 11 £ r om in e a n d t 1 i a t I n t. h i s c o u r t , 
DAN LAFFERTY ;,v . respond, thei i? 
THE CO! IR I 
DAN LAFFERI Y: ^ ' ' ^ p p r e c i a i e 
- • i 
our 
a . op m i oris 
I rpa;izet an-* as : 'i.ivf ) or^i accused of para-
- r • ; i « . 'ie system, 
:.esita:e to acknowledge there is 
.! .vou .1 ask von A : I , „'<;,. of^enrl m- (iist.'.u: : '.a. 
rights auJ acknowleupp ' hem7 
'. e ;) n s t J •• 
* - j t i o n of *1-- ° f a t e oi i * a;i ^no : f.t- . ^ - r . ' u f ^ r , o:" t h e Ur . i t ed 
S t a t e s as u e s l 1 uar, 
THE COURT ; « * , ;••• ;; ; r r e r p r e ' a t i <;: and 
f- - *- <i ; ! f e r *=»r. f A i > < • * - T , n -n i j f ^ ' p r e r / * ^ i~ <"•';*•• 
Li rue .•-..- , 0 s " *..*r J . t r ; i-.,~ - *> ^r-0 ai eun;eir jbv)'.4 
i t at. t h e t i m e . 


























than you have had sofar. 
THE COURT: That's fine. 
DAN LAFFERTY: I, I just want to point 
out that the only thing that I feel that's essentially 
important is that you remain impartial, and that you be 
judicious of constitutional principles, as you said you will. 
And if you'll do that, I know that my judges, you'll repre-
sent, essentially, a referee, my judges will be a twelve-man--
THE COURT: Jury. 
DAN LAFFERTY: --jury, of my peers. 
They will be the judges. And clarify for me, because in some 
areas I know this still doesn't hold true: 
If one individual in the jury finds us not guilty, 
will you override that and find us guilty --
THE COURT: No. 
DAN LAFFERTY: --contrary to those 
constitutional principles? 
THE COURT: No. 
DAN LAFFERTY: So you still do hold 
to the authority of a jury --
THE COURT: If you are found guilty, 
all twelve jurors, and there will be twelve, must find you 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
DAN LAFFERTY: Right. And you wouldn't 
override that? 
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THE COURT: Well, don't feel that safe; 
because there may be a difference of opinion as to what that 
is. 
RON LAFFERTY: That's fair warning. 
DAN LAFFERTY: Well, that's where it 
is. Okay. 
THE COURT: That's why you may ought 
to have counsel. 
DAN LAFFERTY: The reason I don't 
believe it's necessary to have counsel, then, is because I 
don't think there is anyone who can exaplin my point of 
view more clearly to the jury. 
THE COURT: All right. 
DAN LAFFERTY: And as I explain it to 
them, they can draw conclusions. Furthermore, I believe that 
said counsel maybe incompetent, in fact, an attorney or a 
representative of the law profession has the ability, then, 
if I accept them to counsel to represent me, then they can 
ignore much of anything I say and put forth what they feel. 
Furthermore, an attorney is kind of under the gun and is not 
allowed to say many things that I would personally say very 
openly. They wouldn't because of just of fear of disbarment, 
for example. I see in many instances, I know that many things 
I've already done, many attorneys wouldn't even consider 
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DAN LAFFERTY: I know what is it. 
THE COURT: -- and so on, will be con-
ducted by the Court. 
DAN LAFFERTY: So the individuals can't, 
the defendants can't --
THE COURT: In the presence of the 
defendants, and in presence of counsel for the state. 
The parties may submit voir dire questions to the 
Court which they desire put to the prospective jurors. 
Those questions will have to be in writing, and I'll give you 
a date in which they have to be submitted. 
As , there would be ten preemptory challenges for 
each of you and ten for the state. 
Now, preemptory challenges, and they will be 
exercised on an alternate basis. And, the preemptory challenge 
is a right to just simply excuse ten people for no reason at 
all. 
DAN LAFFERTY: Without cause. 
THE COURT: Without cause. 
Now, if we have alternate jurors, which I think 
we might have, there would be two alternate jurors which 
would make a total of 14. And, then the each of you would 
have two additional challenges, so that you'd have twelve 
rather than ten preemptory challenges. 
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defendant Ron Lafferty could waive his right to make such a 
statement, or defer it until after the state has presented 
evidence and rested. The defendant Dan Lafferty would then 
have the right to make an opening statement. And he, like-
wise, could waive his right to make that opening statement, 
or defer it until after the state has presented its evidence 
and rested. 
Then the next procedure in the trial would be the 
presentation of the stated evidence. The state would call 
its witnesses. And after direct examination of each witness, 
both defendants would have the right of cross examination. 
Again, I don't know why Ron and Dan are different 
than why it should be first or second, but I guess that's 
the way that it is in the Complaint or the Information, and 
so that's the way I've used. 
Ron Lafferty would have the right to cross examine 
first, followed by Dan Lafferty who would cross examine 
second. The state would then conduct reexamination of each 
of the defendants -- redirect examination of each of the j 
defendants. And then the defendants could then conduct re-
cross examination in the same order as they did their cross 
examination. ! 
After that, after the presentation of the state's 
evidence, if either or both of you had not waived your right 
to opening statements, then either or both could make an 
o p e n i n g s t a t e m e n t 
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Now, after that, after the instructions, the state 
would make the first closing argument, to the jury; and then 
the defendants, you, would separately make yours, in any 
order that you choose to do so. Then the state would have 
the right to close the argument. 
If the jury brought back a verdict of guilty of 
murder in the first degree, then a penalty phase hearing 
would be had. And if that proceeding were necessary, by 
reason of the verdict of the jury, it is anticipated that it 
would take place as soon after the verdict as is reasonable 
practicable, having due regard to the circumstances which may 
exist. Then, the parties would have to make their arrange-
ments to have witnesses available for that purpose, at short 
notice. 
Now, do you think that you can represent your-
selves in a proceeding if I made such an order as that? 
Mr, Dan Lafferty? 
DAN LAFFERTY: I see no problem. 
THE COURT: Mr. Ron Lafferty? 
RON LAFFERTY: Yes, sir, I think I 
would. 
THE COURT: And would you abide by 
whatever we come up with as the order of protocol procedure? 
RON LAFFERTY: To the best of my 
ability, yes. 
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0 And, you are a psychiatrist. Is that correct? 
A I'm a physician. My specialty is psychiatry. 
Q Psychiatry. Approximately, how much time did we 
spend together, doctor? 
A Oh, between an hour-and-a-half and two hours. 
Q Between an hour-and-a-half and two hours? 
!
 A Yes. 
Q Were there any written examinations? 
A No. There was no written examination, because 
you declined any written evaluation or examination. 
0 So we spent approximately an hour-and-a-half to 
two hours together. During that period of time we discussed, 
mainly, what? 
A We did a history-taking process. 
0 A family history? 
A A family history, your history, and during that 
process I was doing what we call an informal mental staff 
examination. 
Q Okay. So that your-and-a-half period, two-hour 
period, whatever time it was where we discussed pretty much 
family history and then, evidently, you were watching for 
some other signs, you were able to determine that I had "a 
mental illness which has probably been present for a number 
of years," to use your words, first of all; "and, secondly, 
because of this mental illness it is my opinion Mr. Lafferty 
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A We had a brief discussion in terms of procedures 
and setting up the formal hearing for today. 
0 Okay. So that the prosecution as well as the 
judge were present during this communication? 
A This is the time that we had originally scheduled 
the hearing that you hadn't gotten to or missed --
0 Okay. Did you discuss this matter with anyone 
else? Has anyone influenced you in any way, Dr. Washburn? 
A No. This is completely independent. 
0. Okay. No one had contacted you from another 
source and encouraged you to come up with this kind of --
A No. 
0 --a report? 
A No. 
Q Okay. Are you normally able to make a, come to 
this kind of a conclusion in that short of a period of time? 
A Oh, yes. 
Q Are you? 
A Yes. 
Q No, since Dr. Groesbeck isn't here, just let me 
ask you a couple of questions. I don't know that you can 
answer for him or not. But, Dr. Groesbeck makes some of the 
same or comes to some of the same conclusions that you come 
to. However, he makes an interesting recommendation here. 
He makes the recommendation that, he says that: "It is 
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Yes. Some mental illnesses do respond to treat-





















want me to 
mental ill 
depending 
What kind of treatment are we talking about, 
Well, of course we have to depend upon the kind 
you are talking about. There are many kinds 
illnesses. 
Well, what kind of mental illness are you talking 
? 
I vrasn't talking there. 
I'm talking about your report, now. You indicate 
' s a mental illness, too; --
Oh, yes. 
-- the mental illness has been present for years. 
of mental illness are you talking about there? 
The diagnosis, I would, a tentative diagnosis 
a paranoid delusional state. 
A tentative diagnosis? 
Yes, urn-hum. 
Okay. And can that sort of a mental illness be 
a two-month period of time, restored? 
Prognosis would be guarded. In terms of if you 
respond in terms of your original question: "Gan 
nesses respond to treatment?" Yes, many do, 


























Q Can this particular mental illness, in your 
estimation, be corrected in a two-month period of time in 
one of these closed facilities? 
A You may be asking two questions. You may be 
asking the question of regaining competency, and also 
responding in terms of treatment. That is actually two 
separate questions. 
A person may still have a mental illness and 
still be competent to return to court. 
Do you understand what I'm saying? 
Q Yes, I think I do. 
A Okay. So, that if the treatment still may be 
in process, the illness may still be in process of treatment, ! 
the person may along the way be able to return to court, in 
terms of competency. 
Q Okay. Nov;, you didn't mention anything concerning 
treatment, you didn't recommend any kind of treatment. 
A No. 
0 Is it your opinion that this mental illness is 
something permanent and cannot be treated? 
A I haven't offered an opinion on that. I wasn't 
asked. 
Q That is your opinion, however. 
A I wouldn't offer an opinion at this point. I 


























statement at this point. So, I would not offer it at this 
time. 
Q And you mention, once again, that -- Did you ever 
make a comment prior to this or were you ever notified prior 
to the time that you were asked to make this examination 
that you might be making the examination? 
A I was notified by telephone that there was an 
order coming. That's how I'm usually notified of these 
kinds of processes. 
Q I see. Was that prior to the court process, 
making that order? 
A I'm not understanding your question. 
0 Was that telephone call prior to the process 
making the --
A Oh, no. 
0 Okay. 
A No. The order is done, and then I'm notified by 
teleohone that there's an order on its way in the mail. 
Q And you say that at no time did anyone contact 
you from any organization, either religious, government or 
otherwise trying to in any way influence you, Doctor, --
A No. 
Q -- to come up with this kind of a --



























Q Okay. Is this pretty much a standard, when you 
find someone incompetent, is this pretty much a standard 
diagnosis? 
I guess I'm curious to know if you and Dr. 
Groesbeck didn't talk at anytime or didn't communicate con-
cerning this matter. 
A Vie did not talk at all before the evaluations 
were done. 
Q I'm curious to know why the both came up with an 
evaluation that's very, very similar. Is this pretty much 
a canned statement here or --? 
A No. I think we both independently came up with 
similar conclusions. 
RON LAFFERTY: Okay. I have no further 
questions. 
THE COURT: Do you have questions j 
Additional, Mr. Dan Lafferty? 
DAN LAFFERTY: Yes. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. DAN LAFFERTY: 
Q Could you describe for me what "expansiveness" 
is, please, Doctor? It's in your report. 
Yes. If I can put it into terms and phrases 
you can understand: "Expansiveness" is an idea or concept 


























in two or three areas: yard maintenance, landscaping, con-




want to state with regard 
DAN 
THE 
of competency to proceed? 
DAN 
COURT: Are you a journeyman? 
LAFFERTY: Yes. 
COURT: Okay. Anything else you 
to your background? 
LAFFERTY: Nothing that --
COURT: That bears upon the question 
LAFFERTY: -- I was just trying to 
think. I can't think of anything, offhand, I can't. 
RON 
to that, if you'd feel it 
THE 
if you'd like to tell me. 
RON 
LAFFERTY: I could add a few things 
necessary, your Honor. 
COURT: Well, I'd be interested, 
LAFFERTY: I've served two terms 
on the Highland City Council; was involved in the incorpo-
ration of the Highland area; was involved in politics even 
long before that in trying to prevent the Highland area from 
being incorporated; and then as we realized that we had no 
choice, we were forced by the County to do otherwise, we were 
incorporated, and I was involved; and I was asked to serve 
on the first council and elected on the second. 
I've served a mission for the Latter-day Saints 


























active in the Church for many, many years. 
I have done a lot of carpentry work, buildings, 
on my own, on the side. I've built apartment houses; and 
built my own house, on the side. And, did a lot of mechanical 
work; if that's important, A lot of things other than just 
a crane operator. And I've operated all kinds of heavy equip-
ment, not just crane; but, mainly crane. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. Now, 
I'm going to give you an opportunity to tell me why, in 
your opinion, you believe you are competent to proceed in 
this case. And I'll let Mr, Ron Lafferty go first, and then 
followed by Mr. Dan Lafferty. And then I'll have the state 
make a comment, whichever, however it wants me to view the 
matter. Okay. 
RON LAFFERTY: First of all, your 
Honor, I'd like to say that I feel that I'm competent, mainly 
because I have my own best interests at heart. Over the past 
two years, I've allowed others to represent me in other areas. 
And I have been misrepresented, because people don't under-
stand where I come from, your Honor. And I've tried to 
explain to them in detail why I would like to represent --
THE COURT: Do you think you might have 
that same problem with a jury? 
RON LAFFERTY: With a jury? 


























RON LAFFERTY: I could have, but I think 
that I could do a better job of convincing a jury where I 
come from myself, in fact I know that I could do better my-
self, than if I had someone else represent me. I've tried 
that, many times; and people just don't understand; and I 
have been able to explain first-hand where I come from, and 
have had much better success in that than in having someone 
else represent me. 
A great example of that was in my dealings with 
my stake presidency, prior to my excommunication from the 
Church. ily stake president promised, I was invited to write 
a letter concerning constitutional law, quite frankly, I was 
invited to write a letter to The First Presidency and to 
President Benson, who I felt was qualified because of some 
books that I had read that he had written. 
And, I wrote that letter, and I asked six ques-
tions, and I made them as simple as possible. And I wrote 
the letter on the basis that I was invited to write The | 
First Presidency, my stake president had invited me to do 
that. And I told him that I would like to, that I'd be 
happy to, but that I wanted to write the letter; that I didn't 
want him to represent me, in other words. I wanted it to be 
my own letter, and but I would be happy to send it through 
the proper channels, I had nothing to hide, and he was wel-


























Some months later the answer came back, and the 
answer was totally and completely contrary to the writings 
of Ezra Taft Benson. And that disturbed me. And so 1 wrote 
him a letter, and he refused to answer my letter. I went 
back to visit with the brethren there in the Church Office 
Building. And I was told that my letter has been sent back 
to my stake president, that he had interpreted the way he 
thought it ought to be written, had written his own letter. 
And the answer that they had received was an answer to his 
letter rather than my letter, the very thing that, you know, 
I was trying to prevent. 
THE COURT: Now, why do you cite this 
example? 
RON LAFFERTY: Well, I'm trying to \ 
explain to you that no one is in a position to represent me 
like I am. I'm just giving you one example of this. Do you 
understand? 
THE COURT: Not completely, but --
RON LAFFERTY: Okay. I'm just giving 
one example of how I have been misrepresented in my beliefs. 
I was misrepresented by a letter, written by my stake presi-
dent to The First Presidency. And the answers that came back 
were in answer to his letter and not my letter, and as a 
result they didn't address my questions at all. They were 


























interpret my thinking, and ask questions concerning those 
matters. And that's just one example. There have been many 
examples. 
THE COURT: Do you have another example 
as to why you believe that somebody else can, or that you, 
why you believe that you can represent yourself better than a 
skilled lawyer can do? 
RON LAFFERTY: Well, the only real good 
answer I have, your Honor, is that I know that I have my own 
best interests at heart; I know that it's my constitutional 
right to represent myself; I know that I have the right to 
the assistance of counsel, which in my opinion is exactly 
what we have here. And that's the exact wording in the 
United States Constitution, and that is that I have the 
right to "assistance" of counsel, 
That doesn't mean that counsel takes my place 
to speak. I still have the right to speak, and they can 
assist me. And that's what these gentlemen have been doing. 
So I think the way we've got it set up here is exactly the 
way the Constitution defines it. 
THE COURT: Aside from the Constitution, 
is that the way you want it? 
RON LAFFERTY: That's the way I want 



























THE COURT: The record will show that 
the defendants are present in court with their standby 
counsel, that the State of Utah is represented by Mr. Wayne 
Watson and Mr. Noall Wootton. 
Gentlemen, the Court has heard and observed the 
defendants during a hearing which has lasted for approxi-
mately four hours, on two days, and has heard upwards I 
think of ten witnesses, on the question as to whether or not 
the defendants are incompetent to proceed with respect to 
the information which has been filed in this case. 
From the evidence presented and the Court's 
observations of the defendants, and considering their re-
sponses to questions and statements made during the hearing, 
the Court is unable at this time to find by either a pre-
ponderance or clear preponderance of the evidence, that the 
defendants or either of them are incompetent to proceed, as 
those two words are used in Section 77-15-2, Utah Code 
Annotated, 
The Court makes no finding with respect to whether 
or not the defendants suffer from a mental disease or defect, 
but does find that if either of them do so suffer, such 
defect does not result to either of them in an inability 
to comprehend the nature of the proceedings against him, or 
the punishment specified for the offense charged, or in his 


























With regard to the defendants' repeated refusal 
to obtain counsel or to accept appointment of counsel, by 
the Court, it is the Court's conclusion, based upon opinions 
of the United States Supreme Court, that a defendant may 
waive his constitutional right to counsel and represent him-
self, even in a capital case, if he makes a knowing and 
intelligent waiver. In this connection, it is the Court's 
finding that while I believe as a judge and a lawyer that it 
is unwise for the defendants to represent themselves, that 
they do not have the education, training and trial skills 
to represent themselves as we LI as a lawyer might; neverthe-
less, both defendants know what they are doing, and they are 
intellectually capable of making the waiver, 
Accordingly, the defendants may each represent 
himself at the trial, but his conduct must comply with the 
court procedures and protocol. Both defendants have hereto-
fore indicated to the Court that they would comply with 
court procedures and protocol to the best of their ability. I 
The Court orders Michael Esplin and Gary Weight, 
who have previously been appointed as standby counsel and 
who have been present throughout this competency hearing and 
available to the defendants, to be present at all stages of 
subsequent proceedings before the Court in this matter, and 
be available to render advice and legal services to the 


























to the same extent as i f they were retained for that 
by the defendants, 
Now, with regard to the media, as I have 
purpose 
pre-
viously explained to, a motion has been filed, previously 
explained to counsel, the Court exercised its statutory 
discretion to exclude from the courtroom all persons 
necessary to the conduct of the proceedings, because 
no t 
I was 
concerned about pre-trial publicity of evidentiary matters, 
which might have had some affect on the defendants' 
Amendment rights and to a fair trial. 
And also I am concerned that there is a 
Sixth 
right of 
privacy when it comes to inquiring into the mental condition 
of a person, especially when that issue is not being 
by the person who is the subject of the inquiry; and 
that right also ought to be preserved; and I think p 
the statutory, the reason that the Court can do that 
the statute, is perhaps for that reason, if all thin 
equal. 
Now, after hearing all of the evidence, 
having rendered my decision with regard to the fact 
do not believe that the evidence shows the defendant 
incompetent to proceed, I do not believe that Sixth
 t 
rights of the defendants would likely be violated by 
accurate and context reporting of the proceedings if 







































object, then I will authorize rny reporter, at media's expense, 
to make a transcript of the proceedings which we have gone 
through the past couple of days, and make a copy of that 
transcript available to them. 
And I want to ask you before that becomes an 
order: Do you have any objection to the contents or to the 
proceedings which have taken place here being reported? 
RON LAFFERTY: (Shook his head no) 
DAN LAFFERTY: No. 
THE COURT; Mr. Ron Lafferty? 
RON LAFFERTY: No. 
THE COURT: Mr. Dan Lafferty? 
DAN LAFFERTY: No. 
THE COURT; That will be the order. 
(Off the record,) 
(WHEREFORE, the hearing was concluded and the 
Court stood inrecess at 4:38 o'clock p.m., October 24, 1984.) 
- - -
REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
I, EDWARD V. QUIST, hereby certify that ! 
I am an official court reporter for the above-entitled court, 
duly registered and licensed to practice in the State of Utah; 
that on the 23rd and 24th days of October, 1984, I appeared 
before the above-named court and reported the proceedings had 


























that the foregoing 
contain a true and 
notes, as taken in 
of my ability. 
October, 1984. 
pages, numbered from 2 to 150, inclusive, 
accurate transcript of my stenographic 
the above-entitled hearing, to the best 
Dated at Provo, Utah this 30th day of 
' 1 ) 
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Edward V. Quist, CSR 
License No. 71 
310 County Building 
Provo, Utah 84601 
EXHIBIT 3 
NOALL T. WOOTTON 
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY 
ROOM 107, COUNTY BUILDING 
EROVO, UTAH 84601 
TELEPHONE: 373-5510 ext. 320 
""! , 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
-vs-
RONALD WATSON LAFFERTY and 
DAN CHARLES LAFFERTY, 
Defendants. 
PETITION FOR INQUIRY AS TO 
COMPETENCY OF RONALD 
WATSON LAFFERTY 
Case No. 9309 
The Petition of Jerry Scott respectfully shows: 
1. I am a lieutenant with the Office of the Utah County Sheriff. I am 
presently serving as Utah County Jail Commander. 
2. In that capacity I have under my direct supervision and control one 
of the defendants in this action, Ronald Watson Lafferty. He has been 
incarcerated in the Utah County Jail since August 17, 1984, and until 
recently has been cooperative. 
3. On October 25, 1984, while engaged in a conversation, he physically 
attacked me without provocation on my part. He appeared to become irrational 
and was physically out of control and did not appear to be mentally in control of 
his faculties. We then temporarily held him in a holding cell. 
4. Subsequently when transferring him from the holding cell to another 
cell tor security reasons he again, without provocation, physically assaulted 
Deputy Casey Thacker. 
5. I am aware that he has been examined and a hearing has been 
conducted under the provisions of Section 77-15-5 of the Utah Code but these 
events have taken place since that time. Pursuant to Section 77-15-3(2) of the 
Code referred to, in my capacity as a person having custody of Mr. Ronald Watson 
Lafferty, I respectfully request the Court to again entertain this Petition 
under the section referred to and that the Court consider it pursuant to the 
provisions of Section 77-15-5 of the Utah Code. 
Dated this / day of November, 1984. 
VERIFICATION 
Cones now your Petitioner, under oath, and states that he has read the 
contents of the above petition and states that the allegations contained therein 
are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief. 
Dated this / day of November, 1 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me a Nota 
October, 1984. 
day of 
NOTARY PUBLIC / 
Residing at:. 
My Commission Expires: 
da p ~T Hci 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Petition for Inquiry as to 
Competency of Ronald Watson Lafferty, was hand-delivered to defendants, Ronald 
Watson Lafferty and Dan Charles Lafferty, at the Utah County Jail, and mailed to 
Michael D^Esplin, Attorney for Defendants, at P.O. Box "L", Provo, Utah 84601, 
this Lcq day of November, 1984. 
EXHIBIT 4 
PHILIP WASHBURN M.D. 
MOUNTAIN VIEW PSYCHIATRIC CLINIC 
39 Professional Way, Suite #2 
PAYSON, UTAH 84651 
465-2566 
October 10, 1984 
PHILIP WASHBURN M.D. 
General Psychiatry 
The Honorable J. Robert Bullock, Judge 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
State of Utah 
Provo, Utah 
Re: Rrnald Watson Lafferty 
Case /'9309 
Dear Judge Bullock: 
I did a psychiatric evaluation on Mr. Ronald Lafferty at the Utah 
County Jail on October 5, 1984. Mr. Lafferty consented to, and was 
very cooperative with, my psychiatric interview and social history re-
view. Mr. Lafferty however, refused taking any formal written psvchi-
atric or psychological tests. As a result of this psychiatric inter-
view and history review 1 have come to the following conclusions and 
opinions: First; Mr. Ron Lafferty is currently suffering from a signi-
ficant mental illness which has probably been present for a number of 
years. Second; Because of this mental illness it is my opinion that 
Mr. Lafferty is not competent to act in his own behalf as legal counsel 
because this mental illness may in fact jeopardize his right to ail 
the protection offered in the court processes. Third; Even if Mr. 
Lafferty consents to the assistance of legal counsel he may not be comp-
etent to proceed with the court processes because of his mental illness. 
During my psychiatric interview and informal mental status examina-
tion of Mr. Ron Lafferty 1 observed a number of signs and symptoms that 
give us factual information of the presence of a significant mental 
disorder. Mr. Lafferty showed a rather high energy level in his speech 
with a general mood and affect consistant with a hypomanic state, however 
his mood was labile with some periods of depressive feelings. There 
was evidences of expansiveness, grandiosity and paranoid delusion systems. 
Mr. Lafferty feels he has received direct revelation from God. The 
paranoid delusions system is well-organized and involves government, 
laws and the L.D.S. Church. This is a shared delusion system with his 
brother, Dan Lafferty. 




P4*llip Washburn, M.D. / 
PW/sbw 
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C. J E S S GROESBI:OK, M. I). 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
PSYCHIATRY AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 
5 5 0 0 NORTH CANYON ROAD • O * iii »T i n DA ;()1 
PROVO. UTAH 84604 U ' 
October 9, 1984 
The Honorable J. Robert Bullock 
Judge, Fourth Judicial District Court 
Utah County Building 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attention Jim Hale 
Sanity Administrator 
Utah County 
180 East Center Street 
Suite 204 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Re: Ronald Watson Lafferty—Competency to Defend Himself 
Dear Judge Bullock: 
IDENTIFYING DATA: 
Ronald Watson Lafferty is a 42 year old, twice married, white male, born 9 
November, 1941. Criminal case #9309. 
REASON FOR PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION: 
Per your letter of October 1, 1984, you requested psychiatric evaluation as 
to this individuals mental condition, in essence concerning his competency 
to proceed, whether he understands the charges placed against him, the 
possible punishments that could result from being convicted of those 
charges, as well as his ability to assist counsel in his own defense, and 
whether he has competency to waive counsel. 
EXAMINATIONS PERFORMED: 
This individual was reviewed in direct psychiatric examination on 8 
October,1984 at the Utah County Jail. 
There were no medical or other reports for review. However, a brief reveiw 
on the telephone was arranged with Wayne Watson, the Utah County 
prosecutor. 
Ronald Lafferty 
October 9, 1984 
Page 2 
DATA BASIC TO PSYCHIATRIC OPINION: 
INTERVIEW: WAYNE WATSON, Utah County Prosecutor 
He noted that there are multiple police reports concerning this case and 
that the critical issues surround the request of this individual to waive 
counsel, as well as to appreciate the charges and penalties. There are six 
counts of first degree murder, and two counts of aggravated robbery. They 
involve the wrongful death of a sister-in-law, Brenda, as well as her little 
child. It is alleged that this killing was directed by God and by revelation. 
It is briefly noted that these individuals were orthodox Mormons at one 
time, and then, gradually, sought and believed different views and left the 
Mormon Church by excommunication. They started their own "School of the 
Prophets," a religious school for teaching more intense religous ideas 
related to the Mormon religion. 
Allegedly, this individual, Ron Lafferty, received a revelation that "Brenda 
was interfering and would have to be removed." Two other people, a 
woman, a religous leader, as well as a male religous leader with whom they 
had been involved were also earmarked to be removed. 
The brother of Ron, Dan believed the revelation. 
The slashing of the throat of Brenda and the baby took place. It was 
believed that Ron, the brother slashed Brenda, and Dan slashed the Child, 
Erica. 
They, then, went down the road to find a Richard Stowe, a Mormon church 
leader. They couldnTt find his driveway, and allegedly one participant in the 
group said "the Lord does not want this much killing today." Apparently, 
Ron agreed with this and did not try any further. The other religious leader 
was away from her home when they tried to find her. 
It was noted that Dan had been convicted of aggravated assault and a 
violent attack on a highway patrolman. He spent 45 days in the Utah State 
Prison. 
It was stated that of Dan when he was in jail that he may have been 
borderline and may deteriorate in his psychological development. 
PAST MEDICAL HISTORY: 
Central Nervous System: 
He denies siezures convulsions, headaches, or passing out spells. 
Ronald Lafferty 
October 9, 1984 
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Genital-urinary: 
He had a kidney stone four years ago. He was in the hospital for one week 
and one-half. It was quite painful. 
The rest of his exam was essentially unremarkable. There is no heart 
disease, diabetes, or cancer. 
PAST PERSONAL HISTORY: 
He was born and raised in the central and northern Utah area from Murray 
to Salt Lake to Orem. He lived also in Payson in latter years, graduating 
from high school there, and spent nearly one year at BYU. He was never in 
the military. He worked as a contractor in heavy equipment. 
He was raised by his natural parents. His father died a year ago of diabetes 
complications. This allegedly was not a blow. People expected it when he 
became ill. It was not difficult to get over it. The father was 69. The 
mother was 65. There are two sisters and four brtohers, Ron being the 
oldest. All are alive and well. 
His first marriage was in 1963. It ended two years ago. His wife got the 
divorce. There were six children ranging in age from two through twenty. 
He denied ever practicing polygamy, though, he does believe in that 
doctrine. He had no other wives simultaneously. He married a second time in 
1984 for two months. Apparently, it did not work out. He divorced this wife 
also. This was not a legal marriage. He feels the laws of the land do not 
have the right to marry people. He feels that marriage is between a manfs 
wife, himself, and God, and should not involve the state. 
His first wife, as well as his second wife left because they thought his 
thinking should have been controlled. He sees himself as L.D.S. but not 
Mormon. He feels the Mormon Church is totally out of order. It does not 
believe the doctrines taught by Joseph Smith. He feels "it is an imposter." 
HISTORY OF PRESENT PROBLEM: 
He is well aware of being charged with murder and conspiracy and 
aggravated burglary. He described the victim as being as sister-in-law who 
was 23 with a child 15 months of age. She was the wife of Allan, his 
younger brother. He is aware that they died of a slashing death and 
repeated the charges that have been made known to him in the courtroom. 
He stated today that he has been charged with involvement; in fact, all 
four of them have. He, his brother, another Richard Knapp, and a fellow 
named Chip Kearns who has turned state's evidence and currently, has now 
had his charges dropped. 
Ronald Lafferty 
October 9, 1984 
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He states all these charges are false; all of them against his brother are 
totally false. He stated that they are guilty of no crime. He says the state 
alleges the crime occurred. He will go to court and defend himself. He 
states that they will lie, cook up false charges. 
He is upset that they are locked up in separate cells and have been for so 
long. He states that the state fears that they will concoct a story together. 
Yet, they were there together two weeks prior to coming to jail. 
He refuses to accept anyone to help him in his defense because he feels 
that all counsel, lawyers, etcetera sleep in the same bed as a part of the 
same corrupt legal system. Therefore, he wants to represent himself. 
He relates this intrusion control with the Mormon Church who has infringed 
upon his marriage, his family, and behind his back. He feels they tried to 
control his thinking and has encouraged his wife to leave. They also 
allegedly controlled his second wife. He made no distinction between the 
legal system and the Mormon Church. 
He was very angry that he had given all to his wife and urged her not to 
involve the legal process. She did, both with the courts and the church and 
he was extrememly upset. They took everything, excommunicated him from 
the Mormon Church. He was extremely upset. He denied ever cheating on 
his wife, going with any other woman. He devoted himself totally to her and 
the children. He tried to support constitutional law and he quoted Mormon 
leaders as his byword and yet, he was turned away. He felt that his 
children were misused by the Mormon Churhch. Justice was not carried out. 
He states that the only way they could get on him was the way he thought. 
He was most upset at the state giving the custody of the children to his 
wife. He thought it was very unfair since he had been so reasonable. 
He desribed a long, involved procedure with his church official who presided 
over him that he alleged deceived him in his relationship to the high level 
leaders of the Mormon Church with whom Mr. Lafferty felt a great kinship 
in their writings. He quickly then bridged that without distinction to 
deceptiveness in the criminal justice system in general. 
In terms of the court and comprehending its proceedings, he could outline 
very quickly and easily the functions of the judge, prosecuting attorney, 
and the defendant, jury, and then, could very clearly and articulately 
describe how serious the charges were that are placed against him, and it 
could lead to life imprisonment or death. 
In terms of ability to advise counsel, he indicated again he would be his 
own counsel. He has studied procedures, state statues and he has been 
through several legal proceedings. He 'defended himself in the preliminary 
Ronald Lafferty 
October 9, 1984 
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hearing and allegedly received a comment from a prosecutor that he missed 
his calling as an attorney. He has never read much on murder legally. 
His mode of defense of self would be to not enter into legal matters but to 
challenge the court on a spiritual basis. He has already done that in that 
Judge Ballif has stated that the court had no jurisdiction over spiritual 
matters, and therefore, Mr. Lafferty has declined to put in a plea for the 
court. In fact, he feels that the court has no jurisdiction over his problems 
by its own admission. He stated that God was a part of the consitution 
originally and why isn't it now. 
He describes specifically his revelation that he received, one of many. It 
was a revelation in which individuals who are allegedly killed were "to be 
removed." They were his sister-in-law, Brenda, her daughter, and two 
others. The Mormon Church officials, Mr. Stowe, and a woman named Lowe. 
He described reveiving this revelation as "flow of intelligence in the mind. 
It's sweet and itTs expanding." He uses these terms referring to traditional 
Mormon literature as the way one receives a revelation from God. He also 
stated artists and those who make music can also create revelations. 
He stated there is no question this came from God. He has no doubts about 
it . 
Further, he stated in harmony with good Mormon practice, he would never 
just act alone and so he submitted this revelation to the "School of the 
Prophets." This was a small group of committed, intense Mormons who had 
been involved in leaving the orthodox Mormon Church and who were 
studying spiritual matters. This consisted of Bob Crosfield, the prophet, 
President Berry Crowthers, and then others members including himself, 
brother Dan, brother Mark, brother Tim, and two others. He stated they all 
confirmed that the revelation was from God. He denied that anyone had set 
any dates, and in what manner the removal would be. Only that it would be 
as soon as possible. He felt that it was "in the Lordfs hands as to how it 
would be done." He declined to discuss this much further. 
He stated he has followed legal procedures in trying to meet with these 
charges. 
He is extremely upset that he feels that the legal system puts procedures 
above truth. He states that if they beat him, he will warn them of the 
injustice, and then, it is their responsibility. They will have to answer to 
God. He denied that he wanted to take the law into his own hands or that 
this meant that he would actually try to harm or do something to bring this 
about. 
He also warned the interviewer that he would held accountable for things 
Ronald Lafferty 
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that were being testified of as far as the knowledge that he gave. He would 
not premeditate anything and any actions. 
He stated that if they wanted him he would "take the death penalty 
calmly." He feels he would have paid "the price to his God and that it is 
fair and that he will be just in dealing with him." 
He denied suicidal or homicidal feelings. He denied he had harmed or killed 
anybody. 
He prays daily. He feels God is happy with him in his eyes. 
He then went on to describe a number of prophecies related from Mormon 
literature about the last days. 
In terms of susceptibility to decompensation, he noted that he handled 
himself a day and one-half in court. He was calm. He does not feel he will 
break down or have great difficulties. 
He again noted that the death penalty would be the Lord!s will and it would 
be his will if things turn out that he didn't win. He has no predisposed idea 
of who will win. He will, though, try to work to make his life go on because 
he should live. He feels "the Lord could interfere with the whole process by 
opening the door and changing the whole legal process, having an angel 
come and confound those involved." He quoted scripture precedence for that 
from the Mormon scriptures. 
He stated that he could testify for himself very strongly. 
In terms of having counsel assist him, he stated he would absolutely not 
accept it. If they forced him to have counsel, he would not cooperate in 
any way. He feels he would be denied a constitutional right. 
He describes using drugs, marijuana on a couple of occasions, drinking a 
beer occasinally, but otherwise, never being involved in drugs or alcohol. 
He denies sexual attacks, attacking others. He denies homosexual conflicts. 
He has never been robbed, beaten, or had any specific attacks made on him. 
His final plea to the court is that he is qualified and feels they must decide 
on whether this revelation is from God or not. He has a method where they 
could find out, using a time honored Mormon means of quoting religious 
scripture of the Mormons, the Book of Mormon, which indicates that if one 
prays to God, one will get an answer as to whether something is true. 
He states they could also go to a California computer scripture program and 
compare his revelation to others. He -feels that is the most important 
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mission of the court to decide on that revelation. 
He refuses to play games. He feels the courtroom is a big game and he is 
being forced in to it . 
MENTAL STATUS EXAMINATION: 
He is a tall, bearded with blondish hair, mainly brown, white male, who 
came in rather defensively stating that he was not going to go over the 
same interviews that had been done with Dr. Washburn. This reflected some 
fear of involvement and engendered some feelings of anxiety in the 
interview. 
However, he began to decrease that anxiety and to talk more freely and, in 
fact, did cooperate with the interviewer marginally. Throughout the 
interview, he would pull back, move about a bit and very quickly and 
incitefully avoid discussing questions that could incriminate him surrounding 
the charges that have been placed against him. 
In the beginning of the interview, he was given notice that he should feel 
free to not discuss any questions he felt not comfortable with because pf 
the nature of the examination that would go to the court. He understood 
this and accepted it . 
He was alert throughout the interview. He was oriented fully to time, place, 
and person. He knew well the events of the day. He knew what he had for 
breakfast. He talked about the presidential debates in the United States the 
previous night. He talked quite responsibly and appropriately and knew what 
had happened. 
He also talked about many aspects of L.D.S. or Mormon history quite 
authoritatively. 
His concentration was good. He did serial twos making only a couple of 
errors. He abstracted proverbs well, though they were somewhat concrete. 
His intellectual level appeared to average or above. 
Perceptually, there was no evidence of frank hallucinations, or illusions. He 
described having good dreams, usually, a peaceful experience with his 
children, uniting with them. He denied any disburbing dreams. 
His sleep has generally been good, going to bed at ten, getting up at 
six-thirty. He awakens thinking of wanting to be with free men and be 
treated equally. 
Affect revealed an individual with rigid controls, much suspiciousness, and 
with a marked sense of denial of the seriousness of his condition, although, 
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verbally and intellectually he could state these things. 
Anxiety level varied a great deal. There does not appear to be any 
evidence of depression. There was no suicidal or homicidal ideation. He 
appeared quite cooperative and apparently, the people in jail are not 
frightened of him. 
His thought processes were sequential and in tact. There was no evidence 
of tangentiality. However, there was clearcut evidence of disturbed thought 
processes in his reasoning. There was paranoid elements with clearcut 
erection of a paranoid psuedo-community, a tendency to markedly project 
on significant objects about him, a tendency to see the world as it slighted 
him, only in his terms. For example, he saw the Mormon Church and all the 
legal system, in a sense, in the same category with marked evidence of 
thought process over inclusion indicating serious disturbance. His uncritical 
attitude toward alleged revelations are deviant and not in accord with usual 
beliefs within the culture group that he represents. Therefore, it would 
have to be considered that there is clearcut serious delusional thinking 
present. There is marked unresolved anger toward authority officials with 
great ambivilance in how they have dealt with him. At times there was 
almost a murderous feeling showed forth in these brief moments as he 
described them. 
DIAGNOSIS: 
Axis I 297.10: Paranoia chronic—Manifested by persistent delusions of 
persecution, enraged feelings of being hurt and destroyed by significant 
authority, and other familial figures. Dependency is strong, identification 
with religous beliefs, and a paranoid psuedo-community. The building of this 
condition has been developing for several years. 
Axis II 301.00: Paranoid personality disorder—Manifested by expectations 
of trickery or harm, hypervigilance, avoidance of blame, questioning loyalty 
to others, hypersensitivity, feelings of being cold and distant. 
Axis III: No specific physical illnesses at this time. 
PSYCHIATRIC OPINION: 
1. Does this individual suffer a mental disease or defect which renders him 
unable to comprehend the nature of the proceedings against him, or the 
punishments specified for the offense charged? 
The answer to that question is yes. This individual does suffer a serious, 
chronic, pervasive growing longterm illness described as paranoia which has 
as its core a serous delusional system, particularly, being persecuted by 
others. Through it all, he also erected d paranoid psuedo-community that is 
Ronald Lafferty 
October 9, 1984 
Page 9 
about him. 
Though he does comprehend the nature of the proceedings taken against him 
and the charges, it is doubtful in this examinees mind that he grasps the 
seriousness of the punishment that could be leveled against him. He blandly 
puts this off with his religious system that, since he is at peace with his 
maker, that would be no problem to accept it. It is doubtful that this 
individual has emotionally seen the gravity and far reaching complexity of 
looking at the death penalty, for example, or considering the charges placed 
against him. There is too much denial and grandiose denial and exaltation of 
his position. 
2. Does this individual suffer from mental disease or defect which would 
render him unable to assist counsel? 
The answer to that question is yes. Currently, he is vehemently opposed to 
having any counsel help him. He feels he can represent himself. His 
delusional system is so pervasive that he feels that the whole legal system 
which is combined with the Mormon Church is only filled with deception 
and corruption and therefore, he will have no part of it. He would resist 
participating in that counsel at this time. Therefore, it is this examiner's 
opinion that he would not be able to assist counsel. He does not have a 
reasonable as well as a rational understanding in terms of being able to 
assist counsel. 
3. Does he suffer from mental disease or defect which renders him unable 
to make a knowing and intelligent decision with reference to waiving his 
right to counsel? 
The answer to that question is yes. It is felt that his mental illness at the 
current time, essentially, limits his being able to knowingly and intelligently 
decide about defending himself and waiving the rights of counsel. It is true 
this individual has apparently conducted himself quite well allegedly in the 
first hearings, but it is clear that he has very little knowledge of all the 
complexities of defending himself against the death penalty. It is clear in 
his reasoning now concerning the court that it is based on his delusional 
system and has profoundly confused spiritual versus legal matters and how 
they should be obtained. 
He has no comprehension of the risks versus benefits of attempting to 
defend himself. Therefore, in the end, the trial process would be a mockery 
as he would be woefully lacking in the necessary skills to take care of a 
proper defense for him. His grandiosiyty and identification with God and the 
inability to separate spiritual from legal matters suggest a serious deficit in 
his reality testing. 
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It is recommended that this individual be confined for a sixty day 
evaluation and treatment at a closed treatment facility to see if 
competency to stand trial can be restored. 
Sincerely yours^ 
C. Jess Groesbeck, M.D. 
Diplomate, American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology 
CJG:mr 
EXHIBIT 5 
Scott M Matheson Governor State of Utah 
Norman G Angus Execut ive Director 
January 22, 1985 
Honorable J. Robert Bullock 
Fourth Judicial District Court Judge 
Utah County Building 
Provo, Utah 84601 
RE: Ronald Watson Lafferty 
Case No. 9309 
Dear Judge Bullock: 
We have completed our evaluation of Ronald Watson Lafferty whom you 
committed to this hospital on January 2, 1985 for an evaluation and a 
report to the Court as stipulated in the Utah Code Annotated 77-15-3. 
Our evaluation has consisted of multiple psychiatric interviews, physical 
examination, psychological assessment, Halstead-Reitan Psychoneurological 
Examination, electroencephalogram, computerized tomographic brain scan, 
neurological evaluation, review of collateral information, observation 
of his functioning in the treatment setting and presentation before the 
clinical staff. It should be noted that we completed an extensive 22-day 
in-patient evaluation of this individual on November 27, 1984. 
During this evaluation, we have seen signs of diffuse organic brain 
damage (of the dimentia type), which is consistent with his apparent 
attempted suicide by hanging, which occurred on December 29, 1984. This 
brain damage was clearly not present during our previous in-patient evalu-
ation. The organic brain damage we have seen is characterized by. 
confusion, decreased intellectual functioning, both short-term and long-
term memory impairment, decreased psycho-motor activity, disturbed sleep 
wakefulness pattern, decreased abstract thinking abilities, altered 
affect, and inability to perform certain purposeful behaviors. During 
this hospitalization, there has been gradual and progressive improvement 
in each of these features. We are unable to predict at this time to what 
extent his mental state will ever improve and approach normalcy, and are 
unable to predict at what rate he will continue to improve. 
We find at this time he lacks the ability to comprehend the nature 
of the charges against him and the punishment specified for the offense 
charged and lacks the ability to either meaningfully assist his counsel 
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Honorable J. Robert Bullock 
Fourth Judicial District Court Judge 
January 22, 1985 
It is therefore, our recommendation that the Court commit Ronald 
Watson Lafferty to the Utah State Hospital as "not competent to stand 
trial1' and order that he receive psychiatric treatment. We have speci-
fically considered various treatment alternatives, and feel that in-patient 
care at the State Hospital would provide the best combination of security 
and protection along with expeditious treatment and professional observation. 
Sincerely yours, 
7 
Peter Heinbecker, M.D. 
Clinical Director Forensic Psychiatry 
LM 
Van 0. Austin, M.D. 
Forensic Psychiatrist 
Robert J. Howell, Ph.D. 
Clinical and Forensic Psychology 
C. Jess Groesbeck, M.D. 
Medical Director 
VOA/hh 
Enclosures: Psychiatric Evaluation 
Psychological Evaluation 
Social History 
Halstead-Reitan Neuropsychological Assessment 
Computerized Tomographic Brain Scan 
PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION D a t e ° f Evaluation J.,m,.,ry 21, 1985_ 
RONALD WATSON LAFFERTY 
INTRODUCTION: 
On January 21, 1985, 1 evaluated Ron Lafferty in his room at the Utah State 
Hospital. At that time, he appeared to be somewhat gaunt and thin as compared 
to his previous admission to our hospital. He was oriented to time and place, 
and his intellectual functioning appeared superficially to be intact. He stated 
that he was eating well and sleeping well and that he generally felt well. He 
denied any symptoms of depression or thoughts of suicide. Also, he denied any 
symptoms of psychosis such as hallucinations or paranoid ideas. He believed, 
however, that he was following the dictates of nthe good Lord". He denied that 
he had killed anyone and seemed to have a somewhat resigned attitude toward 
his upcoming trial. He said that he felt that the judge and the lawyers knew 
that he was not guilty, but if they wanted to convict him and execute him, that 
it would happen. Although he is obviously somewhat fanatical in his religious 
beliefs, and has based his life on these fanatical beliefs in the last few 
years, it was not possible for me to say that he was psychotic during our inter-
view. 
At the time of his admission, Ron Lafferty had been confused in that he felt he 
had never left the Utah State Hospital. He was disoriented as to time by 10 years. 
However, during my interview on January 21, 1985, he did understand the approxi-
mately correct date and the correct year. He complained, however, of memory 
lapses. He said that he could not remember attempting suicide and could not 
imagine that he would have done such a thing. He did not remember being in the 
Utah Valley Hospital whatsoever. His first memory, he said, was of entering our 
hospital. 1 asked him about the charges against him, and he had a general under-
standing that he was charged with the murder of Brenda and Erica Lafferty. 
However, he said that his memory for details was poor. He stated that he did not 
recall clearly the events of July 24, 1984, although he had some general memory 
of what had happened. During our conversation, he seemed quite angry about the 
intrusion of other people, such as Chloe Low, in his family affairs and said at 
one point that this wouldn't have happened if Chloe Low had minded her business. 
DIAGNOSTIC IMPRESSION: 
Axis I: Manic depressive illness 
Axis II: Anti-social traits, paranoid traits, and narcissistic traits 
Axis III: Dimentia and also organic amnestic syndrome 
^eter Heinbecker, M.D. 
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NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT 
CI ient: 
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A. L. C a r l i s l e , Ph.D 
C l in i ca l Psychologist 
Wechsler Adult In te l l igence Scale - Rev, 
(Given by Dr. Robert Howell) 
Halstead-Reitan Neuropsychological Test 
Battery including the fo l l ow ing : 
Category Test 
Tactual Performance Test 
Seashore Rhythm Test 
Speech-Sounds Perception Test 
Finger Osc i l l a t i on Test 
Reitan-Klove Tac t i le Farm Recognition Test 
Reitan-Klove Sensory Perceptual Exam 
Tac t i l e Finger Recognition Test 
F i n t e r - t i p Number Wri t ing Test 
T ra i l Making Test (A and B) 
Strength of Grip Test 
Interview 
Dr. Robert J. Howell 
Utah State Hospital 
Mr. Lafferty is presently in the State Hospi 
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He was given a Neuropsychological Assessment to help determine the pre-
sence of organicity and the severity of such if it is there. 
Background Information: 
Only a brief history was obtained because a more complete history is already 
available through other interviewers. 
Ron stated that he lived in Murray for the first few years of his life and 
then moved to other areas in Salt Lake and then to Mt. Pleasant. He then moved 
to Payson where he started the eighth grade and continued in school until he 
graduated from high school. He comes from an intact family. He said his father 
passed away a year ago from diabetes at the age of 60. He has five brothers and 
two sisters whose ages range from 40 years to 27 years. His father was a chiro-
practer. He said that he had a good relationship with both of his parents. 
Ron indicated that he had no particular problems during his childhood nor 
teenage years. He graduated from high school and spent six months in the Nation-
al Guard. He went on an LDS Mission to Florida and then returned and went to BYU 
for a year. 
He got married on July 5, 1962. He said that he was not positive whether 
or not his wife had followed through on obtaining a divorce but he said that he 
had given her a bill of divorcement about one year ago. He has six children 
whose ages range from nine to 21 years. 
Regarding prior potential neurological problems, Ron said that when he was 
younger he often had headaches on Sundays. He also stated that when he was in 
the fourth grade he had an accident with a piece of equipment which knocked him 
out for a short period of time. He has had no seizures and he does not remember 
any significant neurological problems in the past. 
Assessment Results: 
Ron was relatively quiet but was cooperative throughout the testing. He 
seemed to try hard to succeed on the tests and the results are felt to be valid. 
The WAIS-R was given to him in November and again on January 11th of this 
year. In November he obtained a Verbal IQ score of 118, a Performance IQ score 
of 111 giving him a Full Scale IQ score of 117. The current WAIS gave him a 
Verbal IQ score of 98, a Performance IQ score of 90 giving him a Full Scale IQ 
score of 95. The subtests indicate that the greatest change occurred where con-
centration, confusion and judgment are concerned. 
On the Halstead-Reitan Battery he had significant problems with the Category 
Test, with total time and localization on the TPT Test and with the Speech-Sounds 
Perception Test. He also scored within the brain damaged range on both parts of 
the Trail Making Test. 
Overall, these results would suggest that there are problems with his 
intellectual functioning. He does become confused and has difficulty performing 
tasks that he could perform prior to the hanging incident. This seems to be 
affecting his memory and his judgment. 
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Further review of the data would suggest that possibly the left fronto-
temporal area may be involved. On the TPT Test he was much slower with his right 
hand than with his left. He is also slower with his dominant hand on the Finger Tap-
ping Test and the Strength of Grip Test. On the Sensory-Perceptual Examination 
he had difficulty feeling the stimulus on the back of his right hand because he 
said that it was numb. He doesn't remember this hand having been numb in the past. 
When asked to indicate which finger was touched (with his eyes closed) he made 
four errors with the right hand and one error with the left hand. The Finger-tip 
Number Writing Perception Test indicated three errors on the right hand and one on 
the left. 
Summary: 
The overall results indicate current loss of intellectual functioning, con-
fusion and loss of memory. Regarding the latter, when asked his age, he said he 
was 36 years old. He couldn't explain the discrepancy between that and the age 
calculated from his birth date. It is felt that this deficite and confusion 
could interfere with his ability to cooperate adequately with an attorney or to 
adequately represent himself or his interests in court. It is recommended that 
time be allowed for further restoration of potential intellectual abilities. 
Diagnostic Impression: 
294.10 Organic Brain Syndrome, Dementia 
A.L. Carlisle, Ph.D. 
CIinical Psychology 
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soc ia l Assessment 
IDENTIFYING INFORMATION: Ron Watson Lafferty, a 43-year old, 
divorced, Caucasian male is currently experiencing his second 
admission to the Utah State Hospital. His current weight is 
139 pounds and he stands 5'10" tall. He was formerly admitted 
to the Utah State Hospital on November 5, 1984 and was discharged 
November 27, 1984, having completed a competency evaluation. The 
conclusion of that evaluation was that he was competent to stand 
trial. The reason for this admission is for another competency 
evaluation. 
SOURCES OF INFORMATION: The information for this social history 
update has been obtained from the Court, Utah Valley Hospital, 
Utah County Sheriff's Department, and from observation of the 
patient while experiencing his current hospitalization. 
REASON FOR READMISSION: Mr. Lafferty was admitted to the hospital 
for a second evaluation on January 2, 1985 after having made a 
suicide attempt on December 29, 1984, having attempted to hang 
himself with his t-shirt around his neck and attached to a towel 
rack. The results of tfiis attempted suicide were that he was 
found in an unconscious condition and assessed at that time to 
have no heart beat, nor was he breathing on his own. Immediate 
C.P.R. procedures were implemented and by the time the paramedics 
had arrived, it is reported that his heart was beating on its own, 
but that he required oxygen resuscitation. He was rushed from the 
Utah County Jail to the Utah Valley Hospital, where he was admitted 
under critical condition. There were concerns that due to the 
amount of time he was unconscious and without respiration or 
heartbeat, that there was a possibility of brain damage. An EEG 
that was done on January 2, 1985 prior to his admission to the 
Utah State Hospital from the Utah Valley Hospital was interpreted 
as being severely abnormal because of diffused slowing of the 
background frequencies. That possibly could mean metabolic, 
infectious, tramatic, or vascular etiology. A Cat Scan was also 
done, and it was found to be normal. 
Due to the suicide attempt, the possibility of brain damage, the 
results of the EEG, the appearance of lack of memory loss, and 
also difficulties in motor control, it was determined by the Court 
that another competency evaluation should be done. This evaluation 
began on January 2, 1985 and should be completed on January 23rd. 
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Readmission Note, continued: 
Ron Watson Lafferty 
INFORMATION RELATIVE TO EARLIER ADMISSION: Mr. Lafferty was admitted to the 
Utah State Hospital for the first time on November 5, 1984, having been charged 
with six felony counts. Two of these counts were first degree murder in the 
slaying of his sister-in-law, Brenda Lafferty, and her daughter. The other criminal 
counts included breaking and entering and conspiracy to kill others. The results 
of that evaluation were that he was found competent to stand trial on all counts 
and was returned to the Utah County Jail by the Utah County Sheriff's Department. 
While in jail, on December 29, 1984, he made a suicide attempt by hanging himself. 
Due to that event and the possible damage that the cardiac arrest and the lack of 
oxygen may have caused, we are currently making another competency assessment. 
PERTINENT BACKGROUND INFORMATION: Please refer to prior social history dated 
November 28, 1984. 
ASSESSMENT OF SUICIDE ATTEMPT: On December 29, 1984, Ron attempted to commit 
suicide by hanging himself. He hooked his t-shirt, which was around his neck, over 
a towel rack and then lifting his own legs off the floor, suspended himself until 
he rendered himself unconscious, at which time the full weight of his body continued 
to hang. The actual time hanging is unknown. When he was discovered and reported 
by his brother Dan, the Sheriff's Officers which responded found him to be unconscious 
with no respiration or heartbeat. There had been enough loss of muscle control that 
he had urinated on himself and mucous had been released from his nose. Immediately, 
C.P.R. was rendered initially by the police officers and then after a few moments, 
by a nurse from the mental health in-patient unit next door to the jail. This 
continued until his heart was beating on its own and the paramedics had arrived. 
After the arrival of the paramedics, oxygen was provided and he began to breathe on 
his own also. He was immediately rushed to the Utah Valley Hospital where he 
was put in intensive care and closely observed until his condition stabilized. 
The incident leading up to the hanging seemed to gradually escalate over a period 
of about a week. Just the week prior to his hanging himself, he began to become 
aggitated and claimed to be being possessed by an evil spirit. This aggitation 
was confirmed by his brother and by the jailers who observed him. On December 28, 
Friday, he went to Court for a trial date to be set. After the date had been set, 
and he had been returned to jail, his aggitation increased to a point that he 
attacked Dan, his brother, severely enough that Dan was bleeding from the attack. 
Through that night, he became more depressed, was eating very limitedly, but unable 
to maintain a fast for any extended period of time. Due to the inability to control 
his fasting, he became more discouraged and finally, on the day in question, was 
aggitated enough that Dan was placed in an adjoining cell with the function of 
observing him. During that time, the jailers had occasion to need to talk with Dan 
and while Dan was gone, Ron made the suicide gesture. When Dan returned from being 
interviewed by the jailers, he found him hanging. 
He remained in Utah Valley Hospital after the hanging from December 29th to January 
2nd, being closely observed medically as well as having two officers from the 
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Readmission Note, continued: 
Ron Watson Lafferty 
Utah County Sheriff's Department maintaining surveillance. Initially, he was 
comatose for the first day and a half, and then regained consciousness. After 
regaining consciousness, he appeared to have lost memory, was out of touch with 
reality, and had poor motor control. Enough progress was noted in the Utah Valley 
Hospital, however, they felt that he needed to be placed at the State Hospital 
for evaluation and better security. On January 2, 1985, he was transported to 
the Utah State Hospital, at which time he was noted to not be able to walk without 
assistance, and had great difficulty in recognizing individuals and people by name. 
He had poor recall relative to the immediate past including the last three or four 
year.s, in addition to no memory at all to the hanging incident. Since his admission, 
he has slowly progressed and seems to have gained good control of his physical 
mobility and the memory loss seems to be returning a little at a time. 
POSSIBLE DISCHARGE PLANS: Due to the patient's current condition, it is recommended 
that he is not ready to stand trial and should be found incompetent. He should then 
be returned to the Utah State Hospital for continued treatment and observation until 
competency can be restored. At that time, he should be referred to the Court for 
disposition relative to his criminal case. 
CURRENT PSYCHOSOCIAL ASSESSMENT: The patient, since his admission to the hospital, 
has shown slow steady progress with a return of physical mobility as well as 
memory loss. Currently, due to inconsistencies in his EEG and Cat Scan, and due 
to a 20 point lower score on his I.Q. performance, the patient at this time does not 
appear to be competent to stand trial. Further neurological work-up and readings 
of his EEG need to be done. It would appear at this point that there is organic 
brain damage, with possible dymentia. It is, therefore, recommended that he be 
continued at the Utah State Hospital for treatment, close observation to determine 
if he will improve sufficiently to become competent to stand trial. 
Robert A. VervT'lTe, MSW/CSW 
Administrative Director 
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Date Of Assessment January 4, 1985 
January 5, 1985 
January 6, 1985 
January 11, 1985 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
Competency to proceed 
Interview of patient 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale 
INTRODUCTION: Ronald Lafferty is a 43-year old, divorced Caucasian male who is 
5*10" in height and at time of admission, his weight was listed at 155 pounds, but 
this was probably taken from his first admission at the hospital which occurred 
from November 5, 1984 to November 27, 1984. I think he had lost significant amount 
of weight during the intervening time. He was admitted January 2, 1985 after having 
made a suicide attempt on December 29, 1984 by putting his t-shirt around his neck 
and attaching the t-shirt to a towel rack and hanging himself. An EEG was done on the 
day of admission. I do not see the report of this EEG. However, another one was 
done on January 2, 1985 and it was interpreted as being a severely abnormal EEG 
because of diffuse slowing of the background frequencies and indicated that the 
tracing was consistent with diffuse encephalopathy of metabolic, infectious, traumatic 
or vascular etiology. A CT scan was done. A date is not listed. It was found to 
be normal. 
When Ron first came to the hospital, he had difficulty in walking and had to be 
assisted. As indicated, I saw him on January 4, 1985 briefly. He recognized my 
name at that time, but did not know what the date was and he thought that Richard 
Nixon was President. He knew he had been at this place before, but he was not sure 
what it was. In general, he showed very indifferent affect that is often seen in 
frontal lobe hypoxic patients. I saw him briefly on Saturday, January 5th, 1985, and 
was here when he was visited by his mother, and an aunt and uncle who live in Sandy. 
The next day, Sunday, January 6th, 1985, I asked him if he had visitors yesterday. 
He responded that he knew he had visitors but he couldn't tell me who they were. On 
a number of occasions, he told me that his younger brother, Tim, had been to visit 
him, but never came up with his mother and aunt and uncle's names. Also, on Saturday, 
January 5th, 1985, when I was there, he was trying to get dressed and for a number 
of minutes continued to try to put his head through the armhole of his t-shirt, and 
did not seem to recognize that things weren't: working just right. He then continually 
got distracted in pulling his pants up. Both of these I interpret as indicative of 
a organic brain syndrome. 
He has improved and today, January 11, 1985, he told me that his aunt and uncle had 
been to visit him just yesterday, when in fact it was on January 5th. He was much 
more stable on his feet and his affect has improved. He allowed us to give him the 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale revised edition when he was here in November and 
December. On this test, he achieved a verbal I.Q. of 118, a performance or non-verbal 
I.Q. of 111, and a full scale I.Q. of 117. Today I repeated this test. He remembered 
having taken the test before. There was a lot more scatter in the test than there had 
been before. He obtained a verbal I.Q. of 98, some 20 points lower than he had been 
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PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT, CONTINUED 
RONALD WATSON LAFFERTY 
Date of Assessment 
before. His performance I.Q. was 90, 21 points lower than his previous performance 
I.Q., and his full scale I.Q. was 95, which was 22 points lower than his previous 
I.Q. score. 
We will have a neurological consultation on him and ask the neurologist to also 
look at the EEG from the Utah Valley Hospital so we have serial EEG' s. It is my 
impression at this point that we are dealing with an organic brain syndrome with 
dementia and amnesia problems, which is secondary to cardiac arrest and anoxia to 
the brain which was caused by a suicide attempt. It will be interesting to follow 
Ron and see how much he improves. Dr. Carlisle will start a neuropsychological 
examination on Ron this afternoon. 
ROBERT J. HOfcklL, Ph.D. 
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quest Cerebral Hypoxia 
Complaints 
Injury Is Chloral Hydrate Sedatior Permissable9 • YES • NO 
>iogicai signs tentative diagnosis, 
and other relevant data 
;TROENCEPHALOGRAM REPORT.-
INTRODUCTION: This stucjy was performed on a 43 year-old male who has a hypoxic 
encephalopathy ceoondary to a suicide attempt by hanging. The patient 1s currently 
on Vallum, Dilantin and Morphine. 
PROCEDURE: The tracing was obtained using 22 disc electrodes, which were placed 
1n the 10-20 International System of measurement» with scalp to scalp and scalp 
to ear montages. The patient was not sedated. He was confused and stuporous 
throughout the recording. 
DESCRIPTION: The background 
present throughout all deriva 
present frontally and central 
12 Hz activity is present in 
add the tracing regains It's 
characteristic of stage II si 
tracing slows further and del 
theta previously described. 
abnotmal16ifcs. 
rhythm is made up of a 4Hz theta activity which is 
tions. There 1s a }c*^ amplitude 25Hz beta activity 
ly. When the patient appears to be most arroused, a 
the central regions. This disappears rapidly, however, 
baseline frequency previously described. No features 
eep were noted during the recording. At times the 
ta frequencies are noted intermixed with the 4Hz 
There were no focal, lateralized or epileptiform 
INTERPBETATIBN: This 1s a severely abnormal EEG because of diffuse slowing of the 
background frequencies. The characteristics of this tracing are consistent with 
a diffuse encephalopathy of metabolic, infectious, traumatic or vascular etiology. 
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ame X-Rav No. Date 
Last First Middle 
OP D r . H e i r b e c h e r ( f t . ^ : \ - ' 
oom No. Hi fcnvT 2h\^ci 'n 
BRAIN CT: 
Unenhanced and enhanced scans she: no significant change since the previous two 
studies of 12 November and 29 Deccrber, 1984. 
There are no identifiable ar<~:.c cf infarcticn. T..3 enhancing ^essols appear 
normal. I to intxapr-rencbT/al or subarachnoid hk~3rrai ~o is present. 
EIPREESIC:: ITc-cative brcin scan, uncharged frc^. 2° rcccrber 1984. 
DENNIS 7. HTASTCN, M.D. 
DICHkr/l' Jan 
X-R.i\ I),;, <t: .-nt 
Rif RADIOLOGY REPORT 
U'AH VALLEY 
bGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER 1034 NORTH 5TH WEST/PROVO, UTAH 84603/PHONE (801) 373-7850 
LAFFERTY, RONALD W. 07 49 62 14 J a n 1985 
arae _X-Ray No Date 
Last First -Middle 
OP Dr. Heinbecker (St. Hosp.) 
OOm No . R^fpimng Phyxinan 
BRAIN CT: 
TJnenhanoed and enhanced scans show no significant-change -sinoe the previous two 
studies of 12 "Novercber .aad 29 "December * 1984. 
There are T*D identifiable areas of infarction. The enhancing vessels appear 
normal. No intraparenchymal or subarachnoid hemorrahge is present. 
IMPRESSION: Negative brain scan, unchanged ircm 29 December 1984. 
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UTAH STATE HOSPITAL 
PROVO, UTAH 
REPORT OF ELECTROENCEPHALOGRAPHY 
LAFFTERY, Ron 
02-7724-02 
Forensic Security (56) 
EEG 85-003 
January 14, 1985 
This is a thirty-minute recording in the awake 6tate. 
EEG DESCRIPTION: The dominant activity in the awake eyes-closed state is 
somewhat irregular mixtures of six-to-nine-cycles-per-second theta and 
alpha waves. Rhythmic posterior rhythms around eight cycles per second 
are frequently present shortly after eye closure. There are no signifi-
cant inter-hemispheric asymmetries. Drowsiness apparently develops ra-
pidly with eye closure, and the dominant rhythms drop towards six-to-se-
ven-cycles-per-second theta. Stage two did develop following prolonged 
drowsiness. Following arousal, the patient's occipital rhythms were 
somewhat better organized and slightly faster in frequency. At times 
eight-to-nine-cycles-per-second alpha rhythm dominated the rhythm, but 
there remained a tendency for intermittent slowing into the seven-or-
eight-cycles-per-second range. Hyperventilation and photic stimulation 
produced no unusual effect. No seizure activity occurred. 
EEG INTERPRETATION: The patient's dominant rhythm is slightly disorga-
nized and not as rhythmical as his previous EEG of November 12, 1984. 
In addition, the dominant rhythm has slowed at times into the low-normal 
or slightly slow range. This suggests the development of a difuse en-
cephalopathy of a mild degree since his previous recording. There are 
no localizing features and no epileptiform features. 





NLUROLOGIC CONSULTATION NOTE DATE OF 
CONSULTAT ION January 23, 1985 
CHIEF COMPLAINT 
Post-anoxic encephalopathy. 
HISTORY OF PRESENT ILLNESS 
The patient is a 43-year-old white male who attempted 6uicide December 29, 1984. He was 
found hanging by the neck without pulse or respiration. He was resuscitated and taken to 
Utah Valley Regional Medical Center. Notes from that hospital document decerebrate activit; 
on admission. He did not wake up until the next day. When he woke up on;December 31, he 
was confused without good memory. He was transferred here January 2 with an EEG on that da; 
showing difuse slowing in the four-cycles-per-second theta range. 
Since arrival here the patient has been observed to be forgetful, although this seems to be 
improving somewhat. No seizures have occurred. The patient has no subjective complaints o: 
headaches, double vision, or weakness. He does say that he feels a little clumsy or dizzy. 
He admits he is forgetful. He thinks his forgetfulness is becoming less and less noticeable 
Ee says that since coming here he has noticed a numbness on the left neck and ear area whicl 
is improving. He noticed numbness in both hands which is improving and much more limited ii 
distribution. It currently involves just the dorsum of his thumb and index finger on both 
hands. 
PHYSICAL EXAMINATION 
The patient has normal scalp and neck exam. There is no papilledema. 
Mental Status - The patient is alert and oriented to himself, place, and time. He knew it 
was approximately the 20th of January but did not know the exact day of the month. The pa-
tient speaks fluently without aphasic mistakes. There is no dysarthria. His reading is 
somewhat labored, and he did make some paraphrasic substitutions during the paragraph that 
he read. He did not read with much retention and later could remember only the general sub-
ject of the paragraph rather than any details. He has no trouble with agraphia, and there 
is no evidence of motor ataxia in either hand. His memory is somewhat impaired. He remem-
bered only one of three objects at five minutes. He is able to retain memory of recent 
major events. He remembers the President's inauguration, the Super Bowl, and the beauty 
contest on TV last night, he remembers quite a few details of these events. He still has 
poor memory for the events surroudning his return to this hospital. The patient's thought 
processes are somewhat more rambling than I remember. His thinking has some paranoid flavoi 
When I asked him about his current legal situation, he said that people were trying to advar 
their careers by persecuting him. His thought processes appear very egocentric. He says 
that society is abrasive to him. 
Cranial Nerves - Cranial nerves were unremarkable. Extraoccular movements, pupils, retinal 
examination, facial sensation and strength, tongue protrusion, palate elevation, and hearing 
were normal. 
Motor examination revealed no focal atrophy or weakness. There was no spasticity or rigidit 
Sensory examination revealed subjective decline in sensation to the lateral left neck in the 
distribution of several upper cervical roots. He also had subjective sensory loss on the 
UTAH STATE HDSPITAL 
NEUROLOGIC CONSULTATION NOTE 
li<3~l_9£-n9A^ P a w 1 o f 2 
PATIENT** LAFFERTY, Ron 
IDENTIFICATION** 02-7724-02 
NEUROLOGIC CONSULTATION NOTE DATE OF 
CONSULTATION januarv 23. 19RS 
dorsum of his hands involving a limited area around the thumb and index finger. There was 
no sensory loss in the lower extremities. 
Cerebellar examination revealed no past-pointing or dysmetria. He did have a very subtle 
clumsiness on hopping but could do this without loss of balance. He could walk in place 
with his eyes closed without turning. Tandem gait was a little effortful and with extra 
balancing movements, but he did not lose balance. This appears worse than in November of 
1984. 
Deep tendon reflexes Tevealed somewhat hypoactive biceps reflexes comapred to his brisk leg 
reflexes. Babinski signs were absent. Frontal release signs were absent. 
EEG 
EEG January 14, 1985, shows a dominant rhythm which is somewhat irregular and slightly slowc 
than his previous EEG in November of 1984. The dominant rhythm is now in the seven-to-nine-
cycles-per-second range. This represents a decline from his normal EEG of November 1984. 
It represents an improvement since his EEG report of December 29 with dominant ryhthm at fou 
cycles per second. There are no lateralizing features and no epileptiform features. 
CT scans have been performed in November of 1984, December of 1984, and January of 1985. 
These are all reported as normal and showing no changes. 
ASSESSMENT 
The patient has post-anoxic encephalopathy. The duration of anoxia was certainly enough to 
cause severe difuse cortical dysfunction initially with coma and decerebration. Her has 
made substantial improvement but still has evidence of memory impairment. There is also 
the possibility of mild frontal-lobe impairment with less judgement. Mild organic changes 
in the personality might be expected to exacerbate pre-existing tendencies towards egocen-
tricity, impulsiveness, and lack of judgement. There is also evidence of mild neurological 
sequela from his neck injury. He probably developed stretch or contusion of the upper cer-
vical roots bilaterally. This has produced some subtle sensory involvement to the left 
neck and hands which is resolving and does not significantly impair his strength or coordi-
nation. There is also likely to have been some mild anoxic damage to the cerebellum because 
of the new development of mild mid-line cerebellar ataxia. 
No specific treatment is available. Progressive improvement in his mental capacities, memory 
and balance may continue for three to six months. 
THOMAS HOUTS, MD 
Neurologist 
/ea 
Dictated 1-23-85; typed 1-24-85 
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EXHIBIT 6 
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UTAH STATE HOSPITAL 
100 Years 0( Service 
March 19, 196 5 
Honorable J. Robert Bullock 
Fourth Judicial District Court Judge 
Utah County Building 
Prcvc, Utah 846C1 
Re: Rcr.alc Watson Lafferty 
Case No. 9509 
Dear Judge Bullock: 
We are submitting this report on the condition of Ronald Lafferty 
as required in your January 28, 1985 Court Order. On January 28, 1985, 
Mr. Lafferty was found by the Court to be "not competent to proceed." 
Since hospitalized, his treatment has consisted of individual and group 
counseling. He has adamently refused treatment with psychotropic medi-
cation. 
Since our January 22, 1985 report to the Court, the signs of diffuse 
organic brain syndrcme which we described have partially resolved and 
coincident with that, his personality structure and his demeanor have 
come to approximate his condition prior to December 29, 1984. However, 
as he has become more lucid and expressive, the pervasive religiosity 
which was present during cur evaluation in November, 1984, has developed 
into a religious delusional system which is associated with blurred ecc 
boundaries. He is unable to determine the boundaries between hir.se] f and 
good and evil spirits and is unable to comprehend that those involved :n 
this evaluation, cr the Court processes GO net function within his 
delusional system. At this time, we feel that these symptoms are the 
result of paranoia. Further symptoms of this disorder include a paranoid 
delusional systen which has generalized to include the entire judicial 
system, a paranoid pseudo-comm.jni t y involving the legal and social systems, 
grandiose denial, a religious martyr complex, and severely impaired ability 
to perceive and interpret reality. Although Mr. Lafferty's memory and 
recall have improved during this hospitalization, because of his unwilling-
ness to honestly discuss this, we cannot accurately deterrine to what 
extent his memory has returned. 
S o c i a l S e r v i c e s . - » . . , <.-..-• S h - - r S : ^ EcD S^C*- iieneer.: 
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Pace Tvc 
Honoral^c J. Robert Bullock 
March 19, 1981 
Fe: Ronald Watson Lafferty 
As to the specific questions surrounding "competency to proceed," our 
opinion is as follows: 
1) Does he have a mental illness? 
The answer to this is yes. He is suffering from an amnestic syndrome, 
secondary to encephalopathy caused by the hanging attempt on December 29, 
198A, as well as paranoia. 
2) Does he comprehend the nature of the proceedings against him or the 
punishment specified for the offenses charged? 
While he has a factual understanding ci the proceedings, he does not have 
a rational understanding. Our opinion en this question :s no. 
2) Can he assist his counsel in his defense? 
Cur opinion on this question is also nc. He is very clear and adament that 
he does not intend to use a lawyer in any way. Further, it is our belief 
that he does have a mental illness in addition to the amnestic syndrome 
that we have already talked about, that of paranoia. His revelation which 
adds to the Mosiah Hancock revelation of the 19th Century is certainly 
reflective of Messianic grandiosity. Further, he is convinced that the 
judicial system and the hospital are in collusion with each other, and 
agents of corrupt man-made law. It is really us (including Court) who are 
on trial (from God) and not him. Finally, it is impossible for him to see 
the inconsistency of his objecting to others infringing on his liberty and 
an entitlement from God allowing him tc infringe on the liberty of others. 
We believe that Mr. Lafferty cannot cooperate with a lawyer, if he agreed 
to representation. He has further made it very clear that he has absolutely 
nc intention of cooperating with, or participating in, any Court processes. 
Our opinion regarding competency is further confirmed by the "Dusky" 
standard (Dusky v. 'Jr.: zee States, 1960) in which the Unted States S^rrere 
COwit ar,T>rcved as a standard for Federal cases as being: 
The defendant has sufficient present ability to consult 
with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational under-
standing and whether he has a rational as well as a factual 
understanding of the proceedings against him. 
We believe that Mr. Lafferty does not have the aizility to consult with 
a lawyer with a reasonable degree of rationa1 understanding, and does not 
have a rational understanding of the proceedings against him. 
Face Three 
Honors!le J. Robert Pullock 
March 19, 1985 
Re: Ronald Watson Lafferty 
Based on this information, it is our recommendation that the Court 
continue Mr. Lafferty's current commitment as. "not competent to proceed." 
We further specifically find that: 
a) Mr. Lafferty at this time has a mental illness as defined in 
Utah Code Annotated 64-7-28(1), 
b) Because of Mr. Lafferty's mental illness he poses an immediate 
physical danger to himself and ethers which includes jeopardizing 
his own safety, 
c) Mr. Lafferty lacks the ability to engage in a rational decision 
making process regarding the acee;-t tr.ee of rental treatment as 
demonstrated by evidence cf inability tc weigh the possible costs 
ar.c benefits of treatment, 
d: There is nc arrroiriate treatrer.t alternative at this tire to 
treatment at the Utah State Hospital, and 
e) The Utah State Hospital can provide Mr. Lafferty with treatment, 
care, and custody that is adequate and appropriate to his conditions 
and needs. 
In view of these specific findings, we are respectfully requesting a 
Court Order directing the Utah State Hospital to provide Mr. Lafferty with 
appropriate medical treatment, including psychotropic medication, which may 
include involuntary treatment. 
Van 0. Aus t i n , M.D. 
Clinical and Forensic Psychiatry 
i 
Robert J. Howell, Ph.D. 
Clinical and Forensic Psychology 
Peter Hcmbecker, M.D.,J.D. 
Clinical ar.c Forensic Psychiatry 
L v<. •- ^ . A / : ( ^ - ^ ^ L 
C. Jess Groesbeck, M.D. 
Utah State Hospital Clinical Dircczcr 
EXHIBIT 7 
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two counts of aggravated burglary, and two counts of 
conspiracy to commit murder; he knows and understands 
the penalties prescribed and he knows and understands 
that he could be given the death penalty although he 
may not believe it will occur, he understands that there 
will be a trial, that there will be a judge on the bench, 
a prosecutor present who will try to convict him of 
criminal charges; knows and understands that he has a 
lawyer appointed for him who will undertake to defend 
him against those charges; he knows he will be expected, 
if he so chooses, to tell his lawyer the circumstances, 
to the best of his ability, of the facts surrounding him 
at the time and place where the law violations are alleged 
to have occurred; he knows that there will be a jury 
present to pass upon the evidence adduced as to his guilt 
or innocence of such charges; that he has sufficient 
mamory of material events that with the aid of memory 
reconstruction techniques he can relate these things in 
his own personal manner if he chooses to do so. 
3. Although the defendant may be operating 
within a paranoid delusional system, there is no evidence, 
except a suicide attempt, of irrational behavior within 
that system or within the system of his religious beliefs. 
In fact, his refusal to cooperate, assist counsel or admit 
that he is amenable to the laws of the State of Utah are 
all consistent with his paranoia and any delusional system 
pertaining to religion. 
4. Although not requested by the Court to do so, 
-8-
the Hospital examiners made findings in their report 
dated March 19, 1985, pertaining to matters of involun-
tary commitment. For the time being and until a further 
hearing in the matter, the Court accepts those findings 
as follows: 
(a) Mr. Lafferty at this time has a mental illness 
as defined in Utah Code Annotated 64-7-28(1) (However, 
such mental illness does not result either in his inability 
to comprehend the nature of the proceedings against him 
or the punishment specified for the offenses charged; 
or in his inability to assist counsel in his defense.) 
(b) Because of Mr. Laffertyfs mental illness he poses 
an immediate physical danger to himself and others which 
includes jeopardizing his own safety. 
(c) Mr. Lafferty lacks the ability to engage in a 
rational decision making process regarding the acceptance 
of mental treatment as demonstrated by evidence of in-
ability to weigh the possible costs and benefits of treat-
ment. 
(d) There is no appropriate treatment alternative at 
this time to treatment at the Utah State Hospital. 
(e) The Utah State Hospital can provide Mr. Lafferty 
with treatment, care, and custody that is adequate and 
appropriate to his conditions and needs. 
OBSERVATIONS 
All of the examiners who testified stated that 
in their opinion the defendant knew he was in court, that 
EXHIBIT 8 
Scott M Matheson Governor State of Utah 
Norman G Angus. Executive Director 
November 27, 1984 
Honorable J. Robert Bullock 
Judge of the Fourth Judicial District 
Utah County Building 
Provo, Utah 84601 
RE: LAFFERTY, RONALD WATSON 
Case No. 9309 
Dear Judge Bullock: 
We have completed our evaluation of Ronald Watson Lafferty, whom 
you committed to this hospital on November 5, 1984 for an evaluation 
and a report to the Court as stipulated in the Utah Code Annotated 
77-15-3. Our evaluation has consisted of multiple psychiatric inter-
views, physical examination, psychological assessment, electroence-
phalogram, computerized tomographic brain scan, neurological evaluation, 
review of extensive collateral information, observation of his function-
ing in the treatment setting and presentation before the clinical staff. 
During this evaluation, Mr. Lafferty has been very appropriate and 
cooperative, except for a limited willingness to participate in formal 
psychological testing. The opinions as set forth below are based on 
these facts. 
We find that Mr. Lafferty is not mentally ill. His thought 
processes, mood, affect, and ability to perceive and interpret reality 
are each appropriate. Although he clearly has fundamentalist religious 
beliefs and a fervent interest in a strict interpretation of constitu-
tional law, we feel that these do not approach the level of a thought 
disorder. He specifically does not meet the diagnostic criteria for 
"paranoia" or paranoid schizophrenia. Further, although he does have 
paranoid traits, these are associated with his religious beliefs and 
are not present to the threshold which is required to meet the diagnostic 
criteria for "paranoid personality disorder." There is evidence by 
history of the possibility of a bipolar affective disorder, but presently 
there are no signs or symptoms compatible with this diagnosis nor have 
there been for the past several years. 
State Hospital I 300 East Center 




Honorable J. Robert Bullock 
November 27, 1984 
We find him to be competent to stand trial at this time in that he 
has the ability to comprehend the nature of the charges against him and 
the punishment specified for the offense charged and has the ability to 
assist his counsel in his defense. We specifically find that Mr. Ronald 
Lafferty: 1) does not now suffer from a mental disease or defect, 2) 
has the ability to comprehend the nature of the proceedings against him 
and the punishment specified for the offenses charged, and 3) has the 
ability to assist counsel in his defense. 
It is our recommendation that he be returned to the jurisdiction of 
the Court for further disposition. 
Sincerely, 
VAN 0. AUSTIN, M.D. 
Forensic Psychiatrist 
ROBERT J. HOWELL, Ph.D. 
Clinical and Forensic Psychology 
PETER HEINBECKER, M.D. 
Clinical Director Forensic Psychiatry 
JESS GROESBECK, M.D. 
Medical Director 
hh 
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IN TOE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
-vs-
RQNALD WATSON LAFFERTY and 
DAN CHARLES LAFFERTY, 
Defendants. 
PETITION TO DETERMINE 
COMPETENCY 
Case No. 9309 
Comes now your petitioner, Wayne B. Watson, Chief Deputy Utah County 
Attorney, and files this Petition pursuant to Utah Code Annotated section 
77-15-1 et seq. in order to have the Court determine whether or not defendant 
Ronald Watson Lafferty is presently competent to proceed to trial. 
This Petition is based on the Affidavit of your petitioner suhxnitted 
herewith. 
Dated this 2nd day of January, 1985. 
WAYNE B^/WATSON 
Que£>fleputy County Attorney 
K VMS', /, j%£-
(• 
NCftLL T. WOOTTON 
UTAii COUNTY ATTORNEY 
ROOM 107, OOUNTY BUILDING 
PROVO, UTAH 84601 
TELEPHONE: 373-5510 ext. 320 
IN TOE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR UTAH OOUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
-vs-
RONALD WATSON LAFFERTY and 
DAN CHARLES LAFFERTY, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION TO DETERMINE 
COMPETENCY 
Case No. 9309 
Cones now your affiant, Wayne B. Watson, Chief Deputy Utah County 
Attorney, under oath and states as follows: 
1. That he is the prosecuting attorney in the above-entitled matter. 
2. That upon information and belief he alleges that defendant, Ronald 
Watson Lafferty, on Saturday, December 29, 1984, attempted suicide by hanging 
himself by the neck at the Utah County Jail. That there is some question 
outstanding as to whether or not defendant Lafferty suffered lack of oxygen to 
the brain for a period of time. 
3. That your affiant has discussed this incident with defendant's 
treating physicians, Dr. A. Tracy Hill and Dr. Allen T. Hunstock. Based upon 
those conversations it is the opinion of your affiant that it would be 
appropriate that Ronald Watson Lafferty be recommitted to the Utah State 
Hospital for a period of not to exceed 20 days for examination and evaluation in 
order to determine whetner or not the reports previously rendered by the 
examining doctors are still the same with regard to his: 
1. Ability to comprehend the nature of the proceedings 
against him or the punishment specified for the offense 
charged; or 
2. His ability to assist counsel in his defense. 
4. Your affiant further advises the Court that he is informed by the 
treating physicians that the defendant is now ready for immediate release and 
transfer to the Utah State Hospital, 
Dated this 2nd day of January, 1985. 
WAYNE BOtaTSQN 
Chief Deputy County Attorney 
Subscribed and sworn to before me a Notary Public, this 2nd day of 
January, 1985. 
Residing at: Utah County, Utah 
My Canmission Expires: 3-20-85 
0 
EXHIBIT 10 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ " 
The relevant parts of the law of the State of Utah 
sets forth aggravating and mitigating factors for your con-
sideration as follows: 
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES 
1. "The homicide was committed incident to one 
act, scheme, course of conduct, or criminal episode during 
which two or more persons are killed." 
2. ,fThe homicide was committed in an especially 
heinous, atrocious, cruel, or exceptionally depraved manner, 
any of which must be demonstrated by physical torture, 
serious physical abuse, or serious bodily injury of the 
victim before death.11 
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES 
1. tfThe defendant has no significant history of 
prior criminal activity." 
2. "The murder was committed while the defendant 
was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional dis-
turbance. " 
3. "The defendant acted under extreme duress or 
under the substantial domination of another person." 
4. "At the time of the murder, the capacity of 
the defendant to appreciate the criminal wrongfulness of 
his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements 
